


THE JEWISH DILEMMA



ELMER BERGER

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THE JEWISH DILEMMA

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by

ELMER BERGER

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*In deep and lasting appreciation and admiration
of*

LESSING J. ROSENWALD

who, by providing a leadership based upon principle and courage, has pointed the way out of the dilemma that has plagued his fellow Jews and, who, together with those who have joined him in the fellowship of the American Council for Judaism, has set a standard for Jews in the pattern of tomorrow's better world.



Acknowledgments



*T*he genealogy of an idea and a philosophy is almost as varied as the valued contacts and friendships of one's life. Here, I can express my sense of indebtedness to only a few of those who, in diverse ways and sometimes, unknowingly, contributed to my thinking about the problem with which this book is concerned.

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Council for Judaism, Mr. Sidney Wallach. Indeed, I am grateful to the whole membership of the Council, which, for the first time in history, has made possible an organization dedicated to independent and clear thinking about, and the propagation of the idea of, Jews as emancipated and integrated citizens of the countries in which they live or hope to live.

And finally, I am grateful to Mr. Coley Taylor for his reading of the manuscript and his preparation of it for publication.

There are others. I hope they may feel in some measure repaid in the degree to which this book leads to normality for the lives of Jews by encouraging normal approaches to their problems.

E. B.

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PART I—The Myth of “a Jewish People”



A letter which came to me not long ago from a professor in one of this country's largest universities says, "Jews don't know themselves what they want—they fight too much among themselves. Since Jews don't know what they want, they are misunderstood by Christians. In misunderstanding men are prone to fear and when they fear they do desperate things. This is not to minimize the troubles of Jews but to explain that because of confusion over what they want many of us Christians do not know how to help."

This book is written to answer his letter. It is an attempt to explain why Jews are confused about themselves and thus acknowledges their part in the confusion of Christians about them. It will not—as it cannot—excuse the treatment that Jews have met, even by a confused world. No confusion justifies mass murder and pillage and degradation.

But, if this book can explain the reasons for the confusion, it may help to cure the trouble commonly called "the Jewish problem," and thereby be a service not alone to Jews but to all men.

So I write about Jews, in the faith that many men—

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not all, but many—now feel moral indignation at the crimes perpetrated against Jews. I write in the further faith that many of those same men will try to do something for the Jews in the days beyond this war, when people hopefully turn to the task of building a better, if not the perfect, world.

I shall therefore not linger over the long, arduous, tragic history of Jews. For I am less concerned with what Jews have been or are, than what they hope to become. I do not want to weep over the past. Men of good will are fighting this war for another chance at a decent life. And I am concerned with the opportunities Jews may have in that chance.

Therefore, this will not be yet another scientific diagnosis of the Jewish problem, frequently called “anti-Semitism.” Such scientific diagnoses have been made. For those who want to read and understand them the clinical data are available. The point is: what are people going to do about it after they know the sociological roots of their hates and prejudices and irrationalities? And the further point is: what do Jews themselves want to do, and have others do, about it?

More books have been written about Jews in the last ten years than ever before. Yet everywhere around me I hear the dire predictions that, after the war, anti-Semitism will be more virulent than ever. I do not believe this will be so. If it is, then we shall have fought this terrible war for a worse, not a better world. But I do not know for sure, any more than do the prophets of despair. And if I do not indulge here in great detail as to the tragic past of the Jew, it is only fair that I not indulge in my own optimistic appraisals of his future.

I am not interested in time, neatly divided. I am interested really in human beings, and for the purposes of this book, the human beings who are known as Jews. Who are they? What do they want?

On that plane I think other Jews and men of good will are interested in the so-called “Jewish” problem. I do not believe that in dealing with Jews in trouble, we are dealing with ghosts—even resplendent ghosts—out of an admittedly

long and martyred and creative tradition. History has made Jews what they are just as it has made all men what they are. We are all, every one of us, Christian, Jew or pagan, the product of our own tradition, inheritors of its particular beauty, glory, tragedy, mediocrity, and shame and limitation. But that is not all we are. We are also the product of our hope and aspiration. This book is written in the faith that these latter qualities can be as powerful in the shaping of human destiny as those that look to and derive from only the past. If we do not believe that, there is no hope for progress beyond the dull mechanistic philosophies.

The Western world, especially in the last few decades, has become increasingly confused about the status of Jews—whether or not they should be considered as a “separate people” or a “race.” Jews themselves, no less than Christians, have been, and are, confused about it. A Jewish periodical *The Reconstructionist*, editorialized on this subject some time ago as follows: “We have not yet determined whether we are to use the term race, religion, nation or culture to clarify the nature of our Jewish entity and identity.”

Anthropologists and other scientists are generally agreed that Jews are not a separate race, but are ancestrally of the Mediterranean family stocks that spread out in pre-history times over much of Eastern Asia, North Africa, and Europe. All of these various tribes from the most ancient generations have moved about and intermarried throughout the long centuries of unrecorded and written history, and have produced the modern Europeans. In cultural background, in local history, in language, in religion, in political and economic organization there have been, and are, many differences, but these differences are not “racial,” as anthropologists would define the term, but rather cultural and environmental. Jews have lived among all of these resultant cultures and environments. They have been part of all of them.

The Nazis opposed these teachings with their blood-cult theory of a master race and its convenient-for-Nazis corol-

lary that others made up inferior races fit only for slave-like subjection or extermination. This view the world at large has violently rejected, fighting with untold sacrifice and nobility to defend the principles of human brotherhood.

I do not propose to trace the history of the development of the Nazi sophistries from their beginnings in tribalism and provincial nationalism, for many books have been written that supply this information, amply documented, interestingly explained, books essential to our understanding of forces active in bringing world society to its present crisis. I can only discuss here the confusion in thought produced by these forces as they affect the relationship of the average Jew and his non-Jewish neighbor.

All over the land, in forums, at dinner-table conversations, in the newspapers and magazines, in books, and pamphlets, even in newspaper advertising, problems facing Jews and attitudes towards these problems are being discussed, with a great deal of perplexity.

Let us look at some of the questions—questions that often seem to be riddles.

"Jews as well as others denounce the Nazi race ideas, yet some Jews subscribe to the notion that they are a separate people or race whose problems can only be solved by the establishment of a country of their own. If this is so, how does this concept differ from the implications of the Nazi theory that Jews are eternally different—an unintegratable element?"

"If Jews really want a nation of their own in Palestine, are they genuinely interested in the countries of which they are citizens? This question seems, and is, insulting to the memories of the battlefield heroes of Jewish faith—but so deep is the confusion over Jewish aspirations that it is often implied, and while it does not impugn the character or nature of the individual Jew who has given himself actually or potentially as a sacrifice to the cause of his native land, the distrust is there in so far as Jews generally are concerned."

"If the Jews want a separate nation, why can't they

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be satisfied with some other section of the world than Palestine? Don't they realize that Palestine is a center of conflict—that it is a Holy Land for Christians and Mohammedans as well as for Jews, and that the Arabs, who have been in possession for two thousand years, look upon any Jewish State there with dismay, and that fear of this has already caused riots, and is agitating the whole vast Moslem world? Don't the Jews realize they are only courting trouble by demanding Palestine? Do they *want* to live on a hot griddle?"

"None of my friends who are Jews want to go to Palestine. They consider themselves Americans. Is it the European Jews who want to settle there? But won't most of the surviving European Jews want to continue to live in Europe after the war? Or in the countries which were a refuge to them?"

"If the Jewish spokesmen insist on Palestine, why do they demand a Jewish State? Can't they work out some co-operative scheme with the Arabs and govern it without distinction as to creed or race? If the Arabs won't play ball that way, what's the use? There'll never be anything but conflict and antagonism—conflict that will not remain a matter between Arabs and Jews, but one that will involve all the nations with a Mediterranean interest and relations with the Mohammedan world. In other words, that conflict has global implications that look very grim. Don't the Jewish leaders who urge Palestine as a solution realize all this?"

"I understand that a large number of American Jews donate money to the Palestine cause. Is that just to help refugees, or is it because they are really interested in founding a Jewish State?"

"Isn't it a curious thing, and tragically ironic, that Zionists and extreme anti-Semites agree on the same solution—*isolate the Jews in a country of their own?*"

"I don't understand all this 'peculiar people' stuff. My Jewish friends are all ordinary folks, and they don't want to go to Palestine or any other country to live. They've been *here* for generations, and don't seem strange or mysterious to me, any more than anybody else is. But it seems every book I pick up about Jews stresses the 'strange people' angle—they're too complicated to understand, a race of mystics; you'd think they were the men from Mars or something. I don't know anybody like that."

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"If Palestine were a large, unsettled area, rich enough in natural resources to sustain a large population, it might make *some sense*. But there must be ten million Jews. They can't *all* go there, if they wanted to!"

"Giving Palestine back to the Jews, after the Arabs have had it for 2000 years is about as complicated as giving Manhattan back to the Indians, isn't it?"

"I was talking to a friend of mine the other day—he's a Jew, and his son is over on Okinawa now with the Marines. He's very pessimistic about the future, and he's all for Zionism now. He thinks it's the only long-range solution to anti-Semitism. He doesn't want to go to Palestine, but—"

These queries and attitudes are, I believe, typical, and they present only a few samples of the confusion about problems facing Jews and their fellow-citizens who want to help them. Part of the confusion, it seems to me, stems from the false and romantic emphasis on the "strangeness" of the Jew.

I do not surrender to the "stranger than fiction" thesis; the history of Jews is not inexplicably strange. There are rational explanations for every chapter in the history of Jews. Within the last century we have learned how to approach the Bible with reason and it has not become less valuable as a spiritual dynamo to those who understand the forces that produced its poets, its prophets, its theologians, its heroes, and its villains.

So, too, with the Jews and their history. Too many people, when they sit down to talk or write about Jews, do so as if they were about to taste something exotic; both Jews and Christians, good and bad, have overdone this strangeness, this bizarreness, about Jews and their history.

This will not be that kind of a book.

I will not use terms like "chosen people," and "God-intoxicated" and "kingdom of priests." These are fine, exhortatory words to hurl at Jews on their Days of Atonement. But as I know Jews, these terms are no more accurately descriptive

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of them as human beings than they are of Christians or Buddhists.

Insofar as I know it, I want to use the language of the average Jew. Who is he? What does he want? What does he think of efforts he himself and others have made to accomplish what he wants? What hope is there to realize his dream?

These are the impulses of all human beings—and it is with human beings that this book is concerned. The way in which I have begun leads me to anticipate some criticisms. From my experience I am sure they will be made and I will try to answer them at the outset, to make my position clear.

These are the anticipated criticisms:

- (1) Jews cannot be divorced from their history.

MY ANSWER: I am not divorcing Jews from their history. Jews today are no closer to Jeremiah than are their Christian neighbors. Jeremiah is a part of the heritage of the western world, of which the Jew is also a part. It is an injustice to today's Jew to make of him a carbon copy of great and visionary men in his past. There are a few Jeremiahs among Jews today and a few among Christians and a few among Mohammedans. They are a high measure of the moral evolution of man. They no more make Jews bizarre, exotic and a "holy people" than similar spirits among Christians or Mohammedans make all Christians and Mohammedans strange, exotic or "holy."

Secondly, too much effort has been made to place the history of Jews on a strange, mystifying level and too little effort made to explain it in terms of the forces that have moved and are still moving through all human history.

- (2) You write as if there were no such thing as a special "Jewish people" with special problems requiring special solutions.

MY ANSWER: I find nothing to support the thesis that there is such an entity as a "Jewish people" except in the sense that among all Jews there are certain similarities of religious belief and practice. Perhaps, added to this religious meaning of the term there is a heightened sense of responsibility to other Jews in times of suffering. When I discuss these

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"common-man," or average Jews, I think it will be obvious that there is no such thing as a "Jewish people."

The word "people" is applied to other classifications of humans without implying any all-prevailing similarities or aspirations. We talk of the Wall Street "people," the farming people, the radio people, business people, or the common people. When we use the term in this way, we recognize that it is nothing more than a convenient generalization to designate a group about which we wish to make some specific reference at the moment. When we have finished using this convenient generalization, the entity falls apart into the reality of its diversities. This is also true of Jews.

- (3) You have no consciousness of being a Jew for you imply you are concerned neither with great achievements of Jews, as Jews, in the past nor possible achievements of Jews, as Jews, in the future. You admit you are concerned simply with human beings.

MY ANSWER: In a sense, that is true. As a human being, as one who shares the hopes of men for a better world, I rejoice in what other human beings have contributed to the race of men. When these human beings were Jews, I may have a particular joy, as any man may have a special joy in what a familiar friend or comrade does to bring a little light into the darkness of the world. But I am really not concerned whether these men made these contributions as Jews or not. I believe Abraham Lincoln today is as much a part of whatever Jews hold sacred as Amos, and more revered than the half-mad first king of Israel, Saul. The great prophets of Israel excoriated their own people and were denied by them. Was it then, as Jews, that these prophets contributed their vision to the world? There are Christians and Mohammedans and Buddhists who more nearly follow the ancient Hebraic disciplines than many Jews. There are Jews who are closer to paganism and barbarism than many who are not Jews. The best that Jews have created has not remained Jewish. It has become the heritage of civilized man. And so, I think I am right in my concern first with human beings and with that part of the Jewish heritage which is universal in scope and only secondarily Jewish. Insofar as the ordinary Jew thinks about things like this at all, I believe he thinks they are good or bad, first, and not whether they are Jewish or not, first.

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Who then are these average Jews and what is their status and condition in today's world?

It is not an easy task to describe them, for I have eschewed all the glittering generalities and romanticized idealizations. Since I insist upon talking about human beings, I am confronted with the dilemma of the philosophers who have tried to describe man and have always ended up with a pallid stereotype. So, I cannot say in a sentence or in a formula who these people known as Jews are.

But perhaps I can describe the various parts of what the world has all too often lumped together as "the Jewish people." If, when I have finished describing this "people," I have done a perfect job, the entity will paradoxically disappear. For there is no such thing as a "Jewish people" apart from the religious fellowship.

Before the Axis program of extermination, there were, in round figures, some sixteen million men, women and children who either called themselves, or were called by others, Jews. After the rise of the Hitlerian doctrine of nationalities of blood and race, other human beings were forcibly thrust into the category of "Jewish" where the primitive theories of Hitler prevailed. But the world has rejected Hitler and Hitlerism and in the better world to follow this war, these people will be free to dissociate themselves from being "Jews" if they wish.

Of the great majority of the Jews who may survive this war, we know a good deal, with as much or as little certainty as we know anything about the frailties of humans.

Who are they? Where are they? What is their status? What are their hopes?

There are, in round figures, five million of them in the United States.* This is today the largest and most prosperous group of Jews in the world. American Jews are the cornerstone of any hope for the reconstruction of the lives of Jews tomorrow, anywhere in the world. From America's

* *The American Jewish Yearbook* (1944) reports 4,960,095 in North America and the West Indies and 4,770,000 in Continental United States.

Jews must flow forth, in large measure, the religious and scholarly inspiration, the moral and financial support needed to rebuild the broken lives of the Jews of Europe. And America's Jews are soberly and willingly assuming this tremendous obligation.

One of the aspirations of this American of Jewish faith, held in common with Americans of all faiths, is to be of assistance in shaping the world—and its Jews—to a decent, dignified life and to prevent any recurrence of such a dismal, barbarous interlude as these past years have been.

These five million Jews in America are largely just Americans who profess Judaism as a religion. I must say a word here about the so-called "irreligious" Jew, about men who say: "I am a Jew but I do not profess Judaism." Some people will point to this kind of a man to prove that since he is not religious, but still claims to be a Jew, Jews must therefore be something more than a religious group.

I do not believe this is a logical deduction. It is a part of that process of being unwilling to think in normal patterns about Jews. Such men are to be found in every faith. In the crises of their lives, at marriage, or death, if such men turn to religion at all, they turn to Judaism, even though they never observed Judaism at other times. They are just, religiously-speaking, bad Jews, as there are, religiously-speaking, bad Catholics or Protestants.

If these men *never* turn to Judaism, then what makes them Jews? Their contributions to Jewish charity? Do their contributions to the Chinese War Relief make them Chinese, or to a policeman's ball, make them policemen?

Unless we accept the false doctrine of race-nations, these men are only Jews if, however minutely, they acknowledge Judaism as their religion. If they do not, they are not Jews.

Jews who freely profess Judaism differ widely in their interpretations of their religion. Some are as devout and some are as casual or indifferent as their fellow-Americans of

all faiths. They are fragmentized in their Judaism, as Christians are fragmentized in Christianity. There are groups among Jews comparable to both high and low-church gradations in Christian denominations. And even within any synagogue of any denomination there are wide divergences of opinion about all matters from the sermons the Rabbi should preach to how much any member, rich or poor, ought to contribute to the maintenance of the institution. There is no unity, even in religion, among Jews. They are among the leading nonconformists of the world.

The five million American Jews vote all political tickets and come from all strata of American economy. They know social discrimination in many places, resent it, and are chiefly concerned with preventing it from spilling over into more serious areas of their lives, such as economic and political discrimination.

By and large, they do not care to go where they are not wanted, though they frequently reflect upon the stupidity of generalizing about the individuals of any group. For they know that there are good and bad among these five million Jews. They want no special consideration for the good and no special penalties for the bad. They want American democracy applied to their lives and they have an abiding faith that the American way of life is the best that man has ever known, and that its extension offers the only promise for a still better way of life.

American Jews are relatively secure. America has on the whole known little of the hates and divisiveness among people that have characterized the old world. Our Jews have their roots in the virgin soil of America. The first of them may have come here from Spain with Columbus. The last of them—several hundred thousand—have found sanctuary and welcome here along with other refugees from the tyrants that have sought to bestride our modern world. Some of these newcomers, like their predecessors, will live on as American citizens. Some, like their fellow-refugees of other faiths, will

return to the lands of their fathers when those lands are cleansed of the infections of hate.

Jews in America are stratified in every way that American society is stratified. Descendants of the pioneer families, many of them dating back to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and those of the nineteenth century are more or less completely integrated. To meet them on the street, or see them in public places, to walk into their homes or their clubs, to list what they eat, read, wear, the amusements they pursue—would be to find the typical characteristics of all Americans of comparable residency here and of comparable economic status.

Those of more recent immigration reveal varying degrees of attachments, outwardly and inwardly, to their original homes. But none of these vestiges is odd because it is peculiarly "Jewish." These people are strange because they are Hungarian, or French, or Dutch or German, and as such, they are just as odd to the American Jew as they are to the American Christian, and in about the same degree. They seem more peculiar to the Jews of the South, or the Midwest than they are to the Jews of New York, just as all foreign ways seem more peculiar to Southerners or Midwesterners than they are to New Yorkers. I have seen and talked with hundreds of refugees who were Jews who felt a greater bond of kinship with Christian refugees from the same country than with American Jews.

Above all, American Jews want nothing so much as to be a part and parcel of American life. They want the processes of American freedom to continue and expand. Some are quicker than others in integrating their lives into the pattern of America. But they all want a strong, prosperous America and each, in his own way, gives of himself to that purpose.

In short, except for a religion of common derivation and a tradition of helping other Jews in distress—because so often no one would help them—there is no more similarity between the Jew of New York or Chicago and the Jews of a common farming project I once visited in Northern Michigan,

than there is between a Southern tenant-farmer and the Cabots and the Lodges. Even the common tradition of insisting that only Jews shall help other Jews is disintegrating in the acids of social upheaval of our day. For the task is too large and the dislocations in society too deep. Gradually, if with stubborn reluctance, Jewish charitable organizations are relinquishing their services to more general programs of social relief.

In a word, what average Jews really want, if they are asked to think about it, is full equality of American citizenship and full responsibility, with all that both sides of the coin of freedom imply. Unfortunately, like most Americans, these five million of Jewish faith do not think very long or very hard about what they ultimately want. They take each day as it comes. They worry in crises and in better times shrug their shoulders at possible crises to come, and live out their lives, neither famous, nor powerful, nor infamous, nor completely impotent.

This is the greatest population of Jews in today's world, and in it I cannot find any unified "Jewish people."



Nearly half-way around the world from America, there live the more than 3,000,000 Jews of the Soviet Union. This is the second largest population of Jews in the world. As the great nation of which they are a part is destined to play an increasingly important rôle in tomorrow's history, so too these Soviet Jews are almost certain to write a large and important chapter in the history of Jews in the future.

Unlike the century and a half of freedom and emancipation enjoyed by American Jews, the Jews of the Soviet have enjoyed equality of status and opportunity for only about a quarter of a century. They are the most recently emancipated

Jews of the world. It was not until the revolution of 1917-20 that Jews in the U.S.S.R. emerged from a life that had been, for centuries, abundant only in tragedy and suffering, ghettos, pogroms and degradation. As late as the chaotic years of 1918-20, there were more than 1000 pogroms reported in some 500 scattered Jewish settlements.

Now, barely twenty-five years later, anti-Semitism is out-lawed by the state. The government invested millions of roubles in plans to assist Jews. It even privileged Jews as Jews, for a time, on the theory of redressing the balance because in Czarist days Jews had been singled out for discrimination. In its determination to equalize its citizens, therefore, the U.S.S.R. paid special attention to these formerly underprivileged Jews. Now Russia's Jews, many of whom were born into a segregated, hunted, victimized Jewish life, are well along on the road of equality and emancipation.

To achieve this transformation, the Russian Soviet Jews have had to make one of the most difficult adaptations ever attempted by Jews, in a conscious effort to become integrated citizens of a nation that offered them the opportunity to do so. Once limited by the backwardness of old Russia to petty-bourgeois economic opportunities, to-day within the life of a generation there has emerged a large, free, emancipated agricultural and industrial class. Jews, who were middlemen and small capitalists, bore the full fury of a proletarian revolution, not as Jews, but as members of a class which a new society would no longer tolerate. But they outrode the white heat of revolution, to settle like other Russians into the emergent pattern of the new state. Russia's Jews revealed their eagerness to stand and build with other men, eager above all to possess and to fulfill equal rights and responsibilities.

It is true that Soviet Jewry does not reveal the wide variations of ideologies and economic stratification that we find among America's Jews. The Soviet system of collectivism precludes such a diversity; and the fact that, twenty-five years ago, these Jews were compressed within the uniformity of ghetto

life would have made such divergencies unlikely, even if the total Soviet scene had permitted it.

There is little active, religious life among Soviet Jews, in the sense of organized Judaism, but there is little formalized religion anywhere in Russia. What the recent formation of a council for liaison between the Soviet government and the various religious groups in Russia implies, no one knows. Nor does anyone know what will be the future of Judaism in a U.S.S.R. which apparently is encouraging more and more of the institutions of the western world, religion among them.

At the present, Jewish life is distinguished in the U.S.S.R. as one of the 164 nationalities that comprise the Soviet Union. This means that where they are a majority of a regional population and wish to do so, Jews may have complete cultural autonomy. It is, in reality, a cultural autonomy distinguished primarily by language, the Yiddish, spoken by many Jews in Eastern and Central Europe. In practically everything but the language difference this autonomy conforms to the general pattern of life in Soviet Russia. The people may speak Yiddish; they may have Yiddish papers, which are subsidized by the state; they may be considered, for cultural purposes, a distinct group. Since the upper house of the Russian parliamentary system is organized along lines of national groups and two representatives are elected for each such national group, Jews enjoy equality with others under this provision.

Here I must say a word about this term, "Jewish nationality" as it applies to Russian Jewry. It is a label having nothing to do with a political entity of a "Jewish nation" or a "Jewish people" which sees in the Jewish Commonwealth "its highest political aspirations." For all practical purposes, this term "Jewish nationality" reflects the same status for Soviet Jews as a term such as Americans of Jewish faith connotes for American Jews.

For the designation of Jews by this term does not mean that these Russians of Jewish nationality are *Jewish* na-

tionalists. They are, for the most part, anti-Jewish nationalists. They are no more a part of a world-wide Jewish nation, sharing any common political objectives, than Americans of Jewish faith. In fact, Jewish nationalists (Zionists) have long wept over the fact that the emancipation of the Russian Jew has lost to Jewish nationalism these three million Soviet citizens of "Jewish nationality." Taught by Russian doctrine to believe that modern attempts to found a Jewish state in Palestine upon the Zionist interpretation of the Balfour Declaration are a part of British imperialism, most of these Russian Jews are anti-Zionist.

All reports indicate that these Russians, like their fellow-Jews in America, want nothing to stand in the way of their progressive march in emancipation and integration. As they move out of the ghettos and the old Pale of Settlement, they lose contact with the officially recognized Yiddish and the other appurtenances of this label of "nationality." They send their children to available schools. They become more and more integrated into whatever is emerging as the common destiny of the U.S.S.R.

Little more than twenty-five years ago, had anyone speculated on the future of Russian Jewry, the speculation would have been hopeless and tragic. The formula for a cure would have been mass evacuation. Surely, in this land of historic pogroms, of ghettos, of arch anti-Semites, of blood accusations, of dark and dank barbarism, no Jew, it would have seemed, could ever again hope for peace and no Jew, from choice, would care to remain. In only twenty-five years a complete change was wrought. It has demonstrated that anti-Semitism is not an organic part of human relationships. It has given the lie to the statement that wherever Jews are in a minority, there is persecution.

True, there is nothing in the present or the future of this community of Jews in Russia to warm the hearts of those professional Jews who fear complete integration and who dread the full logic of emancipation for Jews. For these are not

content to have Jews marked only by a distinctive faith. Such a condition would give Jews full freedom to move in or out of Jewish life, and there are many who fear giving such complete freedom. Though there are many who desire greater control over Jews by Jews, and who resent the dissolution of this control in Russia, where once a ghetto made such control easy and absolute, it is none the less a fact and there is little likelihood of a change if Russia continues to expand in freedom as America has continued to expand in freedom. The ghetto has been liquidated. Freedom and integration and emancipation flow now through the veins of these Jews. Some may rue the fact that these three millions seem lost to the fiction of a "Jewish people," but it is a good wager that the process of liquidation of the ghetto within will go on, and that none of the three million is regretting the life that has been won and the prospect for its continuance. For here too, these three million and more are, first of all, human beings as unconcerned as the average American Jew with maintaining any longer the fictitious entity which habit persists in calling "a Jewish people."



*H*alf of the men, women and children called Jews live, then, in these two great countries, the United States and the U.S.S.R. They are no more alike, these Soviet and American Jews, than any other American or Soviet citizens. It is, I think, safe to say that any American communist has more in common with the Jews of Russia than he would have with an American capitalist, and any of America's wealthy Jews would have more in common with another American rich man than with communized Jews of the U.S.S.R.

But, despite this very disparity, both of these Jewish communities prove an important fact. Both demonstrate that

the answer to the "Jewish problem" is a society of real equality and integration. Both prove that in such a society Jews can and do become responsible citizens of the countries in which they live. Both deny that centuries of persecution have made the Jew feel "homeless" if he is given a decent chance to make a home. Both of these Jewish communities put the lie to "world Jewish solidarity" and to a supranational Jewish entity, to which Jews feel or owe any obligation. Both prove that where there is a will, without the obscurantism of devious psychological explanations, the "Jewish problem" can be solved in the very places in which it once existed. Both prove that if men really have a will for it, they may rid the world of its stupid and sadistic crime of anti-Semitism.

Here, so clear that even those who run may see, is proof that what Jews want most for themselves is no more and no less than that which decent men everywhere should want for themselves; that there is no insurmountable wall between Jews and their fellow citizens, that there is nothing esoteric about the Jewish problem; that there is nothing incomprehensible about the Jewish character. And when enough men of goodwill determine to cut through the incomprehensible and frustrating psychological justifications for anti-Semitism and determine that Jews shall be treated just as people, then, as in America and Russia, after the war, the Jews who survive in Europe will take their proper places with the dignity of men in a free world.

I have written at some length of the U.S.S.R. and America because they represent two quite different patterns of life and environment. Both patterns and environments have achieved for Jews the desired ends of emancipation and equal status.

To this eight million or so Jews in America and the U.S.S.R. must be added 300,000 in Great Britain, 150,000 in Canada, more than 500,000 in Central and South America, more than 500,000 in the various, settled parts of Africa.

In all of these places, substantial groups of Jews have

found substantial amounts of freedom and equality. The patterns of their lives are not all the same, for the governments of all of these territories and countries differ. The point is that except for minor and infrequent incidents, there are no legal discriminations against Jews, as Jews. If Jews in Latin American nations know less security than the Jews in the United States, it is because most Latin American governments have not achieved the stability of American democracy, and no human beings in those states know a security comparable to that of a citizen of the United States.

But there is great promise for the future of Jews in democratic Latin America. The government of Paraguay announced in August, 1944 that it "agreed to permit free entry of Jewish refugees from Europe" without limitation of number. Venezuela and Ecuador have also announced policies designed to encourage Jewish immigration. Official condemnation of intolerance and anti-Semitism on behalf of the predominant Catholic church and by the Protestants, and the growing realization that it is to the best interests of the Americas to foster stable governments and expand the democratic processes in those countries to the South, augur well for that emerging continent's future stability. As general stability increases, its Jews will help to build and share it.



*T*hus far I have dealt only with Jews who live in those countries which were not over-run by the Axis war-machines or those areas of the earth that, once over-run, at this writing have been freed of storm-troopers and Gestapo hooligans.

In Italy there were only some 42,000 Jews in the pre-war years. They presented still a different kind of pattern of integration. We have seen Jews free and equal under democracy

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and communism. Italy presented the peculiar spectacle of a Jewry so integrated into Italian life that many Jews were occupants of important posts in the government of Mussolini before the Sawdust Caesar was tied to the puppet strings that were pulled from Berlin.

This too, is as important as the facts about Russian and American Jewries. No one in Mussolini's Italy was really free. Yet there were no serious charges of Jewish persecution. There was for long no discrimination against Jews, as Jews.

Even to the last, Italy's anti-Semitism was half-hearted and forced. Jews have lived in the land of the Caesars since the glories of ancient Rome. How many of them survived the later German occupation is not known. But there is every indication that those who did survive will be completely absorbed again into the bloodstream of the Italy that will rise from this war.

France, liberated, is stirring to life again and the anti-Jewish laws have been repealed.

What then of France's 240,000 Jews—Frenchmen of Jewish faith? There is little question that those who have survived war, Vichy and the Nazi occupation will live on to rebuild France again. Many who are refugees from France, in other lands, will return to their homeland. Their future lot will not be that of some imaginary "Jewish people." Their future lot will be to build and share the glories or vicissitudes that lie "beyond the top of the ridge" in the country that has for so long been their home. So too, for more than 100,000 Jews in Holland, some 60,000 in Belgium and some 75,000 in Greece.

Here, I am becoming involved with an unknown quantity—for no one knows how many Jews of the Nazi occupied lands survived the scourge. Very few, one fears. The figures I cite are pre-war, and therefore must be considered hopeful exaggerations rather than present-day realities.

There are everywhere signs and portents that the Jews who survive will be welcomed back to the homes from

which they were forcibly driven. And many will return to those homes. For it is not conceivable that Hitler will have won this war, after all, and that the hatreds and brutalities out of which the military phase of the war was born will live on after the defeat of the Nazis.



*B*etween these nations of Western Europe and Russia lies the trouble zone of Europe. Here is the volcano that smoulders with the unfinished business of backwardness and barbarism. From Germany in the North to the Balkans in the South there stretches a corridor that was virtually untouched by the great democratic revolutions, by the enlightenment of the eighteenth and the middle nineteenth centuries.

Included in this corridor of corrupted feudalism are such countries as Poland, Hungary, Romania, Germany, the Slavic states. Surrounded by this corridor, the democracy of Czechoslovakia is an exception to the rule, about which more in a moment.

In this Central European area before the war, lived well over five million Jews, a figure that must now be represented by the quantity x . Here are the Jews who were the "Jewish problem" of the post-World War years, even as this "powderkeg of Europe" offers some of the most difficult problems for the peacemakers at the end of this war. But even here, in the core of trouble, the rule of integration of Jews obtains. There is no special problem, insulated from their surroundings, but one more intimately related to establishing stability in this corridor of ancient trouble than to the problems of American or French or Russian Jews. It is no more a problem for French and American and Russian Jews than it is for all Frenchmen, Americans and Russians. For either here, in Cen-

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tral and Eastern Europe, the night will gradually break into day, and enlightenment will supplant ignorant barbarism, or a generation from now, more Jews will suffer horribly along with their fellow-men, and archaic roots will again mature their flowers of evil."

We do not know much about the fate of the five million Jews who lived here before the war. About 1,750,000 of Poland's Jews have been reported to be refugees in Russia, the largest, single concentration of refugees in any nation of the world. Other reports of uncertain reliability have said that no more than 2,000,000 of the Jews of all Central and Eastern Europe, survive. I do not know. No one knows.

And no one knows what those who survive will really want for themselves at the end of the war. Will they desire to flee these scenes of death, degradation and brutal persecution; will they never return, if they are among the fortunate who escaped as refugees?

It is quite probable that many will be unable to stand the stress and strain of returning to the graves of their first hopes and the scorched earth of what they had thought of as peace and opportunity, to attempt to build there all over again. Such should not be made to return.

Some will want to return, for they will hope, with other men, that humanity will emerge from its paroxysm, free of the fevered barbarities of the past. Many of them, now refugees, have never been at home in America, England or Palestine and, at uncountable cost, they will want to go home again.

So, even here, I cannot talk about a "Jewish people," for as I have met and talked with refugees I have come more and more to realize that they are not a group. They are just average human beings. They are all different. They want, above all, what other men want—peace and security and opportunity. Even the common bond of their forced exile and suffering has given them no common "Jewish" plan for the tomorrow of their lives. Some are members of the undergrounds of Europe and have fought, we may be sure, to live on again in equal

status in their native lands. Here, in America, some belong to the Free Austrian, Free French movements. Some belong to Jewish nationalist movements, hoping to find their future in the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. And those who belong to the one group do not think too well of those who belong to the other, for, as I shall show later the two patterns are mutually exclusive.

Only this can be said: They should be allowed freedom of choice. They should have as much opportunity as other men to rebuild their lives, as they choose and where they choose. No nation should emerge from this war denying the right of its citizens of Jewish faith to return, if they choose. No ghetto of new and colossal proportions should be established anywhere to lift from the world its responsibility, by suggesting the problem can be solved only by excluding Jews from the larger world.

These Jews are not members of some supra-national "Jewish people." It is wicked, ridiculous and irresponsible to lump them together in a formalized, sentimentalized solution to the problem of "a Jewish people." They have had homelands in those nations in which they have lived. It is an inescapable responsibility of a regenerated civilization to see to it that they are free to return to those homelands if they care to.

Germany, in all likelihood, will pose a special problem. Germans seem to love the authoritarian, stratified way of life that characterized the feudal era of history. German economy was dominated by an economic feudalism, before this second world war, that was different from medieval feudalism in that it was dressed in the robe of industrial capitalism rather than a medieval, agricultural economy. Here was the home of the great cartels. Here was the state of a subservient middle class that never quite arrived at middle class stature, the perfect background for the police-spy state of Hitler and the most abundant flowering of Fascism. Here was the state still dominated in its social thinking and foreign policy by Prussian Junkerism, the "cabbage squire" mentality so brilliantly de-

scribed by Heine. Here was the state of the exalted military caste that outrode the disasters of the last war with sufficient prestige to survive on the myth that Germany's armies had never been defeated, but "betrayed." Upon the basis of that myth the same caste could lead Germany submissively again into another war against the world.

It was not so strange that the irrational, crackpot romanticist Hitler should have become this people's champion. As the veneer of westernization cracked in Germany, under the strain of defeat in World War I, there emerged from the depths the ugliest traits in the character of that unhappy nation.

I do not know what will be the fate of the few Jews—of the pre-war original 600,000—who may still live in Germany. Will they wish to give up the attempt to live in that land where they have lived since the days of Caesar? Some, I know, will not. Some, even from America, now here as refugees, will return to try again. For not even the Nazis can make them believe they are not Germans. And if they do desire to return, or to live there if they are still alive and could not flee, will it be possible for them to do so? I do not know. No one knows. This is not a Jewish problem. The problem is what shall be done with Germany, so that there emerges a nation in which Jews as well as other people will be able to live upon a basis of freedom and equality.

By and large it is true that Germany's Jews were more emancipated than the Germans. That is, as a group, if I may generalize for a moment, they leaned to the superficial westernization that Germany possessed more than to that nation's deep and sub-conscious hankering after feudal class-stratification. Any solution that may be proposed for the future of those Germans of Jewish faith who may survive ought to consider this allegiance and affinity to the Western World. It is almost a certainty that these people would be at home nowhere but near the centers of western culture and civilization. Whether they will seek again to find these things in a new

and democratic society in Germany itself, I do not know. Or, rather, I do not know how many of them will. Some will if they are given the opportunity. Jews were in the vanguard of those who founded and built the Weimar Republic. Among those who have survived there ought to be some Rathenaus and Ernst Tollers who will want to try again, assisted by an older and wiser democratic world.

But for those who may not want to live in post-war Germany, some new homes close to the nerve centers of the Western World should be found, as their problem is one with the whole problem of the millions of refugees who will be found in post-war Europe.

I know that there are those who will say that Germany proves that the program of integration I propose will not work, that emancipation is an illusion. Some will say that the Jews of Germany were more integrated and more assimilated than they have ever been in any other place or time in history, yet it was precisely there that the most devastating blow was struck against human beings known as Jews. I know some will say this, for it has been said thousands of times these last ten years.

The harrowing tale of German Jewry, however, proves rather than disproves my thesis. Germany, up to this time, has not used the modern heritage of the Western World. Jews, social-democrats, Heine, Goethe, Thomas Mann—all these and more and by no means Jews alone—were spewed out of a Germany that has not digested the substance of modern society in the last hundred years. Germany and its Jews and their tragedy taught us nothing we should not have known. It merely repeated the historic truth that where men are free, Jews live in security. Where they are not free, Jews, and others know no freedom.

For it is not accurate to say that emancipation and integration were ever really tried in Germany. Emancipation did not fail, it was never real. The average Jew no more failed in Germany than Thomas Mann or Heinrich Brüning failed.

They all failed together, as the revolution of 1848 failed and as the revolution of 1919 failed. What has failed consistently in Germany has been democracy. And as we have fought a war to annihilate Germany's barbaric standards—and won it—I refuse to concede that we have lost it in the one area involving men and women of Jewish faith.



*T*he Jews of one other country merit separate attention in this thumbnail account. There are 500,000 Jews in Palestine. Their position in that country, at the moment, is not unlike the position of the Jews in Central Europe before the war. They are considered a national, minority group. They have guaranteed to them certain rights as a national group. They may, through the Jewish Agency, which represents Jewish nationalists all over the world, petition the Mandate government. This also is a right specified to them in the structure of the present Palestinian government.

These Jews have produced a rather specialized form of culture. They have made Hebrew a language of the grocery store and the cop on the street. They have built the largest all-Jewish city in the world in Tel Aviv. Roughly 30% of them have returned to the soil and have reclaimed Palestine's eroded lands. They have built an important university and brought hygiene and western civilization to the retarded near-East. All this they have done, financed in the doing of it by charitably minded Jews in Western Europe and America.

In this group some 300,000 were refugees from Europe during the last decade. How many of these will elect to remain in Palestine? No one knows. How many of them will join their fellow-refugees of all faiths, now living in other countries, and return to their homes? No one knows. How

many will seek to resettle their lives permanently in some place other than Palestine? No one knows.

Some 200,000 came to Palestine in the years from 1917-1932, for the most part voluntarily, seeking a new life far from the scenes of hardship in Eastern Europe. These, we may assume, wish to live on in Palestine. How they choose to live, the status they will elect for themselves in that country, is by no means certain. Some hope Palestine will become a National Jewish State, Homeland or Nation. Some hope for a binational state in which the more than a million Arabs of Palestine will share political authority with Jews. Some hope that Palestine will continue as a territory controlled by one of the great powers.

For even here, there is no "Jewish people." There are just human beings who are Jews, voting in dozens of political parties. Some are militant and possessed of a fervent frenzy of nationalistic and racial implication. Others have no interest in the complexities of a Jewish life that is "different" and want only to be left alone, to find peace, security and opportunity. Palestine is the locale in which they have elected this pursuit of the good things of life. Granted freedom and equality, it satisfied them as would have any place else in the world.

Some are here with the joy and exultation of true pioneers, experiencing and enduring as pioneers have always experienced and endured. Others are here, grumbling, dissatisfied, eager for the lights to go on again all over the world, that they may return to their former homes or seek to resettle their lives permanently in some other place, Latin America or the Orient or Australia.

The American Jewish Yearbook for 1943-44 lists ninety-five territories and countries in which there is some population of Jews. These populations vary in size from ten in Tanganyika to the nearly five million in America.

I do not know the ten Jews in Tanganyika. In fact, I know very little about Tanganyika. But I feel sure that these ten Jews are neither exotic nor a "priestly people," and that

they are in Tanganyika for some very good, ordinary reason that has to do with the average human's desire for peace, security and opportunity.

These then are the possible sixteen million human beings about whom I am writing—always mindful, as I use that figure of sixteen millions that millions of them have died in Hitler's war of extermination.

I cannot write about a Jewish people because there is none. In fact, no one has ever successfully written a history of "the Jewish people." Except for several centuries, nearly three thousand years ago, when under David and Solomon there was an Israelitish nation in Palestine, there has been no "Jewish people" to write about. Men have written histories about human beings, Jews in Babylon, in Egypt, in Spain, in Poland and so on. There are biographies of men who made outstanding contributions to the religious culture of Jews. But this is not the consecutive, orderly history of a people. No one can say, since the time of Solomon, "The Jews made war against this nation or that." No one can say, "The Jewish people suffered a serious depression," or, "The Jewish people elected so-and-so President," or king or candle-stick maker. Men could and did write of the Golden Age of Spanish Jewry. But the deserved praise of that Jewry's accomplishments would not at all fit the miserable pattern of the life of Germany's Jews in the fourteenth century, when, being charged with responsibility for the plagues that swept Europe, that Jewry was hounded and persecuted. Or, one could write a history of the Jews under the Inquisition in Spain and Portugal. But that lamentable story bore no resemblance to the satisfactory status of Jews, at the same period, in the Ottoman Empire. One might write a history about Jews whose life was influenced by the legislation of the Talmud, written in Babylon. But it would be different from the history of Jews whose life was influenced by the legislation in the contemporary Talmud compiled in Palestine.

There is no "Jewish people," and it is this above all

that men of good will—in whom I have faith, and to whom I address this book—must realize. It would be easier if there were a large, over-all formula for all these several million lives, or even for the two or three million in that trouble-spot of the world, that corridor of barbaric feudalism in Central and Eastern Europe. But we cannot by wishing it make the problem easier. There is no ancient, historic wrong to "a Jewish people" for which this "people" is now demanding a collective retribution from the world. In France and Italy, the specific problems are disappearing. In Poland, it will be the problem common to the struggle to win Poles to democracy. And so in Romania and Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The real problem is the problem of all men to be free; and it cannot be solved by enslaving any to romanticized formulas.

The solution of this problem upon a realistic basis is an imperative of our day. I do not ask Christians to be charitable. I do ask them to consider their own self-defense. For anti-Semitism has become a recognized tool used by those who would destroy the whole of western life. It is the major pretension of anti-Semites that Jews are a "people" apart, upon one basis or another. Once that premise is granted, the fight against anti-Semitism is lost before it is begun. For then this "people" becomes either too good, or not good enough, too rich or too poor, too religious or too irreligious, too nationalistic or too internationalized and so on, ad absurdum and ad nauseam.

There may be a hundred processes necessary to eradicate anti-Semitism. None of them will work until all stem from the necessary premise that Jews want neither special privilege nor discrimination. They want neither condescension nor oppression. They are not weary and tired and homeless. They are willing, as emancipated Jewry has proved in many countries, to settle within the framework of any society that treats them as human beings and to become an integral part of that society. In a hundred and fifty years more than half of the Jews of the world have risen above the degradation and

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persecutions of pre-democratic societies to full stature in an enlightened world. Given a decent chance in a decent world, the rest will follow the pattern.



Will these human beings known as Jews be given even half this chance? I do not know.

In those countries in which Jews have enjoyed equal status until the war, they will continue with equal status again. There is no problem in America, England, Canada, Australia, Russia or any country which has not been over-run by the Axis armies.

In other lands, where Jews knew freedom and emancipation but were deprived of their rights by Axis conquests, a number of official or semi-official pronouncements indicate that all former rights will be restored and the processes of emancipation will go on, once these nations themselves are again free. A recent poll among Jewish refugees in Switzerland revealed that 80% of those from the countries of Western Europe hoped to be repatriated.

The most interesting of several pronouncements on the future status of Jews in an occupied country came from the Dutch government-in-exile. Its author, the Prime Minister and Minister of Justice, was so unconscious of any "Jewish people" as a problem, or any difference about Jews, as Jews, that he found it difficult to talk of their future in terms other than those he would use for any Dutch citizen.

Asked, "What of the position of Jews in the Netherlands after the war?" he said, "The reply can only be, 'The Netherlands shall rise again under the House of Orange'. . . . There is no need for us to make promises. Our long history shows what we have done." This, I am sure, is what Holland's

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Jews wanted most to hear: No special rights and no special duties for Jews, no condescension, no pity, Jews taken for granted, as Dutch citizens.

For Belgium, on July 21, 1942, George Theunis, Ambassador Extraordinary, declared in New York that:

"The Constitution of Belgium guarantees freedom of opinion and belief. Furthermore, the laws and customs of our country have never allowed any distinction between its citizens, according to the race in which they belong or in which they claim to place themselves. All Belgians are equal before the law.

"Those are the principles in the shelter of which the Jews in Belgium lived peaceably until the German invasion. These principles are of a permanent character. They are at the very foundation of Belgian legislation, and re-establishment of them and respect for them are among our war aims.

"It is well known that the Belgian Government, unanimously supported by public opinion, did all in its power, in the years immediately preceding the war, to alleviate the great distress into which Nazi persecution had plunged the Jews.

"Only the Victory of the Allies will put an end to the injustice of which they are victims."

For France, it was declared in November 1941, on the occasion of the 150th anniversary of the emancipation of French Jews, that:

"The famous decree emancipating the Jews of France, like the Proclamation of the Rights of Man, will remain always in force and cannot be abrogated by the men of Vichy." The abrogation of the Vichy laws in France is proof of France's future intentions. In the same statement, De Gaulle promised "to establish after victory, equality both of rights and duties of all citizens of all French territories."

None of the Jews then, in any of these west European nations or in the New World is confronted with any insuperable problem of rebuilding his life in the post-war world, derived from his being of the Jewish faith.

The future is less clear as we move eastward. There is no agency to speak for a better Hungary than the one recently dominated by Hitler, but there is a better Hungary. No Jews anywhere in the world were prouder of their citizenship than were the Hungarian Jews. The nation, as a whole, was backward, but its Jews, since the last war and until the nation fell under the power of Hitler as a Nazi satellite, were unmolested. We may assume, I think, that at least such a not-too-satisfying status will exist again, for those who survive.

In Romania, the pre-war position of Jews was deplorable. Romania was a typical Balkan state. It was filled with the intense nationalism of these little states. Its Jews, designated as a national minority group and largely unintegrated, were regarded as a source of friction, as were all the intense nationality fragments in this congested area.

Unless these territories are tutored and led to a way of life that will make their people, Jews included, safe and secure, these intense little nationalisms will continue to endanger the world. Twice now, in a generation, they have been fuel for a world war. The fate of these Romanian and Hungarian Jews who survive will depend upon the audacity and determination of the peacemakers in handling the explosive gangster-feudalism and barbarism of this corridor in the heart of Europe.

Even though any process of democratic education may take a long time and much effort, it will still be a shortcut to European stability and peace. And if such a plan is effected, we may believe the Jews in these areas will find a thoroughly agreeable orientation.

It is instructive to observe how Jews take on the coloration of the environment in which they live. The intense, even irredentist, qualities of nationalism which have long existed in these Eastern European states are shared by the Jews of these countries. The Jews of these various countries are set apart, yet the friction between Romanian, Polish, Austrian and Russian Jews is traditional and legendary. For even though

separatism has impeded their integration into the countries in which they have lived, these Jews have imbibed the intense nationalisms of those countries just the same. In any program to level those nationalisms off and to eliminate the frictions that have endangered Europe and the world, Jews will need the political and social prophylaxis just as much as others who live in these states.

If this program of democratic emancipation seems visionary, or too slowly evolutionary in nature, consider the examples set by two countries in this same Central Europe. For in the very heart of this area, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia prove that the "Jewish problem" can be solved by this means.

Czechoslovakia's Jews, in the years between the World War and Munich, were following the pattern that emerges in the lives of Jews everywhere under freedom. Like their co-religionists in England, Russia and America, they were becoming completely integrated into the life of the nation of which they were gratefully a part. Those who had been longest under Western influence, in the era before the creation of Czechoslovakia as a state, were more fully integrated. For the most part, they spoke Czech and considered themselves Czechs of Jewish faith. Those who had come under Czech sovereignty, but whose derivation had formerly been of Balkan orientation, were not so well advanced in the process of integration. They considered themselves Jewish nationals and spoke Yiddish.

But here it is interesting again to observe how closely Jewish aspirations and patterns of the lives of Jews follow the patterns of the environment in which Jews live. It is imperative to know this, if men are to deal with the problems facing Jews, realistically—and not romantically and sentimentally—after this war.

For Czechoslovakia was a nation in transition. Slowly, it was lifting itself out of the morass of Central Europe. That process was interrupted by Munich, when the infant

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democracy was forsaken by the liberal, western states. Czech Jews too, until Munich, were following the same, transitional process. There were Czechs of Jewish faith, in the pattern of their co-religionists in the western democracies. Others, only recently lifted out of the medieval concepts of most of Central and Eastern Europe, clung to the medieval concept of Jewish nationality.

The Czech government permitted Jews to designate themselves either way. In 1930, 55% of these Jews declared themselves to be of "Jewish nationality." They were politically organized in an official Jewish Party in a state that was organized itself on the basis of national minority rights. The anti-national Jews were, for the most part, identified with the liberal Czech parties, known only as Czechs of Jewish faith. Still others among the anti-nationalist Jews identified themselves with the German or Magyar minorities and voted with political parties representing those minority groups.

In Czechoslovakia, Jews are assured of the continuation of the kind of freedom that was producing integration of Jews into that nation's life before Munich. The transfer of any property after September 27, 1938, "under pressure of enemy occupation or under exceptional political circumstances" has been declared invalid by Mr. Benes. Both Benes and Masaryk have said time and again that the Czechoslovakia that will be reborn after this war will treat its Jews upon the same basis of complete equality as they enjoyed before the country was taken over by the Nazis.

The history of Yugoslavia testifies also that there is no problem of "the Jewish people"; that where the liberating, democratic influences are extended, the so-called "Jewish problem" is dissolved in the process.

In Yugoslavia's constitutional monarchy, political anti-Semitism was unknown. Its 80,000 Jews are spoken of in official documents as "our citizens of Jewish faith." There is a decree from the Government-in-Exile, similar to the decree by Czechoslovakia's Government-in-Exile, invalidating titles to

property that was transferred as a result of the Nazi occupation. A statement from the Minister of State in the Yugoslav Government-in-Exile, dated August 6, 1942, declares:

"The Yugoslav people has never looked upon our Jews as being subject to a special status in our free community, nor is such a question being raised as far as Yugoslavia's future is concerned. . . . Equal rights and equal duties for all our law-abiding citizens, without distinction of creed, is the guiding principle and cornerstone for a free and prosperous Yugoslavia."

The examples of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in this area generally considered backward and "the tinderbox of Europe" because of its intensely bitter animosities, is dramatic proof that the "Jewish problem" can be met and solved. If it can be done in the Balkans it can be done anywhere!

Poland will present special problems so far as one can determine, not only for Jews, but in many ways. More than any of the other United Nations, its Government-in-Exile has seemed confused about many things, and among them, about the future status of Poland's Jews. More statements on the future of Jews have been issued by the Polish Government-in-Exile than by any of the other Governments-in-Exile and there is no real consistency running through any of these Polish statements. The death of Wladyslaw Sikorski was a serious blow to those who hoped for the liberation of post-war Poland. There have been ominous stories of anti-Semitism in the Free Polish Army, with punishment of the offenders a dubious matter. On the other hand, the inevitable increase of Russian influence in that part of Europe may be hoped to serve as a counter-balance. The following report was widely circulated in the press in August of 1944.

"A Central Committee of Polish Jews in the U.S.S.R., under the auspices of the Union of Polish Patriots which is recognized by the Soviet Government has been set up in Moscow. The Committee represents the interests of

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Polish Jews who have been living in Russia since the outbreak of war.

"Most of the Polish Jews now in the Soviet Union will endeavor to return home at the termination of the war, according to reliable reports. The Central Committee of Polish Jews is formed for the purpose of organizing the reintegration of Polish Jews in an orderly fashion, securing transportation and restoring Jewish property."

"A delegation of the new Committee has left Moscow for Lublin, to assist in the organization of Jewish life in liberated Poland."

Nevertheless it would be foolish to be sanguine over the general Polish scene. Pre-war Poland was the center of some of the stormiest internecine quarrels in Jewish life. For pre-war Poland was the stronghold of Jewish nationalism and Zionism in the years between these two wars. And, as I shall show later in this book, strong Zionist leadership does not make either for integration or for a vigorous fight for the right to integrate as full and equal citizens of any nation.

Against this background, it is not surprising that the Polish Government-in-Exile should have issued a statement that mass evacuation of Jews was being considered as the solution to meet the problem of these uprooted, Polish Jews. More than the Jews of any other nation, in the pre-war years, Jewish nationalistic agitators in Poland suggested such a solution themselves. They are continuing to do so, now, from America. Therefore, on June 2, 1942, the Polish National Council issued this statement:

"The Polish National Council expresses its opinion that at the Peace Conference the Jewish question should be solved as a question of a people without a territory which should be granted conditions enabling its normal development within the framework of a state of its own and with its national government.

"The Jewish nation which has proved its extraordinary vitality during a period of 2000 years since the col-

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lapse of its own historic state should not be deprived of its own state territory."

Polish Jews themselves, insofar as their voice has been heard out of the sepulchre that Nazi domination has made of Poland, seem divided in their attitude toward this ambiguity. Undoubtedly, many of them will have no heart to return to this land, at least unless there is some radical alteration, not alone in attitude, but in legal guarantees, supported by enduring and reliable international supervision. The way out, for all Poland, three times dismembered and long the pawn of power politics, will be long and arduous. Jews will not shirk the duties implicit in such a long and arduous journey out of segregation and barbarism into decency. On the other hand, they will not want and should not be made to assume additional burdens because they are Jews.

Some of the Polish Jews now exiled are apparently determined to return, under any conditions, if they are free to do so. There, in their homeland, they will fight the double fight for the democratization of Poland and for equal status as Jews. For they know that in reality it is the same fight. William Zuckerman, foreign correspondent for one of America's leading Yiddish papers and intimately familiar with East European Jewry, writing of the Battle of the Warsaw Ghetto said:

"The heroic men and women who died on the barricades of Warsaw belonged to a section of Jews who held that their home was in the countries where they had been born, had worked and had contributed to wealth and culture. . . . To them the future of the European Jews, after the war, lay in Europe, in the homes which they had loved and fought for. . . . They always opposed the various plans made by their charitable brothers overseas for their evacuation after the war."

There is also the story of Samuel Szygelbojm, former leader of the Jewish Bundist movement in Lodz. These Bundists long fought the Zionists in Poland on this very issue of

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whether the solution to "the Jewish problem" lay in Poland or Palestine. Szygelbojm was treated to boos and hisses and provoked a riot in Tel Aviv when, in 1943, he stated practically the same thesis as Zuckerman. Later, as a protest against the future which seemed to be portending for Jews in Poland, this man committed suicide in London. Whether, as a member of the Polish Government-in-Exile, he took his own life as a protest against the continuation of anti-Semitism in that government, or whether it was equally a protest against proposals to evacuate Jews as an answer to their problem, I do not know. Certainly, neither of these possibilities is to be denied and either of them might have caused a sensitive man, who had devoted his life to fighting for equality for Jews in Poland, to despair to the point of death.

And another example that I recently came across, a moving, powerful bit of poetic prose, "We Polish Jews," by Julian Tuwin,* one of Poland's outstanding literary figures, emphasizes the Zuckerman sentiment again, an undying and unbreakable affection for Poland, as he knew it, even with all of its faults and failures.

Who is to say how many of those who survive among Poland's Jews will follow the Zuckermans, the Szygelbojms, the Tuwins, and how many will make every effort to leave, never to return, and seek their future in some other land? I do not know. No one does.

For all the Szygelbojms and Tuwins I bespeak the help of men of good will. And not alone for Poland's Jews, but for all Jews who have lived through Europe's tragedy. May they have full freedom of choice. May no fictitious political stigma of an alien and separate peoplehood complicate the already terrifying problems that confront them. May they be as free as other men to return to their homes, if they choose, or to find other homes elsewhere if that is their desire.

* *Free World*, New York, July, 1944.

I am coming now to the real purpose I had in mind when I started to write this book, namely to discuss what Jews want to be in the better world which all of us hope will be built after this war. And unless my reader has drawn the proper conclusions from this description of what Jews are, he will be unable to form any realistic appraisal of what they want to become.

I think these facts emerge from what I have thus far written:

- (1) There is no political entity that can be called, with any realistic accuracy, "a Jewish people."
- (2) It is mere romanticism and sentimentality to speak of "righting historic wrongs done to Jews" or of "the homelessness of Israel" or of "a solution to the problem of the Jewish people."
- (3) The great majority of the Jews who will survive the war are at home in nations where there may be a certain amount of social anti-Semitism and economic anti-Semitism, but where they need no radical, revolutionary treatment. "The Jewish problem" needs nothing more than extending a condition of equality to all Jews, everywhere, and a continued move in the direction of emancipation which will see the gradual elimination of even these social and economic discriminations.
- (4) The so-called "Jewish problem" about which people are urgently concerned in working out the peace, has nothing to do therefore with "a Jewish people." It has to do with, at the very most, five million Jews, practically all of whom lived in the vestigial feudalism of Central and Eastern Europe. Of these, we do not know how many will survive the Nazi policy of extermination.
- (5) About the several categories of refugees and the oppressed Jews, we know only one thing: Upon the basis of their own past and the experiences of other Jews elsewhere they want only peace, security and opportunity for happiness as free human beings. Some will wish to return to their homelands. Some will wish to become citizens of the countries that gave them refuge. Others will want to go to Palestine, or elsewhere.
- (6) Freedom and happiness have been achieved, for Jews,

and the so-called "Jewish problem" has progressed nearer and nearer a solution, where Jews have had the opportunity to integrate their lives and to weld their destiny, not as a separate group, but as different and separate individuals, to the destiny of the nations that have been their homes and of which they are a part.

- (7) This process of integration or emancipation has been enhanced where Jews are considered people different only in their devotion to their religion—Judaism. The process of integration and emancipation has been retarded or completely stultified where the concept of a separate and different nationality status has prevailed for Jews. It is an accurate observation that to designate Jews as a religious group is a part of the heritage and tradition of liberalism and democracy in the Western World. To designate them as a national group is a vestige of the past. Enlightened states always refer to Jews as citizens of Jewish faith. Therefore as nations emerge from absolutism and oligarchy and join the march of freedom into representative government, Jews slowly get out from under the concept of a restrictive, separate nationality group. This process of transition has been witnessed in our own time in Russia, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

I have almost seemed to forget my average Jew in this auguring of the future.

But I have not really forgotten him at all. I am convinced that for himself he little cares whether he is called a member of a national group or a member of a religious community, any more than an average American is much interested in the question whether these United States are a democracy or a republic. The average Jew that I know just wants average peace, security and opportunity. He really is unconcerned, or no more concerned than other men, with the philosophies, the means, by which these average desires may be brought about. He does not care whether he helps to rebuild the lives of persecuted Jews under the label of a national group or that of a religious community. American or English Jews do not believe that foreign Jews in need of help care much

either. Both just want to get the job done and not quibble much over the labels used to do it.

I wish there were no indifference to labels and philosophies about what Jews are to be called. For Jews, in a sense, are engaged in a task of telling the world what they want to become. It is important that precise language be used.



*J*eans as a national group, and Jews as a religious community without national implications, are two widely different, and irreconcilable philosophies, and we must proceed to analyze them both.

Let me say, at the beginning, that the champions of both philosophies, I am sure, are interested only in achieving peace, security and opportunity for their fellow-Jews in a stable, good society. But they read history and estimate the future differently, and therefore they approach the problem facing Jews with two different remedies. I want to make it clear that the advocates of both viewpoints are sincere.

One more explanatory word by way of introduction: from now on I am going to use two words a great deal. When I refer to that philosophy and remedy which considers the Jew as a religious communicant, and which speaks of him as an American or a Frenchman or an Englishman of Jewish faith—or even as a Russian of Jewish nationality—I shall use the term emancipation. When I refer to that philosophy that calls Jews, as Jews, a nationality group with common national aspirations, no matter where they may dwell, and which therefore has produced the concept of "a Jewish people" in a political sense, I shall use the term *Jewish nationalism*.

With that much by way of introduction and against

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the background of all that I have so far written about Jews, let me turn first to the philosophy of emancipation, its premises and the pattern of its solution for the "Jewish problem."

Like all historians dealing with ideas, I am going to have to be arbitrary about dates. You may date a battle or the election of a President with precision. But you cannot clock an idea with a stop-watch.

The antecedents of either philosophy, emancipation, or Jewish nationalism, are very ancient. For Jews at any particular time in history have always wanted to be as free as other men, and to enjoy as much peace and opportunity. And there have always been some Jews who have believed that these desires could be realized by programs in the tradition of emancipation and other Jews who have believed that these aims could be realized by programs that belong in the tradition of the Jewish nationalists. The tug-of-war between these two viewpoints has gone on in Jewish life for many centuries.

Speaking to the Jews who had been taken into Babylonian captivity in 586 B.C., the prophet Jeremiah said:

"Build ye houses and dwell in them, and plant gardens and eat the fruit thereof, take ye wives, and beget sons and daughters; and take wives for your sons and give your daughters to husbands, that they may bear sons and daughters; and multiply ye there, and be not diminished. And seek the peace of the city whither I have caused you to be carried away captive, and pray unto the Lord for it; for in the peace thereof, shall ye have peace."

"Seek the peace of the city whither I have caused ye to be carried away captive . . . for in the peace thereof shall ye have peace." I think this might well be a slogan for those who believe in emancipation. Were Jeremiah living today and using modern language terms, he might have said, "Seek the general welfare of the community in which you live and integrate yourself into its life for only in this fashion will you know peace."

And this, in a word, is the philosophy of emancipation.

Since the days when the Kingdom of Judah fell, 2500 years ago in the days of Jeremiah, there have been Jews living in nations in all parts of the world who have never hoped for the rebirth of the nation that Babylon destroyed and who have sought only to maintain Judaism as a religion and in every other way to be like the people among whom they lived.

However greatly Jews may have desired to live according to this pattern, it was not always possible for them to do so. The world in which they lived was ruled by absolute monarchs and later by a combination of absolute monarchs, state churches and an ignorant provincialism on feudal lines. This combination, for many reasons and for many centuries, prevented most Jews—and other groups as well—from achieving real freedom or integration and from working for the peace of the cities and larger communities in which they lived. For this combination isolated Jews, sometimes within physical ghettos and sometimes within walls of legal discrimination and political restriction, and many times by a combination of all these segregating techniques.

So that while emancipation and integration have been existent in Jewish life through all these centuries to some extent and were true for some Jews at many periods of history, it cannot be said that they were conscious, continuous patterns for a solution to the problems facing Jews. Nor were they welded into any sustained and universal effort for most of the centuries which history knows as the Dark Ages. Europe has been a battle ground, dynastic, political, ideological, nationalistic and economic, since the time of the Romans. There has never been a period of long and uninterrupted social security and peace.

In the closing years of the eighteenth century, in America and France, there were born, through two great revolutions, the first libertarian democracies in the history of man. Rule of law was substituted for rule by whim of "divinely ap-

pointed" monarch, and the grip of state churches, Catholic or Protestant, was broken in those societies under declarations that under the ruling law men were equal without regard to creed. To the Dutch of New Amsterdam, and to Rhode Island, New Jersey and Pennsylvania (largely to Roger Williams and William Penn) go the honor of originating that pattern of freedom.

As that pattern of general society became more widespread, the proponents of emancipation began to come into their own. What had been only sporadic disconnected efforts to meet the problem of Jews in this pattern before, could now become a sustained and universal effort.

It ought to be noted and remembered that, as a consistent and universal pattern, emancipation is only a century and a half old. Before that time, Jews were, by and large, unable to try this pattern. Since then, they have tried it with increasing success for a growing number of Jews in an expanding number of nations. From America and France, the opportunities for emancipation spread to England, Western Europe, the Scandinavian nations, the British Empire, Italy, Latin America and, in the interval between these two world wars, to Russia, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in the last strongholds of feudal segregation in Central and Eastern Europe.

Those who believe in emancipation, then, simply believe that history sustains the struggle of Jews for equality as an integral part of the eternal struggle of man to be free, that there is no such thing as a permanent "Jewish problem" peculiar to a "Jewish people." Each advance of human freedom has liquidated some part of that problem, from France in the eighteenth century to Russia a quarter of a century ago. The result of this program of emancipation and integration is not a perfect solution. It will probably never be perfect. It will always be just average. But the average continues to improve as men generally improve their society.

The proponents of emancipation have faith in the future of democracy and its opportunities for emancipation.

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They believe that beyond this global war, man will go forward in another advance toward fuller freedom. The believers in emancipation believe in the moral evolution of man and do not believe that it is inherent in men to hate Jews. In meeting the problems facing the uprooted Jews of to-day's world, they insist therefore, first, on the right of repatriation as equals. They reject any blanket attempt to lump all distressed Jews together as a separate people, and every solution that denies equality to Jews, however much it may give them privileges as a separate group.

Believers in emancipation assert that these problems must be met and solved by the United Nations, who must accord to uprooted Jews whatever rights may be accorded other men in rebuilding their lives at the end of the war. Such uprooted citizens of Jewish faith should be free to migrate anywhere that other men are accorded opportunities to resettle. Restitution of property must be made to Jews on the same basis as to other men. In brief, believers in emancipation want no special privileges for Jews anywhere and no discrimination against Jews anywhere.

This philosophy is merely the application of the principles of democracy to human beings who happen to be of Jewish faith. Thus, by supporting it and contending for it, believers in emancipation strengthen the hands of democracy as it faces the future. They know that the solution will not be perfect, anymore than society can be expected to be perfect, but they also know that to admit or encourage imperfections or to espouse programs for Jews that are predicated upon failure of democracy is to render Jews and all men a tragic disservice.

The process of emancipation implies even more than this universal equality of rights and obligations for Jews as citizens of the nations in which they live. For emancipation brought with it not alone freedom from domination by cruel states and political church groups. It emancipated all men from

those corporate tyrannies. It emancipated the Jew from still another. It freed him from a rigid control by other Jews over his life. It meant intra-Jewish freedom as well as the right to expand into the external world.

I have used the words "emancipation" and "integration" a little carelessly perhaps. While they are parts of the same process, they are not synonymous. There can be no integration without the freedom of emancipation. I am also inclined to believe that the process of emancipation can work with real success only as integration takes place.

Let me put it this way: Emancipation is that larger freedom in general affairs which, for the most part, must be conferred upon Jews by the vast majority of men who are not Jews. Integration is the Jew's normal reaction to emancipation. It is the process which he himself controls and which enables him to take advantage of emancipation. Once integrated into a society, as a full and equal citizen he may then, within the limits of his abilities, work for still further emancipation. It is a kind of endless chain, to be sure. But in reality it is nothing more than the old concept of *noblesse oblige*, of privileges bringing responsibility and of accepting responsibility that privilege may continue.

This situation first developed for the Jew as a conscious philosophy with the beginnings of emancipation.

In the historic process, with the opportunities of a new world opening for Jews, with ghetto walls dissolving, the Jewish community *as such* dissolved too. Jews were no longer compelled to compress their lives within the limits of a Jewish quarter. They no longer owed civic allegiance to a Jewish community, but only to a larger, non-sectarian community. They might be as much or as little Jewish as they chose. They might even cease to be Jews; and I should say here, parenthetically, that it is testament to the virility of their faith that with this freedom of choice, there are as many Jews as there are in today's world. For it has not been easy to be a Jew. Many of them might have forsaken Judaism, but they didn't.

Believers in emancipation, then, believe not alone in the process of emancipation of Jews to equality. They believe also in the emancipation of Jews from corporate control over their lives by other Jews in anything that resembles a revival of the Jewish community concept of the Middle Ages. They dissent from World Jewish Congresses or international political organizations of Jews, or attempts to corral Jewish votes. They do not believe there is such a thing as "Jewish unity" in the commonly accepted meaning of the term of a "people" with unified agreement about economic, social or political questions. They believe that the idea of a Jewish community, organized as such, or any reasonable facsimile thereof is an anomaly in the modern world. It is interesting, by the way, to observe that it was a part of Hitler's program for Jews to revive the "Jewish community" concept in the occupied nations. He did this the better to further his own diabolical ends, of course. But nothing is more indicative of the atavism of his philosophy than this act.

There is no simple formula for integration; it involves first a constant vigilance against revivals of vestigial philosophies of separatism and segregation among Jews, and it involves also the more positive process of urging Jews to participate actively in the civic, social and political life about them, not as Jews but as individuals, and to reserve any distinctiveness as Jews for their religious life.

This double-edged program has gone on since emancipation emerged as an intelligent philosophy of Jewish life. And the program to integrate Jews, or have them integrate themselves, has encountered considerable difficulty from Jews themselves. An inevitable consequence of emancipation is the dissolution of the corporate Jewish community as such, and its control over the lives of Jews by other Jews. Naturally, the controlling Jews have always been reluctant to surrender such controls and many a Jewish John Doe has failed to understand the organic relationship between emancipation and integration.

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Professor Salo W. Baron, in his *A Social and Religious History of the Jews*, observes this anomaly when he says:

"On its march toward consolidation the modern state encountered no small obstacle in Jewish communal organization. The material as well as the spiritual power possessed by communal leaders, represented vested interests of considerable magnitude. . . . The modern state however had to batter down this refractory group, this nation within the nation."

And then he makes one more revealing observation which supports the contention that all organized Jewish life, as such, for the purpose of creating Jewish communities, as such, is a vestige of medievalism and a detriment to integration and emancipation. For Dr. Baron points out that there was an alliance between the reactionary forces in society and those Jews who desired to maintain controls over other Jews. The liberal elements in the new societies worked for the dissolution of the anomalous Jewish communities. Baron says:

"In each state progressive forces combined with a small vanguard of Jews against reactionary forces allied to the masses of Jewry. Radical anti-Semites often echoed demands for Jewish autonomy, as expressed by the most unyielding traditionalists among Jews."

So the pattern is clear. Believers in emancipation hold that Jews are stronger when they stand shoulder to shoulder with their fellow-men, as integrated individuals of free and democratic states. Or when they stand with their progressive fellow-men in those states where progressives are still waging the battle for democracy.

For even if all Jews were alike and had, common aspirations and were not scattered from Tanganyika to America, they would be a small number of people. What could they do if left to themselves as a "people"? What fortune would they have in a world that would continue on the low level

of civilization that insisted upon calling them a separate "people"? How could they lift themselves by their own bootstraps? What would have been the fate of the million or so Jews who populated the seventeenth century world had they not gradually broken out of a restrictive shell, through emancipation, and integrated their destinies with the destinies of a great and mighty continent? What contribution could these million humans have made, as a separate, isolated group had they not joined hands, everywhere, with men of good will and just as men and not particularly as Jews, helped wage the fight for freedom?

So too today, the proponents of emancipation, upon purely practical and expedient grounds, believe that Jews are stronger when they labor as Americans or Britons or Frenchmen of Jewish faith than they would be as separate and segregated parts of what must inevitably be a tiny "Jewish people." This is "One World" and the fight to make that world free transcends boundaries and national groups. And that fight to make this one world free is the same fight that will free all of its Jews, everywhere.

This then is the remedy of emancipation. It is really another name for man's evolution of liberty. It lacks a specifically Jewish flavor because the believers in emancipation do not believe there is a specific "Jewish people." If mankind's march toward freedom continues, as it must, only Jews themselves can prevent the average Jew from marching along. Some Jews may do this by opposing the integration of Jews into the environments in which they live. If they do that, an onward marching world will leave them behind. Jews may do this unwittingly, for I am sure none of them would do it with malice and design. But because I do not want this to happen, whatever the motivation, I dissent from Jewish nationalism, which I now propose to analyse.

I began the discussion of the philosophy of emancipation with the Biblical quotation to attest to the antiquity of

the principle, and I will do the same for my discussion of the philosophy of Jewish nationalism.

Referring to the same historical event as did the Babylonian Exile Jeremiah, an anonymous poet wrote in the 137th Psalm:

“By the rivers of Babylon, there we sat down; yea we wept when we remembered Zion. Upon the willows in the midst thereof we hanged up our harps. For here, they that led us captive asked of us words of song, and our tormentors asked of us mirth: ‘Sing us one of the songs of Zion.’ How shall we sing the Lord’s song in a foreign land? If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget her cunning. Let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth, if I remember thee not; if I set not Jerusalem above my chiefest joy.”

As Jeremiah’s admonition to these same Jews—to seek the peace of the city wherein they had come to live as the only way to peace for themselves—may be said to be the kernel of the philosophy of emancipation and integration, so the lament of this unknown Psalmist may be said to be the kernel of the philosophy of Jewish nationalism.

“How can we sing the Lord’s song in a foreign land?”

In a hundred variations that has been the theme of Jewish nationalism from that far-off day to this. Jews were not at home in the world. They were forever “a people” in Exile. They lived, always, a Palestine-centered life. Palestine is an “incurable fixation” among Jews, declares one of the more articulate of modern Jewish nationalists. And in another place, the same spokesman for Jewish nationalism says, speaking of emancipated Jews who no longer possessed this fixation, that they had simply outgrown “the habit of Exile.”

Another defender of modern Jewish nationalism told the Foreign Affairs Committee of the United States Congress:

“The Jewish people will never be able to do in any other land outside of Palestine what they are able to do there

under the impulse of the idealistic drive that has its roots in centuries of history."

This statement was made after 2000 years of "exile," at Congressional hearings on a Resolution designed to establish Palestine as a "Jewish commonwealth." Always, everywhere, in the expressions of Jewish nationalism, runs the refrain, "Only in Palestine can Jews be a normal people." "'How can we sing the Lord's song,' how can we be true to ourselves in a foreign land?"

There has grown up in Jewish nationalism a whole terminology that is redolent of this basic concept of the movement. Jewish nationalists speak of the "homelessness of Jews." They refuse to admit the historic dissolution of the short-lived Jewish nation and contend that Jews today are still a nation, no matter where they may live and that the highest political aspiration of Jews is a "Jewish commonwealth."

The founder of modern, political Jewish nationalism, Theodore Herzl, declared this basic principle of "the peoplehood of Jews" in these words, "We are a people—one people." And speaking of those emancipated and integrated Jews who did not share this aspiration of a "Jewish nation," Herzl said, "The whole thing does not concern them at all. They are Jewish Frenchmen. Well and good! This is a private affair for Jews alone."

Dr. Chaim Weizmann, President of the World Zionist Organization, reiterated this basic principle when he said, "Henceforth it shall be said of Jews, 'One God, One People, One Land.' "

This then is the major premise of Jewish nationalism. Jews are one people. They are a political people—a nation. They share common political aspirations for a Jewish state. For the nationalist in Jewish life claims that this "one people" at present is an abnormal people and that this abnormality is the source of its eternal trouble. Its abnormality lies in the fact that as a nation, in exile, Jews, unlike other

nations, have no territory, no sovereign state of their own. The "Jewish problem" therefore, has no direct relationship to the progress of democracy and the processes of emancipation and integration. The *only* way to normalize the lives of Jews everywhere is to reconstitute the Jewish nation, upon a land of its own.

"There is but *one* solution for national homelessness which is the source of our millennial tragedy. . . . That is a national home! Not new immigration opportunities to other countries for fleeing refugees, for new colonization schemes, in other parts of the world. . . . The *only* solution is to normalize the *political status* of the Jewish people by giving it a *national basis* in its national and historic homeland." (Italics mine.)

These are the words of one of the foremost exponents of Jewish nationalism in the world, spoken in 1943.

There is a third step in the logic of Jewish nationalism. Jews are one people. They are an abnormal people whose abnormality can be eliminated only when they return from Exile to a state of their own. Finally, that state must be reconstituted in Palestine. For, as the Jewish nationalist sees it, Jews have never surrendered their political rights to Palestine. To the Jewish nationalist, Palestine has always been above his "chiefest joy." The Jewish nationalist speaks of "ancient and historic rights" in Palestine. It is interesting to observe that he does not say that he merely wishes to establish a Jewish nation in that country; he carefully uses the word, "reconstitute." For to him, the establishing took place long ago and has never undergone disestablishment.

This is the philosophy. As I evaluated the philosophy of emancipation and integration, so now I must evaluate these premises, as objectively as I can.

The terminology of the Jewish nationalist, describing Jews as a nation and a "people" in a political sense or even in an ethnic sense, is not Jewish in its origin. When Rome destroyed the second Hebrew Commonwealth in the

year 70 and Jews were scattered to the far reaches of the Roman Empire, they were considered citizens whose religion was Judaism.

In the third century, the Catholic Church philosophers first began to insist that Jews were "a nation." Judaism had been a universal religion; it won many converts, even among the nobility of Rome. But the Christian Church, while it recognized the origins of Christianity in Judaism, took the position that with the coming of Jesus, Jews were no longer to be regarded as possessors of a universal religion: that title now belonged to the Church. Therefore, Church leaders consciously and publicly sought to limit Judaism as the creed of "one nation" called Jews, and this nation was to be kept in its own circle as an ethnic group.

It should next be observed that this philosophy of Jewish nationalism is not a program designed for the sole purpose of meeting the present problems confronting Jews. The larger, more fundamental theses of the program have been lost sight of in contemporary discussions as to the future political status of Palestine. Like the philosophy of emancipation and integration, Jewish nationalism is a complete philosophy for Jewish life. It looks upon the present tragic plight of many Jews as an incident in the fulfillment of that philosophy. It recommends programs—or more accurately *one* program—as a solution. The *one* remedy of Jewish nationalism is to end the "homelessness" of Jews. The cornerstone of the rehabilitation of Jewish life must be the *one* solution of returning Jews to political statehood, as a political entity in Palestine.

It looks askance at any proposals that do not feature this fundamental. It is indifferent, or even opposed, to other immigration opportunities or colonization plans. Its one relentless drive is for the recognition of Jewish nationality status and the reconstitution of Palestine as the place in which this Jewish nation will live. Moreover, not even Palestine will do under just any circumstances. It must be a "Jewish commonwealth." In a recent book, one of the protagonists of Jewish

nationalism says that exponents of the philosophy entertained fears about the effect that German Jewish refugees might have on Jewish nationalist ambitions for Palestine. They were afraid, he says, that to these refugees Palestine might be just like any other country and these refugees, who had considered themselves Germans of Jewish faith, might now consider themselves Palestineans of Jewish faith, rather than Jewish citizens of a Jewish Commonwealth. To the Jewish nationalist, there is all the difference in the world. For their program must be compressed within the dogma of their philosophy, which leads through the various stages I have traced, from the "peoplehood" of the Jews to the necessity of proving to the world that Jews are a nation by creating in Palestine a "Jewish" state.

This is the place to observe the irreconcilable differences between these two philosophies of emancipation and Jewish nationalism. The use of terms like "exile," "homelessness," and "one people" among Jewish nationalists is not accidental. It derives from the fundamental premise of their philosophy that emancipation has failed, that the Jew can never know freedom or normality, or at least not equal freedom and normality, in any nation other than Palestine. To the Jewish nationalist there is only one Jewish homeland.

To the believer in emancipation, since there is no "Jewish people," individual Jews are at home in every place in which they are citizens.

If that formula is not yet perfect, it is because it is relatively new, just as democracy is relatively new. But it is improving, and slowly more and more Jews are finding peace and security in the countries in which they live as a result of its efficacy. So believes the advocate of emancipation. The Jewish nationalist is prepared to call the whole attempt to win equal rights for Jews everywhere a failure. He is particularly sure that it has failed and will continue to fail in Central and Eastern Europe. Before the last war and during the negotiations for the peace, Jewish nationalists were certain that Jews could no longer live in any part of Central or Eastern Europe.

The great change that came about in Russia, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia proves the falsity of that blanket prediction.

If the believer in emancipation is an optimist, with faith in the moral evolution of man, the Jewish nationalist is a pessimist. With his spiritual predecessor, Herzl, the Jewish nationalist of today says, "If only we could be left in peace. . . . But I think we will not be left in peace." The Jewish nationalist believes that anti-Semitism is incurable; that it is inherent in the relationship of Jews to non-Jews. His solution to anti-Semitism is compressed into the dogma of his philosophy. Only when Jews have a political representation, through a political state, and Jews not in that state presumably look to that state's authority for protection, will anti-Semitism be curbed.

But it is not alone in the area of external emancipation that the Jewish nationalist comes into conflict with those who believe in emancipation. In that inner emancipation of Jewish life, which I have called integration, there exists a sharp conflict between these two philosophies, too. For Jewish nationalism, in some instances by conscious design, in others by the inescapable logic of its program, works against integration of the individual Jews. Since Jewish nationalism denies the dissolution of the Jewish nation, through the process of emancipation, it is only logical to expect that it seeks, wherever possible, to maintain the corporate forms that belonged to the era before emancipation. As believers in emancipation oppose Jewish congresses, so Jewish nationalists favor them. Jewish nationalists like to apply words such as "Congress" or "Assembly" to any significant gathering of Jews. Jewish nationalism was the leading contender for recognition of Jews, in East and Central European countries at the end of the last war, upon the basis of minority group rights. Jewish nationalists protested, some years ago, when Turkey dissolved its minority guarantees and established its government on the basis of individual rights. Wherever they could, Jewish nationalists have encouraged complete, Jewish group autonomy. That sys-

tem of national minority group rights has been admitted a failure, even by the nationalists among Jews who contended for them. Yet, they have wedded themselves to a policy in Palestine which has made Jews there a "nation within a nation." And the inevitable result of their program in Palestine, even if Jews should become a majority, would be to make the Arab population a "nation within a nation." Thus they would apply to others in Palestine that which worked so disastrously for themselves in Eastern Europe.

The program of Jewish nationalism is opposed both to emancipation and the inner freedom of integration. It seeks to retain, in one form or another, that corporate control over the lives of Jews that emancipation would normally end, and has ended, in places where emancipation has had the longest tradition. Jewish nationalism believes in spokesmen for "Jewish life" and, as I shall show later, possessing organization of Jews for ends other than religion, it has assumed the mantle of spokesmanship.

The revival of the corporate Jewish community, with control over the lives of Jews by other Jews, has in recent years taken on a new form. In nations where Jews were free, it was increasingly difficult to compress local, or even national, Jewish populations into purely Jewish communal forms. Jews had access to regular courts, to public schools. They found themselves in a competitive, economic society and evolved a philosophy of Judaism that was compatible with their life in such a society. Jewish leaders who believed in "a Jewish people" could not adequately control the minutiae of the lives of the average Jew. That average Jew was no longer subject to the punishment of excommunication; his "Jewishness" was a matter of conscience, as all religion should be. In politics, in business, in education, in social viewpoints, he was as free and uncontrolled as other men.

But the Jewish nationalist substituted a larger area of corporate control for this control of local population of Jews. The substitute was the concept of the revival of a Jewish

nation, with its locale in Palestine. Through this political aspiration, which the Jewish nationalist claims is common to all Jews—to "the Jewish people"—attempts at corporate control over Jews filter back in the many nations in which they now live.

Whether that control shall succeed or not is today the most important question facing Jews everywhere. For the answer that they give to the attempt to so control their lives will determine whether or not they proceed in the pattern of emancipation or whether they revert to the pre-emancipation pattern of separate "peoplehood," as unintegratable nations within nations among the many nations of the world.

The mechanism, the philosophy, the potentialities for the realization of this program are all inherent in the organized movement known as Zionism. It is to a history of the organization of this philosophy of Jewish nationalism into a concrete mechanism that I turn our attention in the next chapter.

PART II ~ Zionist Nationalism



*F*or many centuries Zion lived in the hearts of Jews. And because it lived in their hearts, it lived in their prayers.

There are sound, psychological reasons for the persistence of this sentiment. In the land now called Palestine the great, religious heritage of Israel had originated. The Bible was saturated with the lore of the land. In the darkness of their ghettos, in the bleak and benighted feudal and post-feudal era, the joys of their faith, its traditions, its festivals, its heroes provided Jews with their only release from an uninviting world. And Zion, Palestine, was a part of all this.

But if Palestine brightened the life of the average Jew in the medieval ghettos of Europe, so did the Sabbath. So did the white bread of the Sabbath meal. So did endless poring over the Talmud as one of the chief outlets for his intellectual energies. All of these provided the limited pleasures of circumscribed Jewish lives. But *none* of the elements in this tradition was an "incurable fixation."

Emancipation diminished the intensity of the Jew's reflection on Zion and observance of the outward ceremonials of his faith. When white bread was no longer difficult to secure, it lost some of its importance as a delicacy for the Sabbath alone. When the Jew secured access to the larger, intellectual opportunities of a new society, he ceased to be single-minded

in his stress on the importance of the Talmud. Emancipation permitted integration and he found that none of these elements of his tradition was immutable or an "incurable fixation." Nor was Palestine.

Jews did not organize to capture the Holy Land. Here and there a false messiah rocketed across their usually dreary heavens and promised redemption and a return to Palestine. But in most of these experiences, the personality of the would-be Messiah, not a Palestinian fixation, ignited the fires of expectancy—it was his challenge and power-promises, not the idea of Palestine itself that produced activity and engendered hopes. I would not condemn the Palestinian memory for the havoc these charlatans wrought; nor would I credit it with the feverish activity they usually managed to produce.

Left to the normal pattern of their lives, the average Jew lived as well as he could under the rigors of what was, for everyone but a chosen few, a perilous and insecure world. When Palestine was a part of the Roman Empire, the Jews of the Empire did not return there in appreciable numbers. Nor did they ever make strenuous efforts to return to it although they met persecution and exile while mankind was feeling its way through the labyrinthian darkness of feudal provincialism and ignorance.

Though Jews lamented that they could not "sing the Lord's song in a foreign land," they did sing it. They have produced rich and immortal contributions in almost every land in which they lived, from the days of Babylon to the present.

A religious nostalgia for Palestine survived. That nostalgia was much more important in days when, because of their confinement, their religion was the sole outlet for their lives. It became less and less important, when, with the ghetto gone, they became citizens of a larger and more inviting world. Yet they continued to sing of Zion—and so have Christians.

I write this about Palestine and its place in Jewish life with no feeling of apology. There was an affection that

had nothing to do with the immediacies of the life of the Jew, or with the realities of his existence. If he was homeless in medieval Europe, this religious nostalgia, while a compensation for his spiritual depression, did not give him a sense of home any more than it did to Christians, to whom Palestine has been and is, the Holy Land.

Insofar as this religious nostalgia had any relationship at all to the problems besetting their lives, Jews believed that the return to Palestine was to be only a part of a Messianic emancipation of all men. It was, to them, a sacrilege for man to arrogate unto himself the power to bring this about. It was to be God's own work and in His "own time."

It is difficult to speak of this religious, pious interest in Palestine *vis à vis* emancipation, as I have written of Jewish nationalism *vis à vis* emancipation. For in these long centuries of darkness there was no philosophy or practice of emancipation and integration, in the contemporary sense. The average Jew of the tenth or eleventh or twelfth century would have said, "When the Messiah comes I shall return to Palestine as a part of the Messianic Plan." In this way, he placed Jerusalem above "his chiefest joy," and left it as a far-off, never-never land.

It was not until the nineteenth century that Palestine came to be offered as a specific cure for the problems facing Jews. By this time, the effects of emancipation and integration were established facts in the nations of Western Europe and in the United States.¹ Emancipation had progressed so well that it had produced Jews of great influence and considerable wealth. Among these were men like Moses Montefiore and the Rothschilds. Such men were appalled at the continuing tragedy of Jews in Eastern Europe, particularly in Russia. Montefiore visited Palestine seven times and was enthralled, as a pilgrim, with its tradition-laden atmosphere. It seemed to him to offer opportunities as a sanctuary for the hapless Jews of Russia. He financed a number of social and economic experiments to explore the possibilities of the land,

not as a "homeland" for a "Jewish people" but as a sanctuary for the endangered Jews of Eastern Europe. Baron Edmund Rothschild also turned to Palestine as a possible future home for some of these tormented humans. In a more systematic and schematic way, he financed and supervised colonization projects.

The efforts of these men and others like them are not to be confused with Jewish nationalism, or Zionism. They saw in Palestine the possibilities of a home for tragically situated Jews. But like the pious sentimentality of the average medieval Jew, these exceptional nineteenth century Jews became unwitting contributors to the latent movement of Jewish nationalism. Their philanthropic interest in helping distressed Jews was to provide a basis for a movement that came later to object strenuously to philanthropy or a rescue-refugee program as methods of meeting the problems of harassed Jews.

To these two ingredients of religion and philanthropy in the chemistry of Palestine as a specific for the problems affecting Jews, there was now added a third that transformed, or attempted to transform, the other two; the idea of nationalism.

In Western Europe and to emancipated, philanthropically minded Jews, Palestine appealed as a land of refuge because of religious sentiments. In the unemancipated and unintegrated Jewries of Eastern Europe, Palestine came to be linked with an entirely new phenomenon among Jews. It became the solution in which there was brewed the movement of secular Jewish nationalism as a specific for the ills of a new phenomenon, the "Jewish people."

Two factors combined to bring about this new, unorthodox development in the lives of Jews, neither of them of Jewish origin.

The first was the prevailing temper of the times manifested in the rise of great, national states. This was the age of strong imperialisms in England, France and Holland, and to a lesser extent in America. Among mighty nations that

had felt the influence of enlightenment, nationalism took this form of expansion.

In nations into which enlightenment had not penetrated, there emerged a frustrated union of provincial superstition and the dynamics of the new power of nationalism. This was the era of the modern version of the race-state, the era of Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, the ideological father of Adolf Hitler. It was the age when large states grew still larger and when small states, having no outlet for the passion of nationalism, developed the neurosis of frustrated people. Jewish nationalism is a reflection of these general factors. It led some Jews to wish to become a nation, like other nations.

Another factor contributed even more to Jewish nationalism. In those parts of the world where emancipation existed, Jews were gradually integrated; but in areas of the world where emancipation had not yet arrived, an increasing and narrow nationalism seemed to isolate the Jew. The chief source of the tragedy was the lack of democratic development. Exponents of Jewish nationalism, however, overwhelmed by the rush to petty nationalism, believed that the solution to their problem was to be found in the same rush. This consideration has produced enduring paradoxes and inconsistencies in the movement. Designed to solve the problem of "a Jewish people," it refused to recognize that man's expanding freedom was dissolving this concept of a "people" upon which Jewish nationalism was founded. Discouraged at the slow pace of the emancipation that was producing that dissolution, Jewish nationalism flung itself in the face of the forces of history and said, in effect, "If emancipation has not been completed yet, it never will. Therefore, we will seek freedom by continuing in the rôle which barbarism and serfdom assigned to us, as a separate, unintegratable group." It was as if men everywhere had said: "Democracy has not been a success in these fifty years. It has not extended its freedom to every human being on earth. Therefore, it is a failure and we reject it as a way for man to live."

Because emancipation was slow and, as all historical phenomena, met with occasional setbacks, Jewish nationalism rejected its philosophy completely. It did more: It proceeded upon an attempt to organize a pattern of life that was derived from the era and forces that opposed emancipation; it called Jews a "nation" and set out to deal with the problems besetting Jews as "national" problems with an economy and society stemming from the Middle Ages. It sought to maintain the substance of the distinct Jewish community, with control of the attitudes of Jews on all manner of problems in human life. While a society was emerging in which men were to become increasingly interdependent, it put forth a program for Jews predicated upon the belief that one part of that society could fall or rise without affecting the rest of the organism. In a society whose very essence was faith in the moral evolution of man in his gradual development in freedom, Jewish nationalism offered a "cure" predicated upon the assumption that hostility to the Jews was eternal and immutable. In short, it conceived of society as frozen and static, in the restrictive, stratified patterns of the Middle Ages, and predicated the future of Jews upon that basis. Because it did this it adopted a position that becomes increasingly anomalous as mankind makes its slow, hesitating, but nonetheless persistent, advances toward freedom.

All of these premises of Jewish nationalism are clearly and forthrightly stated in the works of men who consciously began to formulate the doctrine as a total philosophy of Jewish life and as a cure-all for ills of a "Jewish people."

There were a number of such men in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The work of three of the most important served as precursors to the actual organization of Jewish nationalism into a world movement.

The first of these was Moses Hess, a German by birth. In 1862, Hess set forth one of the earliest statements of the embryonic movement of Jewish nationalism in a book, *Rome and Jerusalem*. In it Hess put down the historic and

economic bases of the movement later to be called Zionism. His philosophy was based on the thesis that "We [Jews] shall always remain strangers among the nations; these, it is true, will grant us rights from feelings of humanity and justice, but they will never respect us so long as we place our great [Jewish national?] memories in the second rank, and accept as our first principle, 'ubi bene, ibi patria.'"

Here is revealed, by the first of these philosophers of the movement, the hard, unyielding, never-to-be-forgotten core of Jewish nationalism. Whatever its timely interest at any moment, whether that of aiding refugees or advancing Jewish culture, all must serve the principle of being Jews first and human beings second. It was never to be enough for this philosophy that "where I am well off, there is my country." It had a doctrine to promote and Jewish lives to compress within the limitations of that doctrine. Even when it grudgingly admitted that Jews might be granted rights, it found these not enough. It was concerned less with the rights of humans who were Jews than with the method used to achieve those rights. It was concerned less with Jews than with an artificial entity of the "Jewish people."

Here Jewish nationalism departed from the interests of the Montefiores and the Rothschilds and their successors among Jews—the men who were intent upon securing humanity and justice for oppressed Jews by any honorable and legitimate method. Jewish nationalism, however, crystallized into a program that would admit of "only *one* solution," even a century after Hess, in an era that had already expanded freedom and emancipation for Jews. Jewish nationalism never freed itself from the dogmatism of Hess; it cannot free itself without ceasing to be Jewish nationalism. To Hess it made all the difference in the world whether rights were conferred upon Jews as individual citizens of the nations in which they lived, in societies of increasing integration and cooperation, or whether "the Jewish people" through a display of national consciousness wrung such rights as Jews, for Jews, from the

world. This dogmatism looked askance at the salvation of Russian Jewry in a program that extended beyond Jewish nationalism. This dogmatism today impels a political descendent of Hess to admit that Jewish nationalists were fearful in 1933-'34 that the men and women who fled the Hitler terror in Germany and came to Palestine might consider themselves Palestineans of Jewish faith, rather than Jewish citizens of a projected Jewish commonwealth.

Some years later and perhaps independent of Hess, Leo Pinsker arose in Russia. He formulated this philosophy into an even more definitive statement. In 1882, Pinsker published his book, to which he gave the significant title *Auto-emancipation*.

The title is revealing. Its intended contrast to the philosophy of emancipation was unmistakable, as the author intended it to be. It expressed in a single word the essence of Jewish nationalism in direct opposition to the philosophy of emancipation and integration. For as to Hess, so too to Pinsker ". . . the Jew is nowhere at home, nowhere regarded as a native; he remains an alien everywhere." The answer to this "homelessness" of all Jews must be the opposite of integration. It must be the solidifying of Jews into a unit known as the Jewish "nation" and the unremitting effort of that solidified group to free itself, by itself, through a regenerated "national consciousness."

Once again and this time more clearly than in Hess' *Rome and Jerusalem* it became evident that Jewish nationalism had gone far beyond an answer to the pious lament, "How shall we sing the Lord's song in a foreign land?" It had also gone far beyond the purposes of the western, emancipated, philanthropic Jews who saw in Palestine a territory for development as a refuge and future home for a fraction of persecuted Jews.

Hess and Pinsker were neither religionists nor philanthropists. They were proponents of an entirely new thesis. They were secular nationalists. They were uninterested in

emancipation unless it came in terms of their "auto-emancipation." And the paradox of their position was and is that their terms for emancipation insisted upon maintaining a *pre-emancipation* (segregated) status for Jews.

Like Hess, Pinsker rejected emancipation which was not founded upon recognition of the rights of "a Jewish nation," regardless of the advantages it may have brought to individual Jews. Emancipation on any terms but national he placed in the same category as being "persecuted, tolerated, protected . . .".

He goes further. The objective student of the "Jewish problem," Pinsker declares, "will not make either of the parties [Jews or Christians] seriously responsible for the antagonism. . . ." The antagonism, presumably, is founded in the very nature of the universe. There is an inexorable and inescapable conflict between humans known as Jews and other humans. To believe otherwise is "to stand awkwardly by and expect of human nature something which it has always lacked —humanity." To the Jews who expect humanity of men, he says, "you are contemptible, because you have no real self-love and no national self-respect."

But even where humanity operates to place Jews on a plane of equality with other men, it is not enough. It was wrong to rejoice that emancipation had put "a small fraction of our people on equal footing with non-Jews." It was degrading to reveal joy at this evolution of some Jews out of misery. To reveal such joy is to be "a renegade."

And then, the solution: "We must seek our honor and our salvation not in illusory self-deceptions, but in the restoration of a national bond of union." And further, the struggle to achieve this "must be entered upon in such a spirit as to exert an irresistible pressure upon the international politics of the present. . . ."

While these pillars of the philosophy of Jewish nationalism were being reared in Eastern Europe, Western Jews, in the spirit of the Montefiores and the Rothschilds were sup-

plying the substance necessary to transplant some of the harassed Jews of Eastern Europe elsewhere, including Palestine.

The first serious attempts at colonization in Palestine took place in the 1880's. As yet there was no synthesis of these two efforts—the one to rescue humans, the other to formulate a new political philosophy for Jews everywhere. Jews who went to Palestine were not yet forced to determine whether they would go as citizens of another land or as the first exhibits of a reconstituted Jewish nation. And, like the average Jew today in need of a refuge, the great majority of the beneficiaries did not care.

Because of their improved situation, emancipated Jews continued to supply the means for refuge to Palestine and to concern themselves with the practical needs of the refugees. But increasingly Jewish nationalism, professing as one of its major premises a lack of faith in emancipation, was to interpret all that was done in terms of affirmations of a "Jewish nation." This was not apparent at the early stage because neither group was organized. Emancipated Jews were as yet at no disadvantage *vis-à-vis* the proponents of Jewish nationalism, because neither had an organization. Later, as Jewish nationalism developed into an organized movement, the scales were unbalanced.

But if emancipated Jews were indifferent to labels, the Gentile world was not. Hardly had it learned to think of Jews in terms of emancipation, before it began to hear these dire, hopeless predictions of the failure of emancipation. Almost before it had learned to think and act toward Jews as Englishmen or Frenchmen or Americans of Jewish faith, there came these urgings of some Jews, demanding recognition of Jews as a separate, unintegratable nation. What effect this had on the early extension of emancipation we shall probably never be able to estimate.

In the closing years of the nineteenth century, there arose a conflict as to whether the practical work of philanthropy should go on in Palestine regardless of the shape of things to come, or whether the philosophy should be made to prevail

first and, in the spirit of Hess and Pinsker, a "nation" of Jews should reconstitute its nationhood as of national right. The debate went in a circle.

Into the circle, in the closing years of the century, stepped the third man who helped shape the skeleton and framework of Jewish nationalism as a philosophy of Jewish life. His name was Asher Ginsburg, a Ukrainian Jew who came to be known under his pen name, Ahad Ha'am.

In the controversy as to which should come first, the physical transplantation of oppressed Jews to Palestine or the definitive formulation of the doctrine of Jewish nationhood, Ahad Ha'am sided with the latter group. The weight of his influence was decisive. Thereafter, Jewish nationalism was first a philosophy, conditioning, patterning, compressing the lives of Jewish human beings into a rigid formula. Refuge, economy, social problems—all these were, forever after, secondary concerns.

Ahad Ha'am came to the conclusion "that a thought as NEW as that of a Jewish national ideal required a certain amount of spiritual preparation. . . . Colonization must be regarded not as an economic or philanthropic, but as a national, problem."

This man, insisting upon the birth of a national spirit before actual establishment of refuges, has come to be called the founder of "cultural Zionism." And "cultural Zionism" has come to be regarded as something quite apart from and independent of Jewish nationalism. Yet no man was more determined than Ahad Ha'am that the political formulation of a Jewish nation be indestructibly established. This he proposed to do by careful, patient conditioning of Jews into a "Jewish people."

Ahad Ha'am is thus not outside the dogmas of Jewish nationalism; he is among the creators of them. He differed from others in the movement only in method. For Ahad Ha'am reveals in his writing what Hess and Pinsker did not know or

would not admit: the success of emancipation in normalizing the lives of Jews. He knew that if Jews were left alone, there would be no Jewish nation. Therefore he set as his first goal the creation of one, and set his face forthrightly against emancipation. He did not believe emancipation would fail; he believed it would succeed, and he did not want it to succeed. He wanted to preserve a solid, unintegrated entity of a "Jewish people." In order to preserve this entity, he believed it necessary to have a Jewish state in Palestine. Then, in a kind of cultural imperialism, a Jewish Palestine would maintain the Jew as a separate, distinct national no matter where he might be in the world.

Unless this happened, Ahad Ha'am believed, the processes of integration would work so well that there would be left only human beings of Jewish faith, fully integrated into the nations in which they lived. So he laments that, because of emancipation, "the best talents born among us in the last generations . . . have forsaken the field of our national endeavors and have gone their various ways, to give of their wealth to strangers."

Ahad Ha'am was the most outspoken exponent of Jewish nationalism, centering in the creation of a Jewish state, as the new method of maintaining corporate control over a "Jewish people."

Ahad Ha'am's thinking made a profound and lasting impression upon the movement. "Cultural Zionism" does not differ much from political Zionism except in degree and method. There is no difference in purpose or direction. Both viewpoints are the viewpoints of Jewish nationalism, and both are opposed to emancipation.

There were other men in these years who expressed similar views, but these three may be said to have collected the brick and mortar. It now remained for a figure to come along who would take what these men had assembled and build the tangible structure of Jewish nationhood.



In the light of the conflict between the Western Jews interested in refuge and philanthropy and the East European philosophers interested in Jewish nationalism, it was perhaps inescapable that the man who was to create a tangible structure should be a quaint amalgam of both the West and East. The man was an Austrian Jew, Theodore Herzl. For forty years of his life he was an example of the success of emancipation and integration—as a newspaper man and belle-lettrist in Vienna, one of the most cosmopolitan and cultured cities of the world. He had even less than the average Jew's interest in things Jewish. Among average men he would have been one of those who held no great interest in religion.

Representing the *Neue Freie Presse* in Paris, Herzl reported the famous Dreyfus affair. Here he absorbed the mistrust, the lack of faith in emancipation, that was to convert him to Jewish nationalism. "The Dreyfus *procès* . . . which I witnessed in Paris in 1894, made me a Zionist."

As an average, Westernized Jew, Herzl knew nothing of Hess and Pinsker. In Paris, he attempted several times to formulate an answer to anti-Semitism, which he had come to look upon as "cosmic." His first attempt was a drama, which he called *The New Ghetto*. This medium did not satisfy him and in 1895 he attempted to put forth not alone an analysis of the problem, but a solution in an essay which he frankly entitled *Das Judenstaat (The Jewish State)*.

In this essay, Herzl came to the same conclusions as Hess and Pinsker and Ahad Ha'am before him:

"We are a people—one people. It is useless for us to be loyal patriots, as were the Huguenots who were forced to emigrate. If we could only be left in peace. . . . But I think we shall not be left in peace. . . . I shall now put the Jewish

question in the surest possible form: Are we to 'get out' now? And if so, to what place? Or may we yet remain? And if so, how long? . . . The nations in whose midst Jews live are all either covertly or openly anti-Semitic. . . . Anti-Semitism increases day by day and hour by hour among the nations; indeed it is bound to increase, because the causes of its growth continue to exist *and cannot be removed.*" (Italics mine.)

"The causes" for anti-Semitism which Herzl gave were indeed interesting. He departed from Ahad Ha'am when he said one of them was "our loss of the power of assimilation during the Middle Ages." He seems to have agreed with Ahad Ha'am's disparagement of Jewish life in emancipation when, as the second cause for anti-Semitism, he suggested "our excessive production of mediocre intellects."

These "unfortunate Jews are now carrying anti-Semitism into England; they have already introduced it into America." The solution, Herzl insisted with Hess, Pinsker and Ahad Ha'am, must be "national." Philanthropy he declared "was bankrupt." In a letter to Baron de Hirsch who, more than any other individual until that time, had put his energy and fortune at the disposal of oppressed Jews, Herzl wrote: "What you have hitherto undertaken was as magnanimous as it was mistaken, as costly as it was useless. Hitherto you have been only a philanthropist, a Peabody. I will show you a way by which you can become greater."

Like Hess and Pinsker and Ahad Ha'am, Herzl was neither religious nor philanthropic. A plan to help Jews on that basis was unacceptable to him. It must be "national" or nothing. "Let the sovereignty be granted us over a portion of the globe large enough to satisfy the rightful requirements of a nation; the rest we shall manage ourselves."

Herzl was indifferent as to whether "the portion of the globe" assigned to Jews was Palestine or Argentina, and by this attitude revealed the true nature of the movement known as Zionism. Its basic, fundamental premise is the nationhood

of Jews and the insistence that every approach to problems affecting Jews be compressed within the pattern of a Jewish nationality. To Ahad Ha'am it made little difference whether most of that nation lived in Palestine or elsewhere, just so long as the nation came into being. To Herzl, it made little difference whether Palestine was to be the location, so long as most of the nation was collected in one place.

Herzl then proposed the formation of two organizations to implement his idea. One was to be known as The Society of Jews. All Jews who were interested in his idea of the Jewish nation were to be welcomed as members. "The Society of Jews will do the preparatory work in the domains of science and politics. . . ." The other organization, known as The Jewish Company, was to be composed of "practical" men who would turn to practical usage the work of the Society.

Herzl did not really intend to create a movement by writing this essay—the essay contained not a single original idea, as every biographer of Herzl agrees. What Herzl had that Hess, Pinsker and Ahad Ha'am did not have, was "personality," and a political power urge.

Herzl wrote *The Jewish State* only to clarify his own thinking. He admits to entertaining the further hope that "this pamphlet will open a general discussion on the Jewish Question. . . ." He hoped that sometime in the future, as a result of that discussion, his Society of Jews and his Jewish Company would be formed to begin the actual creation of the Jewish state.

The first edition of the essay was published in Vienna in 1896. Whether he wished it or not, it was the Bible of movement. With this event, modern or political Zionism is said to have been born and the movement crystallized about the personality of Herzl.

Could it be that this de-emancipated Jew had been supplied by emancipation with what his predecessors in Jewish nationalism had lacked? His admittedly facile pen, at home in the languages of the Western world? His savoir-faire in the

presence of notables of the time? His knowledge of at least the rudiments of world politics? His access to the emancipated Jews of the world? I do not know. All of the biographers of Herzl have themselves been Jewish nationalists. Every one of them assigns his pre-eminence in Jewish nationalism to his "personality." None of them attempts any real inventory of the intangibles that made his personality a unique contribution to the new movement which came to be officially designated as Zionism. It is at least an interesting observation that only Herzl of all these prophets of Jewish nationalism could be said to have known the blessings of emancipation.

When the first edition of *The Jewish State* appeared in 1896, it came to the attention of a group of nationally minded Jews who called themselves the Kadimah Society. The group wrote to Herzl, urging him to proceed with the actual founding of his Society of Jews. Interestingly enough, it was proposed that the central office be in London, in that same England to which Herzl had thought it necessary to make special reference in order to prove the fallacy of emancipation.

Beginning with Herzl, we find the strange contradiction that runs through the history of Jewish nationalism. His life dramatizes the strange impugning of emancipation and integration on the one hand and, on the other, a concentration of Zionist forces in the midst of the most emancipated Jews. Here is the constant belittling of the possibilities of emancipation in the world, and yet a dependency upon emancipation to further Zionist aims. Richard Gottheil, a recognized historian of the movement, admits that it was the liberalism of England that first attracted Herzl as a place to begin his activity. Zionism has always presented this paradox of talking as if emancipation were an established failure and yet of using its blessings to the utmost. It has always bit the hand that fed it; emancipated Jews continued to be "practical" and "statesmanlike" as they unwittingly fed the machinery that made for greater and greater separatism and segregation. Zionism has never rid itself of the logic that existed in the days when Pinsker called Jews

who believed in emancipation "contemptible," even while the Montefiores and the Rothschilds were pouring energy and wealth into Palestine. For since Hess, Pinsker, Ahad Ha'am and particularly since the days of Herzl, there has been no Zionism that has not been compressed within the patterns of Jewish nationalism. And there is no Jewish nationalism that can make its complete peace with the practical results of emancipation. Herzl early recognized and expressed this inevitable logic when, speaking of emancipated French Jews, he said ". . . if all or any of the French Jews protest against this scheme on account of their own 'assimilation' my answer is simple. The whole thing does not concern them at all. They are Jewish Frenchmen, well and good! This is a private affair for Jews alone."

Thereafter, those who did not subscribe to the Zionist position of a separate, national, Jewish people were no longer to be considered Jews. A "nation" which did not exist was already peremptorily legislating.

Herzl went to London, and through the intercession of Israel Zangwill he first presented his ideas to an audience of emancipated Jews. He addressed the Maccabean Society, a group of professional men, and met with a lukewarm reception.

Nevertheless, when *The Jewish State* was published, the *London Jewish Chronicle* became an important medium for publicizing it. Calling the proposal "one of the most astounding pronouncements which have ever been put forward," it identified the author as "a responsible journalist, associated with the *Neue Freie Presse*." So, again, Herzl's emancipation, which he had rejected as a failure for Jews, now came peculiarly to the service of his anti-emancipation idea.

The *London Jewish Chronicle* had great influence. It brought Herzl's proposals to the attention of both Jews and Christians all over the world and, as Herzl had hoped, the publication of the ideas precipitated a discussion of the Jewish question.

Jews everywhere took positions on one side or the

other. Herzl was disappointed. He had hoped that those who agreed would come along in his Society of Jews. While he protested that he wanted discussion he was pained at the "creation of an opposition party."

He was also "deeply pained . . . by the unwelcome cordiality with which the anti-Semitic press greeted the effort." He was himself dubbed "the first Honorary Anti-Semite" by some of his Jewish opponents.

Then, on April 21, Baron de Hirsch died and Herzl wrote in his diary, "Hirsch dies and I enter on negotiations with princes."

With Herzl, that group of Jews which committed itself to Zionism and acknowledged him as its leader entered a peripatetic kind of diplomacy which took it into many chancelleries and parliaments, exploring the labyrinthine and devious ways of international politics in a part of the world where political intrigue and secret deals were a byword. Jews began to play the game of "practical politics."

Herzl was determined that the quiet process of saving lives of oppressed Jews through philanthropy and colonization, which he called "infiltration," in Palestine must end. There had to be forthright recognition of Jewish nationhood and Jewish national rights in a charter to Palestine.

There were many turns in the international scene, one, or a combination, of which might lead to the granting of such a charter. Herzl pursued them all. Besides, he reasoned, he must impress the Jews who were to follow him; and one way to impress them was to let it be known that he was being received by the important government officials of the day. When he spoke to the discriminating group of Maccabees it is reported that he was "vague" about his diplomatic efforts, and he did not stand up well under the questioning to which he was submitted. But in other circles, more easily awed by names and far-off places, he created the desired impression.

In the diplomatic prize-hunt there was first of all "the sick man" of Europe, the Turkish Empire, on the verge

of dissolution. In this arena, money was one tool with which Herzl attempted to work. "Jewish wealth" against the Turkish debt might add up to a charter for Palestine. A figure of twenty million pounds was mentioned. Another tool was the Sultan's desire to quiet some of the European criticism of his Armenian policy. Committees were being organized throughout the continent in support of the Armenians and it was suggested to Herzl that perhaps Jewish influence might quiet their agitation and have some bearing on the much-desired charter.

Then there was England, waiting impatiently for the disintegration of the Turkish Empire and not unwilling to profit from the event by acquiring a buffer state in Syria, which included Palestine.

There was also Germany, well advanced in its *Drang nach Osten* and, perhaps in that direction, Herzl thought, he might find the course upon which the Jewish ship of state would sail.

Herzl spent a year pursuing these possibilities. He attempted to act as intermediary between "Jewish wealth" and Turkish need. He sought the help of influential British and French Jews to aid him in quieting the European agitation in behalf of the Armenians. Through a Christian he secured an audience with the Grand Duke of Baden. This was to be a stepping-stone to an interview with the Kaiser himself. To the Grand Duke, Herzl promised "the diminution of radical propaganda in Europe, in proportion to the development of national effort among Jews." For each, Herzl had an offer; from each he sought a charter to Palestine for "the Jewish people."

The year of 1896 was a year of failure, insofar as Herzl's plan to secure his charter was concerned. This was inevitable, for Herzl had not recognized, with Ahad Ha'am, that there was no "Jewish people." Yet he was crossing and recrossing Europe, making promises, listening to offers upon the assumption that such an entity existed. Many hailed him as "the leader of the Jews," but he was a general without an army. Time and again, during the year 1896, he reported that

"there was never a better time for our acquisition of Palestine." But each time something came along to alter the situation. He could never put together the proper combination. He found wry comfort in the observation that he "must have put something in motion" because his plan was "already being opposed by the diplomacy of great powers."

At times he was thwarted by his inability to move Rothschild or Montefiore or Montagu to act as his lieutenants in the game of international politics in behalf of "the Jewish people." If he had Turkey amenable to a deal, Rothschild failed him. If he had Montagu ready to assume responsibility for a substantial amount of funds, the Sultan slipped out from between his fingers. If he had an "in" with the designers of German imperialism, he found himself at cross-purposes with the ambitions of England. So the rainbow-chase went on.

However, the masses of East European Jews were impressed with the reports of Herzl's doings and mistook that activity for real progress in the amelioration of their plight. Palestine was no closer as a refuge, but Herzl was assuming the mantle of a messiah and Jewish nationalism the stature of a religion.

This is no mere figure of speech. In Herzl's diary he tells of one of his trips to Constantinople, on which he stopped off at Sofia and was asked to speak in the synagogue. His dairy contains this item:

"I stood in front of the Ark. When I hesitated, uncertain how to address the audience without turning my back to the Holy Ark a voice whispered: 'You may safely stand with your back to the altar. You are holier than the Law!'"

This kind of thinking was to determine the next step in the development of Jewish nationalism.

Herzl was unyielding that all assistance to Jews be compressed within the nationalistic pattern. ". . . Edmond de Rothschild's philanthropic support must come to an end. He must subserve the national purpose . . ." he said. But Herzl

could not win to his Jewish nation the emancipated Jews, who foresaw the dangers of compromise with this anti-emancipation idea. Finally, in desperation, Herzl tried intimidation where argument had failed. He told Rothschild:

“I will start a great agitation in which it will be difficult to maintain order. . . . You think it is a misfortune to operate with . . . masses. Consider well, would it not be a greater misfortune if I set the masses in motion by a tumultuous agitation? That is what I wish to avoid. I have shown you my good will. . . . You refuse—I have done my duty.”

With this threat as his standard, Herzl spent the second half of 1896 in developing a new approach to his “Jewish nation.” If the emancipated Jews would not subsidize a program, the ultimate end of which would defeat emancipation, Herzl determined to go around them to the still unemancipated Jews, particularly those of Eastern and Central Europe. With the aid of half a dozen lieutenants, among them Max Nordau, meetings were held and agitation created and hopes built sky-high. Herzl himself addressed the first of these mass meetings in the East End of London on the 13th of July.

These meetings were the first expression of a plan by means of which Herzl determined to overcome the impasse created by the aloofness of the recognized Jewish leaders. He himself would call together a Congress of Jews. This would be the midwifery through which the Jewish nation would be born.

It was a foolproof plan. There was no effectively organized opposition to the idea, however great the dissent of scattered groups and individuals. The formula for “the Jewish people” was the one which Herzl had enunciated, speaking of his French Jews. Those who attended the Congress would, ipso facto, be “the Jewish people.” They would speak for “the Jewish people” and discuss problems affecting Jews as if they were problems affecting a “people.” They would revive the ancient concepts of segregation and separatism and apply them to Jews. They would commit the “Jewish people” to responsi-

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bilities in a political formula. They would be "pained" at opposition, but they would ignore it because they counted upon the practical men and the underestimation of the forces of Jewish nationalism that characterized emancipated Jews.

In March 1897, the first call went forth "for the holding of a representative Zionist congress at Munich on August 25, next." There were to be elections of delegates among Jews all over the world. The medieval concept of corporate Jewish life was emerging again, this time at the volition of Jews.

There were dissenters. Men and organizations that had been assisting Jewish colonization in Palestine for two decades and more were apprehensive. They had been and were willing to save Jews. They were unwilling to be faced with a *fait accompli*, in which, upon the basis of their support and interest, they were to be confronted with the creation of a Jewish "nation" and "state" and a return to pre-emancipation life patterns. Herzl's insistence threatened a split in the supporters of Palestinean colonization. But he was unmoved.

".... Better a split than do nothing. What will the split be like? On the one side a few rich men with their *schnorrers* (beggars), a couple of benevolent institutions that are badly administered; and on the other side all the live, youthful, courageous and spiritual powers of Judaism. Forward! All the Jews have more money than the Rothschilds. —Think of my words."

In July the leading rabbis of Germany issued a protest against the Congress. They were brushed aside as "protest rabbis." Finally, the Jews of Munich objected publicly to holding the Congress in that city and it was decided to move the meeting to Basle, Switzerland, and the dates set for August 29-31.

One hundred ninety-seven delegates attended, most of them from east of the Danube. The de-emancipated Herzl insisted that every delegate wear the full evening dress of the most fashionable European circles of the time.

For two days there were speeches. Most of them had

to be translated into several languages. Herzl himself was unable to understand most of the delegates, and they were unable to understand him. An interpreter was a constant necessity between this "leader" and his "nation." But what was lacking in homogeneity was compensated for in frenzy and in evangelical emotional anticipation. Herzl himself called the Congress a "miracle." Certainly, most of those who attended thought that a miracle was about to take place.

There is an interesting incident, recorded by a biographer of Herzl, that reveals the naïveté in which the Congress assembled. On the third day it was finally decided that a World Zionist Organization should be formed and a constitution designed for that body. This was easier said than done, for now that the speeches were over and everyone had agreed upon the lamentable condition of East-European Jews, Herzl had to contend with the realities of the "Jewish nation" he was calling into being. And the reality was that it did not exist, except as a wish in the minds of some of the delegates. Most of the delegates were more concerned with a refuge than with the ideology by means of which it might be obtained.

Consequently when the time came for the consideration of a common and definitive platform, the unity vanished. Hundreds of memoranda were submitted in almost as many languages. After endless hours of debate and much drafting and re-drafting, Herzl entered the hall in which the Congress met.

He asked whether the committee had completed its labor. It had. The chairman then read the draft and each member followed with a translation in his own language.

"Good!" exclaimed Dr. Herzl heartily and, smiling, he added softly, "The Jewish State exists"

A young lady from amongst the crowd that always followed at the heels of the leader asked what did Dr. Herzl say so mysteriously.

"Oh, he only said that the Jewish state is in existence. Her eyes flashed with enthusiastic fire. She was about to cheer, but she paused to ask in quivering accents, "What has happened?"

"Happened?" was the reply, "Oh, we have just finished the constitution of the Zionist movement."

Half a century later, I was to see at first hand a revival of this kind of Messianism and wonder at how many conclaves of Jewish nationalism it had been repeated and repeated, and at how many more it would go on being repeated.

In August 1943, I was a spectator at the American Jewish Conference. This was to have been a gathering of Jews to attempt to formulate common action for the relief and rehabilitation of the Jewish victims of the Hitler terror. There were the usual speeches and frenzy, and anticipation that here, too, in the Waldorf Astoria in New York City, a "miracle" was taking place.

At a featured place in the program a disciple of Herzl delivered a thundering oration, unequivocally demanding a Jewish commonwealth for the Jewish people in Palestine; he received hysterical applause and cheers. One little old lady, sitting next to me in the spectator's gallery, who had obviously only half understood the elegant English of the orator, asked me: "Does that mean we get Palestine now?" It was obvious that I had heard the same speech, in the same setting, and been asked the same question—fifty years later.

The first Zionist Congress did not move the great powers, nor did it arouse the emancipated Jews although it marked a fork in the history of Jews. Herzl and his Zionist followers knew this. Unfortunately, emancipated Jews did not realize that. Herzl and his followers had introduced a divisive force into Jewish life. Heretofore, Jews had been concentrating upon the extension of the philosophy of emancipation. Now a group of Jews had reared a structure to oppose emancipation, and to herald its failure. Emancipated Jews failed to understand, or, if they did understand, refused to take the new development seriously. The Zionist Congress had convened by default of any organized opposition. It was destined

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to go on convening; and anti-nationalists, pro-emancipation Jews were to continue to default and to compromise.

By what specific acts did the First Zionist Congress set this force of Jewish nationalism in motion? What were its achievements?

First, it succeeded in re-creating the entity of mediæval Jewry; the concept of a corporate community; a separate nationality group. It is perhaps no accident that the forgers of the greatest anti-Semitic libel of modern times [the Protocols of the Elders of Zion] gave it the setting of a Zionist congress!

I do not know how many Jews participated in the elections of the 197 delegates. If later elections of the same type are any indication, many, many more Jews stayed away from them than participated. Although there had been no indication that the Congress would become a continuing organization, it proceeded to establish itself as such. It established the World Zionist Organization, cut completely of the cloth of Jewish nationalism. Hess, Pinsker and Ahad Ha'am had only philosophized. Herzl injected the Jews of the world as a political mechanism into the arena of power politics.

Out of the Congress came what has ever since been known as the Basle Program, the unalterable basis of Zionism. It reads as follows:

"The aim of Zionism is to create for the Jewish people a publicly secured, legally assured home.

"The promotion, on suitable lines, of the colonization of Palestine by Jewish agricultural and industrial workers.

"The organization and binding together of the whole of Jewry by means of appropriate institutions, local and international, in accordance with the laws of each country.

"The strengthening and fostering of Jewish national sentiment and consciousness. (Italics mine.)"

"Preparatory steps toward obtaining Government consent, where necessary, to the attainment of the aim of Zionism."

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Max Nordau, who is credited with the phraseology of the Basle statement described its language as "elastic." It is therefore subject to interpretation and, since it is the basic creed of a formidable interpretation of Jewish aspirations, it should be subjected to the closest scrutiny.

The use of the words "publicly secured, legally assured home," was a victory for Herzl over the men who were interested in simply rescuing Jews and resettling them wherever they might have as much security as other men. By the use of the phrase "publicly secured, legally assured home," Herzl prevailed with his philosophy that such a transfer of Jews must be to a place where the "Jewish nation" would be recognized as being at home as of right, as a nation. So once again, the identification of Zionism and Jewish nationalism was affirmed.

The marriage was further dramatized in the section which described, as one of the purposes of Zionism, "the strengthening and fostering of Jewish national sentiment and consciousness." This was reminiscent of the intense nationalism of Ahad Ha'am. Here, certainly, there was no connection with refuge and rescue of harassed Jews, but rather the avowed purpose of recreating a Jewish nation in exile. Here was the wedge of Jewish nationalism to be driven between Jews and other human beings. Here was the permanent mold of ghettoism into which Jewish life in the unemancipated nations was to remain compressed so that the self-generating processes of emancipation and integration could not come into play. Thus a program was announced of consciously and deliberately fostering Jewish nationalism, even where it had no justification.

Of all the objectives of Zionism, this is the most serious challenge to the believers in emancipation. Its logic is inescapable, no matter from what point one starts in the closed circle of Jewish nationalism. Start with the Jewish state and forces must be set in motion to create that entity, which does not exist, to be known as the Jewish nation, and to populate that state. Start with "the people" as a separate, national entity, and the logic of Zionism leads to an accentuation of dif-

ferences between human beings who are Jews and other humans, so that the entity can be itself only in a state in which its accentuated qualities are the norm and standard.

This conditioning of Jews was to be carried on by these cells of Zionism established in each country, all pyramid-ing into an organic whole in the World Zionist Organization.

Herzl was elected president at the first Congress and the delegates adjourned. Neither they nor the ordinary Jew realized the implications of what had taken place. It was years before the logic of the events then set in motion was to be generally perceived.

But a few saw it even then. Among them was Herzl. Perhaps his own words may be the best estimate of the Congress of August 29-31, 1897. He wrote:

“We have made history. . . . Were I to depict the Basle Congress in a word—which I shall refrain from uttering publicly—it is: In Basle I founded the Jewish State. . . . I hounded the people into the state sentiment and conveyed to them the emotion that they were the national assembly. . . .”

If Zionists rejoiced, emancipated Jews repeated what was to become an historic pattern of error. They scorned and temporized. A Paris Jewish paper labelled the meeting “The Utopianist Congress.” Herzl was called a “pseudo-Messiah” by the German-Jewish press and attention was called to “the hazy ecstasy which characterized many of the speeches of Basle.” Emancipated Jews, for the most part, sat back content that “a few words will suffice to prove the impossibility of founding a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine or elsewhere. The demands of the Zionists are so absurd that we almost doubt the sanity of their leaders.”

Everyone of these emancipated Jews overlooked Herzl’s statement that he had already founded the Jewish state. They were concerned with Palestine and its political structure. They failed to realize that to Zionism and Herzl this was only

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an incident in a total philosophy. What was fundamental was the creation of Jewish nationality. If that could be brought into being the logic within and without Jewish life would take care of the rest.

The Basle program remains today as the classical and basic statement of Zionism. Every member of the Zionist organization agrees to its principles as he joins the Zionist movement.

Meanwhile Zionism was plagued by lack of funds. Herzl considered the Congress his "Society of Jews." He must still create "The Jewish Company."

Nordau wrote from Paris that a loan of forty million francs to Turkey might bring forth a concession "to colonize 70,000 square kilometers of Palestine." Herzl was moved to reply, "Alas, we cannot get the rich scamps and our bank does not yet exist."

"Our Bank" was one of the projects Herzl hoped to realize before the Congress met again in 1898. He had determined to found a "Jewish Colonial Bank." It was to be capitalized with two million pounds "no part of which would be employed to purchase land or would be directly expended on colonization projects." It was to be a commercial banking business, and with it Herzl hoped to be able to enter the field of international finance and to use it as an economic-political lever for obtaining the charter to Palestine.

In view of Nordau's information on Turkish need, Herzl again went to the Jews of England. In a revealing fit of anger at his failure he wrote, "The Jewish Colonial Bank has to become actually the Jewish National Bank. 'Colonial' is only a shine, nonsense, firm name. It shall be established as the national financial institution."

In the spring of 1898, the Zionist executive committee convened in Vienna. An interesting episode took place to prove again that there was to be no Zionism without Jewish nationalism and that Jewish nationalism would go on at what-

ever disadvantage to needy Jews. The Russian members of the committee came to Vienna to register a strong protest. They wanted more "practical" work in Palestine, "less diplomacy." After all, they were the ones for whom Nordau had wept so profusely at the first Congress. All this was being done primarily for them, wasn't it? Well, they were just ordinary Jews, human beings in serious trouble. They wanted to get out of trouble. They were unconcerned whether there were extricated as Jewish nationals or as human beings of the Jewish faith. All they wanted was to be helped and a great many eloquent words had been spoken by the group headed by Herzl, promising a solution.

But these poor Russian delegates were at the wrong meeting. They had come to a pediatric examination of the status of the infant "Jewish nation." There was no time or place here to talk about saving lives. Philanthropy "beggared" a people. This proud, self-respecting nation would have none of it—nor give any. Herzl's "legally assured" charter won over the Russian pleas. Russian rabbis who dissented were packed off together with the German "protest rabbis" marked as "disloyal."

Four hundred delegates came to Herzl's second Congress in Basle, August 28-30, 1898. The delegates wore badges and a "Jewish" flag was formally unfurled.

It was again, if the records are to be believed, an orgy of emotionalism and speeches and a glorification of Herzl. The protest of the Russian delegates was ignored. "The Jewish State" was in existence.

No matter that the American Jewish John Doe did not want it. It would speak for him just the same as long as he carried the name "Jew." No matter that the average Jew of Russia did not want to wait until this state was established before he had any alleviation of his distress. The state existed for several hundred delegates who now, once a year, in the best European full-dress attire, could meet and legislate for Jews. At the end of this second Congress, one of these could say,

grandly, "The Zionist Congress is no longer a Zionist assembly, it has become a Jewish Parliament; every conceivable Jewish problem has been flung on the carpet."

Herzl himself could not refrain from making one of his most antagonistic observations on emancipation. As if all history would be as pliable in his hands as the naïve and bewildered delegates to his Congress, he pronounced the end of the era of emancipation. He gave it a faint-hearted eulogy.

"Let us not forget, even in our days, darkened by anti-Semitism, that a great-minded epoch has gone before, in which all cultured peoples gave us equality of rights. The will undoubtedly was a good one, but the result was certainly ineffective. Whose fault was it—ours or theirs? Probably both, or perhaps the fault lay in those circumstances of yore, which could not be removed by laws and regulations . . . *the historic import of emancipation must be . . . that we prepare a home state for our freed people.*" (My italics.)

He was also becoming increasingly intolerant of opposition: What was wrong with those Jews who wanted to be Jews but didn't want to be politically linked with a mass migration scheme to Palestine? Why didn't they just stop being Jews? His intolerance set a pattern from which Zionism has never been able to escape.

"It cannot continue much longer," he said, "that in enlightened communities an agitation should be carried on against Zion. . . . We must once and for all put an end to it. In all places where the official heads of the community are not with us, an election campaign should be started against them."

A Jewish political existence was thus coming into being. From Vienna, or later, from London, or still later from New York, Jewish life was to be dominated by the party line. For the "Jewish State" existed, for Herzl. At least if Zionism could help it, there was to be no effective opposition to say that it didn't.

The second Congress adjourned achieving more paper victories. Herzl's bank idea was approved. Future work for Palestine was more firmly under the imprimatur of Jewish nationalism and Herzl began to publicize the man he had selected to succeed him, David Wolffsohn. The checking of colonization by "infiltration" was made more effective and was "evidence of the completeness of his victory."

But whether Herzl wanted such "unchartered" immigration or not, it was becoming increasingly more difficult to restrain it. Turkey was not receptive to establishing a Jewish State in Syria. Yet, Zionism was insisting that Jews who came to Palestine [Syria] must come as of right, as Jewish nationals. Another pattern began to emerge out of this insistent demand for Jewish nationhood. It was a pattern that was to plague Palestine from that day to this. Jewish nationalism was to obstruct the very purpose it was supposed to serve: It became a deterrent in settling Jews in Palestine. Jacob de Haas, Herzl's Boswell, admits that opposition to Jewish settlements in Palestine increased "when the Jewish nationalistic aspect began to dominate the movement (1897)."

There is in this a tacit admission that Zionism was less concerned with refuge and rehabilitation than it was with the dogma of Jewish nationhood. This admission was to be repeated time after time. Yet, amazingly, no one but the Zionists was ever to take it at face value.

Herzl had failed in England. He had failed with the representative Jews. He now conceived the idea of hitching the Zionist wagon to the rising star of German Imperialism. There was talk of a German protectorate over Syria in return for German assistance to Turkey.

Suddenly, Herzl realized that Wilhelm II possessed

"the versatility, the innate theatricality . . . coupled with a shrewd appreciation of the value of pageantry in international politics. . . . The methods employed by the Emperor in forcing his imperialist policies upon both the German people and upon Europe suggested to Herzl that Wilhelm II

was possessed of that mentality which would respond best to a face to face discussion of the Zionist plans."

I do not condemn Herzl nor Zionism for these attitudes and plans. If he was desperate and deluded, he was never evasive. Zionists, by and large, have announced their designs to the world. They are fighting with desperation against all of the forces of history and freedom, hoping to keep Jews compressed within a pre-emancipation formula for Jewish life. They have announced their goal as the political restoration of a nation long, long dead. And to achieve that goal, small and impotent as they are, they have never been able to create world policies. They have had to move on the tide already in motion.

It was learned that the Kaiser was to visit Turkey and perhaps Palestine, and Herzl with the assistance of many intermediaries, was to see him either in Constantinople or in Jerusalem.

Another diplomatic victory for Zionism! No matter that when the audience was set for Constantinople and Herzl arrived there, he sent Wolffsohn to arrange the details and "Wolffsohn went from entrance to entrance, but everywhere he was refused admission." Nor did Herzl fare better himself when at last he saw the Kaiser, who volunteered that he favored Herzl's plan because, "There are among your people elements it would be worthwhile to transfer to Palestine. I think for example of Hesse, where there are usurers among the farming population." Here was the first example of anti-Semitic support of Zionism.

Such was the dignity and pride in which the "Jewish nation" embarked upon its policy of national regeneration. This was the "nation" that had scorned the efforts to secure respect and security upon the basis of humanity and simple justice.

It was agreed that the Kaiser would present Herzl's program to the Sultan. What should he request from the Sultan

in behalf of the Jewish nation? "A chartered company under German protection."

But this was not enough—this agreement. Herzl had been impressed with Wilhelm's love of pageantry and, indeed, Herzl had demonstrated a knack at it himself. This private audience would not suffice. The Kaiser was going to Palestine. This whole scene would then be re-enacted in a public ceremony in which Herzl and the Jewish deputation would welcome the Kaiser to the Holy Land. In the welcoming address, Herzl would make reference to the Kaiser's errand to the Sultan in behalf of Zionism. Then they sat down to write together the speech Herzl would make.

But for all the pageantry, practical action again came to nothing. The German protectorate did not materialize and Herzl and the Zionist stake in it dwindled into nothingness as European politics went round and round in confusing and clashing circles that were soon to involve the world in war.

Yet, it cannot be said that Jewish nationalism did not benefit by the audience, even if refugees did not. Many Jews were impressed. "The Leader" had sat with the Kaiser. What was more, a Jewish deputation had welcomed the Kaiser to Palestine. Undoubtedly, some bewildered soul somewhere among my garden-variety Jews could ask again, "Does that mean we get Palestine now?"

When, after a time, Herzl failed to hear from the Kaiser, he wrote him a petulant letter, in which he suggested new bait for an elusive hope. "If our work miscarries, hundreds of thousands of our supporters will at a single bound join the revolutionary parties."

Twice now Herzl had referred to this diminution of support to liberal forces in his attempts to interest German statesmen in the aims of Zionism. He was to offer the same bait a few weeks later to the Russian Czar and since it seems to have been a pattern in his diplomacy and an integral part of his understanding of Zionism in its relation to the world, it is worth pausing to examine the implications.

Implicit in this bargain is the admission of the contrast between Jewish nationalism and emancipation. For it is true that in the countries still unemancipated, Jews were drawn to the revolutionary parties as the only ones that welcomed their participation in the national life. Even under tyranny, Jews were integrated into the underground freedom forces that waited for the right moment to come above ground and fight. Here was emancipation of a kind, freedom in an embryonic state, and Jews were ready to help in its birth. Herzl would have bargained that position away for the opposing philosophy of Jewish nationalism. Fortunately, he failed. He failed because he did not really control Jews.

The political question arose again when Herzl and Wolffsohn began to carry out the second Congress' mandate for the creation of the bank. The bank was to be established in London and emancipated British Jewry objected to the creation of an institution that would represent a Jewish nation. During the controversy that took place, Herzl wrote to Wolffsohn:

"The important thing is not that the bank is established, but that it is so established that it will serve our movement as a fitting instrument for political Zionism and so remain." The bank came into being as "The Jewish Colonial Trust."

Herzl now had something definite to offer and so he convened the "world executive" in January in Vienna, 1899. By this time, he had made good his threat to Rothschild, to create a great agitation among the masses. The next few months were to show how tragically right he had been in his estimate of what could be accomplished by holding out evanescent hope to desperate people.

The Russian delegates to the Vienna meeting again asked for more practical work in behalf of Russian Jews. They were answered by Herzl with a report of his audience with the Kaiser, "the significance of which can only be overlooked by dishonest or stupid people." They were also answered by Nor-

dau who stated: "even if the Jews were willing to rush to Palestine I do not know that for the present I personally should favor colonization without publicly guaranteed rights."

Herzl described the Third Congress as "respectably sleepy as a real parliament." In more than one way his anti-democratic attitude was expressing itself: in his arbitrary adoption of a nationalism for a "Jewish people," in his willingness to trade away the liberal influence of Jews; in his "leadership" fixation. Now in his derogation of parliaments, this man revealed a total incompatibility with the emerging progressive forces of society.

Yet the Congress was one of the most important events in the history of Jewish nationalism. True, the man who wanted Jews to be a nation like other nations was disappointed when his "parliament" acted like a real parliament. To those who opposed Jewish nationalism, this should have been a forboding. They could not dismiss the results of this Congress as "hazy ecstasy" or the machinations of a "pseudo-messiah."

For it was at the Third Congress that the World Zionist Organization became a well-organized institution. In a well-defined constitution, the many little Zionist societies throughout the world were bound together. The Greater Actions Committee was formed to direct policies between congresses. A machinery was built which would drive on to capture control of the communities of Jews throughout the world. It would stamp Jews in the mold of Jewish nationalists. It would represent the homespun Jews of the world as something they were not and make it appear that they sought to become something to which they did not really aspire.

Because this Congress produced no circuses, emancipated Jews were quick to announce that "Zionism had sung its own swan song or rather its death rattle." So the historic error was continued. It was to recur again and again. And because it was to recur, the world was to be ever more confused about the status and aspirations of the average Jew.

For the third Congress, by its very "sleepy parlia-

mentarianism," achieved more than the other two. True, the charter for Palestine, never more than an incident in the philosophy of Jewish nationalism, was as far away as ever. But Jewish nationalism itself had taken long strides forward. Thereafter, every Jew who became a member of the Zionist Organization acknowledged the sovereignty of this "Jewish state" in political matters affecting Jews. Such a Jew subscribed to the Basle program and whether his interest in Palestine was culture or refuge, he, knowingly or not, contributed to the momentum toward Jewish statehood and to the fostering of Jewish nationhood among Jews everywhere. Ghettoized, corporate, Jewish existence became a reality again and now existed upon a greater scale than it had ever before achieved. This corporate entity could wait for its sovereign territory. Meanwhile, it would condition Jews everywhere for the eventuality.

Is my reader becoming weary of the repetitious pattern of these Congresses? He may very well be. Yet the details form a permanent pattern in Zionism; a pattern that dates back to Herzl's failure to impress the rather discriminating audience of the Maccabean Society of London as he spoke vaguely of his diplomatic achievements, and to the mass meeting in the East End of London later, when he produced a frenzy of anticipation. At every crisis, Herzl had an "event which I am anticipating" depending upon a "discussion I am to have with an important personage." Those who have the patience to read through this record of Zionism will find the pattern again and again. Palestine is never more nearly "ours" than at a given moment. In fifty years the words "never more nearly" have reappeared many a time. Nor has Zionism's nationalism been embarrassed by the failure. No matter how tragic failure might be, Jewish nationalism still remained the "ONE ANSWER." Meanwhile emancipated Jews, mistaking the failures to secure national recognition in Palestine for Jews as the barometer of the success and destiny of Jewish nationalism, continued their somnolence.

How tragically Zionism was misdirecting Jews—and

opinions about them—was revealed in 1900, when 50,000 oppressed Romanian Jews took to the highways of Europe in a mass migration. These poor, deluded people were stopped at every border. Yet Nordau, who for three Congresses had been the official lamentor for oppressed Jews, "strongly favored the march of the Romanians." No matter that they had picked up bag and baggage and fled and that they had nowhere to flee. Jews, under the influence of hysterical messianism had done the same thing before, when oppression became too bitter. This was the kind of a mass demonstration of a "people" that dramatized the thesis of Jewish nationalism. It was therefore good!

Herzl had no comment to make at the time. He was bombarded with telegrams and appeals. He was the self-declared "leader" of the Jews. And while he had not directly instigated the mass movement, de Haas admits that in "a measure" this was a Zionist demonstration. These poor, deluded humans had taken Herzl's audiences with European potentates seriously. And Christians in Europe naturally believed this was a demonstration inspired by a responsible man and a movement that had advocated such a program before every available sounding-board in Europe.

Zionism, however, was empty-handed before the Frankenstein monster it had created by its extravagant claims and pretentious announcements. The man whose boast was that he consorted with princes was unable to do a thing for the people who had been beguiled. He had created the illusion of a great statesman for the desperate, politically illiterate Jews of Eastern and Central Europe, and produced nothing but tragedy. At the Fourth Congress, Herzl referred to the Romanian episode.

"You all know the awful case of the wanderings of the Romanian Jews, which have been like a trail of blood flowing through Europe. Where was official Jewry? (*sic*) Where were the acclaimed great ones of Israel? The pillars of the Community? A few thousand fugitives were woefully

and fearfully moved on, with an assurance of incapacity to do anything else. Those who followed may be numbered in their hundreds, and their wanderings were regulated by the aid of armed forces. Hustled together in emigrant trains they were once more thrown across the frontier which they had just crossed amid cries of anguish. These special trains were official Jewry's last efforts of pity."

Where indeed had "official" Jewry been? And the ones who had claimed for themselves the imposing titles of "parliamentarians?" They had been engrossed in planning a new shift of Jewish nationalistic diplomacy. This time, back to England and London, where the Fourth Congress was held. Now, Jewish nationalism was to provide the commandos for British imperialistic interests in the Near East.

"It is of increasing importance to the nations of civilization that on the road to Asia—the shortest road to Asia—there should be set up a post of civilization, which would be at the service of civilized mankind. This post is Palestine. . . ."

Jews were ready, he bartered, with "blood and substance" to provide this post. "England, great England, free England, England commanding all the seas will understand our aims." This not too subtle appeal to the imperialist England of Kipling and Rhodes was the keynote of Herzl's opening address to the Congress.

Was this the man who had heaped contempt upon "the few rich Jews" and their "sycophants" and upon the talents of emancipated Jews that had been put to the service of "strangers?" No "protected" Jew had ever been more servile. What had been a "sin" for the individual Jew, who as a human sought only to find the greatest amount of peace, security and opportunity, now became a virtue to an artificially conjured-up nation.

Despite its part in the Romanian tragedy, the Zion-

ist Congress ended, oblivious of its failures, shouting we "are alone in possession of the only true remedy."

During 1901 there began a series of negotiations with Turkey that were to be carried on for the balance of Herzl's life. Turkey was in need of money and Herzl continued to insist that Jews provide it in exchange for concessions to Jewish nationalism in Palestine.

In May, Herzl saw the Sultan. For the next four years there followed the weirdest, most baffling game of tragic-comic high finance imaginable. The Western powers were not averse to the bankruptcy of Turkey, and because therefore Turkey could not secure assistance elsewhere, Herzl came to be looked upon as the financial wizard to refinance the Turkish debt. Nothing ever came of the plan, but constant reference to it, in guarded ways, by Herzl and his intimates fed the expectancy of the Zionists. Now and then a carefully worded announcement provided a stimulus for the Congresses. There was even an occasional exchange of greetings between the Sultan and Herzl, disclosed at opportune moments. But beyond such diplomatic and verbal chess moves, the Turkish Debt Unification Plan, as it was called, was another will-o-the-wisp.

Among many formulas suggested by the Turkish officials was one which would have permitted immigration of Jews, as potential Turkish citizens of Jewish faith. Such immigrants were to be received at various places in the Turkish Empire. But the proposal did not meet any of the requirements of Zionism-nationalism and so Herzl rejected it, although its acceptance might have brought a large immigration of Jews to the Near East. He was not interested in individual protection—that was obtainable almost everywhere—but in national protection; more specifically he desired a "great manifestation in our favor, such as an invitation to the Jews to immigrate without restrictions."

Off and on until he died in 1904, Herzl dangled the prospect of success in this plan before Zionists and anti-Zionists. He in turn was caught on the end of a snarled and knotted

rope that was the Turkish Empire. He seemed oblivious of the intricate world politics that were already dividing up a decadent Turkish Empire and which, therefore, had little desire to see Turkey's financial position strengthened.

Meanwhile, the dull Third Congress that had displeased Herzl and lulled anti-nationalist Jews to sleep because it had no political victory in Palestine to report, was yielding results. Zionism was becoming a disciplined movement. It was made the replica of a national assembly; it now contained within itself several political parties.

All of the parties were supporters of Jewish nationalism. But they sought their objective through different methods and wanted it for different purposes. There was, for example, the religious-orthodox group called Mizrachi, composed of that segment of Russian orthodoxy that tried to reconcile Zionism's diplomatic efforts with the Messianic idea of a return to Zion. The Zionists would help God realize His plan.

There was also the "Kultur" group. This group was composed largely of youth, devotees of Ahad Ha'am, interested in the statehood of Jews in order to revive the idea of a Jewish nation in the midst of other nations in which Jews lived.

There were the "practical Zionists," who persisted in attempts to colonize and settle Palestine and to exploit its economic possibilities. This work, they reasoned, would then lead to a better basis upon which to secure the legal assurances of Jewish national rights in Palestine in accordance with the Basle Program.

The majority of the movement, however, judging by the record of the Congresses followed Herzl. At least, at every test, Herzl was able to maintain the sovereignty of the Basle dogma over all action.

The Fifth Congress was notable only in that it established the Jewish National Fund. The money collected by this fund was to be used to purchase land in Palestine. Since its inception, the Jewish National Fund has invested over thirty-

million dollars in land in Palestine.* Of this figure, American Jewry has contributed more than twelve millions. This amount has purchased roughly about one hundred forty-seven thousand acres of land. The original contributors to the Jewish National Fund were largely members of the oppressed Jewish citizenry of the Central and Eastern European countries. The primary source of this revenue, for many long years, was to be found in tiny blue and white boxes that hung in millions of Jewish homes, and periodically collectors passed from door to door all over the world, to gather the contributions.

In recent years more efficient and spectacular techniques for raising funds have been devised. The Jewish National Fund is now a "big" financial institution. In America it is combined with philanthropic efforts aimed at rescue and refuge for Jews. The federation of these combined fund-raising efforts, of which the Jewish National Fund is a part, is known as the United Jewish Appeal. Today, almost all American Jews contribute, at least by indirection, to the Jewish National Fund. The system is much the same as that followed by Community Chests and War Funds in most American communities. All contributions go into a general fund and allocations are then made to the various beneficiaries by agreements reached by officials of all the benefiting agencies.

Yet the Jewish National Fund, like Herzl's bank, was designed to serve the nationalistic ideal in Zionism. It still does. The first "aim" of the Jewish National Fund is "to acquire the soil of Palestine as *national* and inalienable property. (Italics mine.) "Underlying the work of the Jewish National Fund since its inception was the urge of the Zionist movement to reestablish the union between the people and the land of Israel." Therefore, the land purchased by the Fund becomes the inalienable property of "the Jewish people." The purchase of land is used to advance the claims of "the Jewish people" for national rights in Palestine. The more land "the

* The precise figures as of September 1, 1941, are 5,965,000 Palestinian pounds.

Jewish people" own, the greater their claim to recognition of national sovereignty over all of Palestine. This is the reasoning of the Zionist Organization.

The land so purchased is never sold to individuals. It is leased. After the first five years of occupancy, the lessee pays rent at the rate of between one and two per cent of the assessed value of the land. The leases provide that the land shall never be rented by any but Jews and if the holder of a lease dies and leaves no Jewish heir, the Jewish National Fund obtains the right of reclaiming title.

Moreover, the leases specify that only Jewish labor shall be employed upon the land. The lessee agrees that "if and whenever he may be obliged to hire help, he will hire Jewish workmen only."

The Fund has provided a great boon to Jewish *nationalism*. By its consolidation with other funds, designed only to serve refugee and relief purposes, it has compelled practically all Jews, nationalists and anti-nationalists, to contribute to the maintenance and furtherance of an aggressively nationalistic institution. The arrangement provides another example of the advance made by Jewish nationalism, regardless of the political status of Palestine, in reviving a corporate Jewish community, as such, as it existed in the pre-emancipation era. By default, anti-nationalist Jews are compressed within the form of Jewish nationalism in order to help distressed human beings who happen to be Jews.

The Sixth Congress saw the first fierce struggle between some of the new parties in Zionism. It also saw the first withdrawal of important figures from the Zionist movement.

The struggle was precipitated by a new attempt on the part of Herzl to capitalize on friendly interests in England, and to throw Zionism's destiny in with British colonial ambitions.

Herzl was despairing of success in his rôle as an intermediary between Turkish financial need and the banking facilities of the Rothschilds and other west-European Jews. So

were many other Zionists. At various times, during these negotiations with Turkey, as the charter for Palestine seemed as far away as ever, consideration was given to places other than Palestine. Herzl himself, devoid of religious attachments, had not irrevocably accepted Palestine as the nationalist goal. One Congress had considered a proposal for Jewish colonization of the island of Cyprus. Another had considered the possibility of the Sinai Peninsula, with perhaps a "little bit of Palestine."

Logic was with Herzl. After years of Zionism's relentless efforts and unrestrained propaganda, the concept of "a Jewish people" had been established. Sporadic opposition to Zionism had always been designed to oppose a particular political scheme for Palestine. It had consistently overlooked the fact that Jewish nationalism moved on, whether it came closer to Palestine or not. A "Jewish Parliament" convened. The "Jewish state" had been launched. Anti-nationalists were satisfied if it never found a harbor, and underestimated the effect of the existence of the ideology of Jewish nationalism itself.

The final argument for Zionism would be the recognition of this "state" by world powers. There had been such recognition in a semi-official, backdoor kind of diplomacy. But the grant of territory where "the Jewish people" would be "at home" would be open acknowledgment of the "Jewish nation."

Palestine, as the definite location, was surrounded with baffling complexities. In the minds of the Zionist leaders there emerged the plan of securing *any* territory. Then, with greater authority than Herzl had been able to command, an established "Jewish nation" might play to the full the game of diplomatic chess. Substitutes for Palestine were considered by the various Congresses as political leverage and "stepping stones to Palestine."

The most sensational of these offers was one from Britain, through Lord Lansdowne in 1903, the year of the Sixth Congress.

Because of political complications involving Egypt, England found it necessary to withdraw the offer of territory in Sinai Peninsula. It had also passed a law restricting immigration into Britain, and to the public hearings on this immigration law it had invited Herzl as a witness, an invitation that had come as a surprise to the emancipated Jews of England. Whether these facts had any relation to the offer of a territory in Uganda in British East Africa, it is difficult to say. Herzl was not sure that there was no relationship.

In many ways the Uganda offer must have been a thrilling experience for Herzl. He was tireless and undiscouragable in pursuit of his plan. Uganda was not Palestine, nor near it. But at last he could face a Congress with some kind of a check, made out to the "Jewish nation" which he had labored to create.

Because Uganda was neither Palestine nor near it, he put the offer to this Sixth Congress with misgivings.

"The new territory has not the historical, religious and Zionist value which the Sinai Peninsula would have possessed, but I do not doubt that the Congress, as representing the Jewish masses, will receive the new offer with the warmest gratitude. The proposal consists of an autonomous Jewish settlement in East Africa, with Jewish administration, Jewish local government, with a Jewish Governor at its head, all of course under the British suzerain control. . . . As the matter was of such extreme importance for us all it was necessary that the proposal should be constituted in such a way *as to harmonize with those national ideals* that are so dear to us. Our representative, therefore, carried on for some time comprehensive negotiations with the members of the British Cabinet and heads of departments, and these negotiations took a favorable course."

He went on to say that "the Jewish people can have no other goal than Palestine, and although—whatever be the fate of the proposal—our views as to the land of our fathers are unalterable and must remain unchanged, yet the Congress will recognize what an extraordinary advance our movement has made through the negotiations with the Brit-

ish government. . . . I believe the Congress can find means of taking advantage of the offer. . . . It is true that it is not Zion and can never become Zion. It is merely a provisional measure of colonization, but, be it noted, *on a national and self-governing basis.*" (My italics.)

Acceptance or rejection of the proposal was put in the form of action on a motion to dispatch a commission to survey the offered territory for its possibilities of development. Herzl feared a direct approach to the question, in which he would offer the alternative of Uganda for Palestine.

But the indirection fooled no one. The vote, taken by roll call, favored the sending of such a commission. But the effect upon the Congress was anything but comforting to any one contemplating the founding of a nation in the offered territory. The Russian delegates, motivated by orthodoxy in Judaism, who had believed that Herzl and Zionism were worldly tools of God to bring about the Messianic return of Israel to Palestine, sat "on the floor mourning in Orthodox fashion for a dead Zion."

But there was more to the plan than appeared on the surface. To his intimates, Herzl revealed the complete pattern. He had urged consideration of Uganda at the Congress to impress the delegates with the status of Zionism. Also, the Congress provided the sounding board against which he could proclaim the advanced status of Zionism to the world. The "Jewish nation" had received an offer. Governments would negotiate with it.

Herzl was interested because the Uganda offer was a device

"with which we must force the hands of the rich Jews. They object to Palestine, we pave the way for building a new Jewish autonomy in East Africa. . . . Now we will put them to the test. Let us accept and let them reject East Africa. That will be our capital asset. *Eine Schach Zug! Eine Schach Zug!* (a capital chess move) ."

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He was correct in his estimate of anti-Zionist vision, or lack of it. Anti-Zionists had never really understood Zionism. They always thought their opposition would be sufficient if limited to the actual creation of a Jewish State. Since Palestine seemed the inevitable locale for such a state, they were always satisfied if political complexities prevented the realization of Zionist objectives in Palestine. They were at a disadvantage because they fought an opposing philosophy on specific proposals. They did not see the compelling need to turn the philosophy of emancipation and integration into a sustained, organized program to oppose the sustained, organized program of Jewish nationalism.

What is more, because of the character of the opposition, anti-nationalists came to be known as anti-Palestineans. This despite the fact that Rothschild and Montefiore and later Warburg, and other emancipated Jews since their time, poured energy and substance into Palestinian settlements. There were to be times in the history of Zionism when the movement would have failed completely had it not been for the help of anti-nationalist Jews. In their refusal to oppose the basic element in Zionism the Palestinian settlement was to take on ever more and more a nationalistic character, and to condition an attitude toward Jews as a nationalist group.

Now Herzl had them in a dilemma. He embarrassed some of these emancipated Jews into saying, "We are content to wait [for Palestine] on the single vision which cannot be schemed for and by [the hope for emancipation] which the ghettos survived till the days of the exile be ended." Thus they opposed an organized movement with a diffused hope. He forced the Jewish Colonization Association, which had been founded by the de Hirsch fortune, to ask for guarantees that the Uganda project would represent "no political undertaking." With such a guarantee the organization would be willing to assist in financing an expedition to survey the possibilities of the offered territory.

It was poetic justice that Herzl could put them on

the defensive. They were attempting to work in the pattern of emancipation and integration, but they had not fought for the acceptance of the philosophy of emancipation. The Association was willing to assist distressed humans who were Jews. Herzl needed the money that the organization had at its disposal. They offered it for the purpose that should have been paramount. Yet Herzl could say to them:

"I regret that your reply can only be regarded by me as a rejection of my proposal. . . . By your condition you make your support dependent upon the matter bearing no political character. It has been known for years that our *mouvement* has a political character. You therefore impose an impossible condition."

Here again the dogmatics of nationalism stood in the way of concrete action. It was really Herzl who had rejected an offer promising a haven of refuge. By allowing Herzl and Zionism to call the turns, anti-nationalists appeared as obstructionists and negativists.

To his opponents in the Zionist Organization, Herzl replied that if they knew of a better way to Palestine, they should offer it. If they had no better plan, they "should not aimlessly seek to disturb the unity of Zionism, *which is worth more than a few plots of land in Palestine.*"

The Seventh Congress rejected the Uganda proposal. A number of circumstances intruded to bring about this reversal of opinion between the Sixth and the Seventh Congresses. While there was a good deal of support for a return of Jews to Palestine, there was little support for Jewish nationalism. The Uganda affair had stripped away the romance and sentiment which Jewish nationalism had grafted onto itself. Revealed for what it was—the revival of Jewish nationalism—it was an unappealing sight. Even non-sectarian sources of public opinion like *The London Times* opposed the Uganda offer. The so-called Zionist-Zionists, who polarized around Palestine, had used the interval between the two Congresses to

organize effectively. They threatened to withhold support from the movement if the Uganda offer were accepted.

And in this period Herzl died.

Out of the violent dispute emerged a reinforcement of Zionist dogmatism. The Seventh Congress declared:

"The Zionist Organization stands firmly by the fundamental principle of the Basle Program, namely, 'The establishment of a legally-secured, publicly recognized home for the Jewish people in Palestine,' and it rejects, either as an end or as a means of colonizing, activity outside Palestine and its adjacent lands."

The Congress' action and resolution did not prevent a split in Zionism. The insistence upon Palestine took Israel Zangwill out of the ranks. It also led to the creation of an organization known as the "Jewish Territorial Organization," which proposed to pursue all of the political and diplomatic practices of Zionism, except that it would not insist upon Palestine. It would accept "a territory upon an autonomous basis." This was no serious departure from nationalism. It was simply a quarrel over a particular, political formula for "the Jewish nation."

The Uganda incident provided another definitive chapter in the history of Palestine and Zionism and Jewish nationalism. It also had far-reaching effects upon the lives of average Jews who were in trouble and needed help. It was now the reiterated policy of Zionism that it was not an "immigrant aid scheme" or a refugee and philanthropic program. Insofar as it was the spokesman for Jews—and lacking opposition it acted as the spokesman—Jews now set conditions upon refuge and rescue. Such activity must be through the channels of Jewish nationalism and those channels must be converged upon Palestine where one day there would rise a Jewish state. This was to become an implacable and undeviating formula. It would misrepresent Jews and their aspirations. It would confuse Jews themselves. It would ghettoize Jewish activity when

such a vigorous movement avowedly limited its activity to "Palestine and its adjacent lands." It would lead Zionism openly or deviously to oppose attempts to colonize Jews elsewhere. Yet to the still unaroused anti-nationalists, the failure of the Uganda proposal appeared only as another proof of the chimerical nature of Zionism—instead of what it was: the relentless stimulation of a new nationalism.

There was one item of business inaugurated by Herzl before the Sixth Congress which remained unfinished at his death. While he was negotiating with Britain on the Uganda matter, he was also negotiating with Russia. Russia's attitude to its Jews and the traditional Russian interest in the Near East provided another "hopeful" combination that might lead to a charter. After much maneuvering, Herzl secured an audience with Von Plehve, Russian Secretary of the Interior. Von Plehve's conversations, as reported by Herzl himself, are illuminating. They reveal the impressions that were being created by Zionism. And Herzl's bald recording and acceptance of these estimates indicate that Zionism was not disturbed by them.

The Russian admitted frankly, "Formerly, we were sympathetic to the Zionist movement, because it advocated emigration." But emigration was not all Zionism advocated. It advocated also the nationalization of ALL Jews, whether they emigrated or not. It was intent upon creating a nation within a nation. And this the Russian Government did not like. So, Von Plehve said, in equal candor ". . . we notice a change. There is less talk of Palestinian Zionism than of Kultur, organization and Jewish nationalism."

Herzl did not deny the charge. Rather he admitted, "I was inwardly astonished at his familiarity with the personnel of the movement." Herzl also admitted that in his conversations he spoke "not only for Zionists, but for all the Jews of Russia."

The incident is important in demonstrating that Zionism has as its fundamental purpose the nationalization of

Jewish life; it is not primarily concerned with the human problems of Jews. It is not even fundamentally concerned with Palestine. It has testified that it aspires to become a total philosophy for all of Jewish life and that in that philosophy, Palestine, relief, rescue, rehabilitation are all only incidentals that must conform to the over-all pattern of Jewish nationalism.

Herzl died July 3, 1904. He was buried in the Austria in which he had lived and where, ironically, he called his residence, "Home Sweet Home."

I have treated the history of Zionism in some detail for two reasons. First, during Herzl's leadership of the movement, Zionism took on practically all of the permanent patterns that it has retained down to the present. Secondly, because Zionism was aggressively put forth as the *only* answer to problems confronting Jews, and lacking an organized opposition, the Christian world cultivated the belief that the vast majority of Jews was as dogmatic as the Zionists about how their problems must be solved.

A few conclusions emerge:

(1) Jewish nationalism was a new phenomenon in the already complex life of the average Jew. This was admitted explicitly by Herzl and Ahad Ha'am and implicitly by their predecessors, Hess and Pinsker. Until this time, Jews were never, in their own minds, a separate, political-national group. They suffered under discrimination designed by forces of reaction that considered them in that light. But they did not accept the segregation and separatism. Certainly they did not elect it of their own volition. Jews everywhere were straining to reach the status of integration in emancipation.

(2) Jewish nationalism was not only new, it was a divisive force in the lives of Jews. For in the struggle for emancipation and integration, all Jews found a common interest. Those who had already achieved that status wanted to extend it for themselves and secure it for less fortunate Jews. And those who did not enjoy the blessings of emancipation were constantly in search of it, through emigration and by a constant battle for equality of status in the nations in which they lived. Jewish nationalism came to reiterate

to emancipated Jews that their emancipation was an illusion and their integration undesirable. To unemancipated Jews it advocated the surrender of the fight for equality and resignation to a status of segregation which could be transformed into normality only in a Jewish state in which Jews would be a majority.

(3) Zionism confused Jews. It became an opiate and a psychological substitute for emancipation. Herzl admitted this many times by offering a diminution of Jewish participation in revolutionary parties as a quid pro quo for a despotic government's support of Zionist ambitions. Herzl's biographer and devoted disciple de Haas admits candidly that by 1899, "The leader had behind him now a great, restless mass of Jews, who in consequence of his efforts, had divided Jewry as it had not been divided since the rise of Sabbatai Zevi,* in 1666.

(4) Zionism confused Christians. In this rôle it duplicated a historic characteristic of all nationalism. It proved to be a distraction and a sublimation in which fundamental problems were ignored. Christians were willing to help out in the fight for emancipation, which merely meant the fight for greater democracy; but they were unwilling and unable to attempt to exorcise out of Jewish hearts an imputed mystical, insatiable yearning on the part of Jews to remain different and to go "home." There was little the best intentioned Christian could do about this. Certainly it gave no inspiration to fight for equality for Jews in their own lands. And the world was being told over and over that this was what Jews wanted.

(5) Zionism conjured up a "Jewish nation." First it denied the designation "Jew" to all who were not nationalists. Its Congresses were representative of only the various Zionist Organizations created under the Basle program. Yet they presumed to speak for all Jews. No one knows, even to this day, how many Jews actually subscribe to the fundamentals of Zionism which were established in 1897 in Basle. No one knows how many who superficially subscribe know the implications of their act. No one can speak for all Jews.

(6) Zionism arrogated to itself all credit for all work done in Palestine. Much of this work was the result of the

* A false Messiah who wrought catastrophic harm to seventeenth century Jews in Asia-Minor and Europe.

interest of men who opposed Jewish nationalism. Zionism now made it impossible for unfortunate Jews to migrate to Palestine without either being a Jewish nationalist, or passively contributing to the inflation of Jewish nationalism. Richard Gottheil, recognized historian of the movement, frankly admits that "nationalism was the very heart of Zionism." He too admits that by insisting upon this core of nationalism, "Zionism has caused a split and a division in the Jewish ranks; that it has set community against community; even at times, house against house."

(7) The mounting success of this movement was like the march of a ruthless Goliath. It was as much the result of laissez-faire attitudes on the part of emancipated Jews as it was the result of Zionist determination and perseverance. Herzl in 1897 had driven 197 Jews to proclaim the birth of the "Jewish nation." Against that statement there stood millions of Jews who would have disagreed had there been any real leadership of dissent and any aggressive, imaginative program for integration. The opposition, by a policy of ignoring, or of sporadic protest, was inadequate. Emancipated Jews were not only losing by default, they were in fact strengthening Zionism by their unqualified philanthropic help to Palestine. This policy called "practical" and "statesmanlike," bears a striking resemblance to the "realism" of the Chamberlain era of more recent days. The organization of a pro-emancipation program was imperative. It was Zionism's fortune and the Jews' misfortune that no one but Zionists realized this.



*H*erzl's death left a gap in the ranks of Zionism. Neither Wolffsohn nor his other immediate successors put into the movement the personal drive that Herzl had given it. During the years from Herzl's death to the First World War, Zionism produced few diplomatic pyrotechnics.

Anti-Zionists, continuing to underestimate the char-

acter of the movement, saw in Herzl's death the end of Zionism. But it was not dead. It continued in the "sleepy" kind of parliamentarianism of the Third Congress. It was mending fences and improving its organization. It intensified within Jewish life its drive against the citadels of emancipation. The dramatic, the immediate, the spectacular had appealed to Herzl. He had tolerated the Kultur group because he wanted their numbers, but under his influence, their place in the movement was never definitive. With Herzl, political nationalism was a hard and unyielding program and he was able to hold Zionism to it by personal influence. But after his death, the influence of the Kultur groups increased. Zionism was unable to create a state in Palestine, but it was influencing Jews in the many nations of the world. If it made no new diplomatic offensive for Palestine in these years after Herzl died, it was waging a ceaseless war against integration of Jews in their native lands. It opposed any and every migration plan that would settle them as individuals. The principle had been born at the Seventh Congress in the rejection of the Uganda offer; it was now expanded into general policy. "In a general and somewhat theoretical way, it may be held that the Zionist organization as such ought to have no official connection with movements based upon the principle of further dispersion."

By its own testimony therefore, the movement was unconcerned with refugees or alleviation of distress. It was interested in relief and rehabilitation only when these activities conformed, or could be made to conform, to the dogmas of Jewish nationalism.

When Herzl died the capital of Zionism was moved from Vienna to Cologne, Wolffsohn's native city. There was also another reason for moving the headquarters of the movement to Germany: German universities contained large numbers of Jewish students from Poland and Russia, and while German Jewry had resisted Zionism strenuously from the days of the "protest rabbis," these students from Eastern Europe made up a kind of Trojan Horse. Zionism gained a sounding

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board in Germany through the active mobilization of these students. That mobilization was facilitated by moving the center of activities to Germany itself.

In 1911, the seat of the Inner Actions Committee, the political heart of Zionism, was transferred to Berlin. In evaluating the latter-day fate of German Jewry it is well to remember that to the vestigial feudalism of Germany, Zionism added a concentration of its own forces, designed in the medieval conception of Jewish life. This move was later to involve Zionism in difficulties when World War I came to put members of this fictional "Jewish people" in the armies of both of the coalitions of states that fought that war. Zionist headquarters had to move to Copenhagen and, to complicate the scene still more, an English citizen, Chaim Weizmann, emerged as the leader of the World Zionist Organization.

The years from 1903-1914 saw a decline in the nationalistic diplomacy designed to secure a charter for Jews as a national group in Palestine—and an increase in practical work done in Palestine.

This growth was in part due to the fact that anti-nationalists pitched in with a will. The Zionist world was delirious with joy when, in 1913, Edmund de Rothschild visited Palestine. Though Rothschild remained an uncompromising anti-nationalist, Zionism claimed credit for the achievements and used Rothschild's commendation to advance Jewish nationalism. Eighty-five thousand Jews now lived in the land. There were forty-three colonies. Much of the work done by way of preparation for and guidance of these colonies was the result of the efforts of The Jewish Colonization Association, an anti-nationalist organization. The Alliance Israelite Universelle, a French organization, also anti-nationalist, had founded a technical school at Haifa. This was more grist for the mill of Zionism. The Herzl gymnasium was opened at Jaffa. Emphasis upon this practical work reached a climax at the Eleventh Congress, held in Vienna in 1913. Under the leadership of Otto Warburg, "the thought of Homeland was completely aban-

doned. On the political side, absolute resignation prevailed." Warburg "dissociated himself from all schemes for a charter and declared that work in Palestine was itself an end and not the means to an end . . ."

But the realities were dominant for only a short time. This was not peace, but an armistice while Zionism was preparing a new coup.

Anti-Zionist help had been welcomed in founding and building the technical institute at Haifa. It had been agreed that Hebrew was insufficiently developed to serve as a language of instruction in complicated and technical matters. But suddenly, the Zionist element submitted an ultimatum insisting upon Hebrew as the exclusive language to be used in the school.

The provocation may seem absurd but the incident created a furor in Palestine and among Jews everywhere who had been intrigued into believing that this dogmatism in Zionism was dead. Students at the school went on a strike in behalf of Hebrew. Zionist organizations all over the world made the incident an occasion for white hot protestations of the virtues of Jewish nationalism and its renascence of Hebrew. The world war put an end to the controversy. The incident, however, was important, for again it demonstrated the impossibility of compromise with the nationalistic core of Zionism.

This was to be demonstrated time after time, after an expedient peace during which Zionism had lured more "benefactors" into the fold. Amazingly the "benefactors" gave no sign of understanding the strategy.

Characterizing this period between the death of Herzl and the outbreak of the war, Gottheil says:

"These [practical accomplishments in Palestine] would hardly have been possible without the substantial aid of many who would object to being classed in any of the categories into which Zionists may be divided. . . . The great danger, however, lies in the possible one-sided insistence on this work as the quintessence of Zionism."

It is significant that with the enforced muting of Zionism's nationalistic demands, Palestine progressed practically.

The First World War provided an obstacle to the furtherance of Zionism. The headquarters of the movement were in Berlin and for a time cut off from contact with Jews who were citizens of the Allied powers. The war prevented the convening of the regularly scheduled Congresses. The reality of Jews fighting in all of the armies in the world eclipsed the fiction of a "Jewish people." In addition, Zionist diplomats, confronted with their first serious diplomatic situation, did not know which way to turn. Zionist headquarters fled to the neutrality of Copenhagen and Zionist diplomacy "walked on eggs," a phrase that Herzl had used more than once.

The exigencies of war determined the way out of this dilemma. Zionists contented themselves with increased activities within the Zionist organizations of the countries where these existed. There was an increase in Zionist propaganda and an intensification of Jewish nationalism.

Both of these objectives were aided by universal sympathy for the Jews of Eastern Europe. Large numbers of Polish and Russian Jews were concentrated in areas in which there occurred some of the bitterest fighting on the Eastern Front. Everywhere among Jews there arose the plea for "unity" in support of these helpless people. Normal differences between Jews were forgotten in unified efforts to alleviate this distress.

For a time during the war, Zionism was uncertain which of the alliances of nations involved in the war would win and the great powers were wooing the fiction of a "Jewish people" that Herzl and his disciples had created. Turkey and Germany both made offers to Zionist representatives along the lines of a chartered company such as Herzl had discussed with the Kaiser when they had met in Constantinople.

But British diplomacy was more astute than that of the Central Powers. For many years, France, Russia and England had been contemplating the fall of Turkey and the divi-

sion of her Empire. The war offered a long-awaited opportunity. In a sudden expression of that diplomacy, a British army under General Allenby began a vigorous campaign that was to reach a successful conclusion with the capture of Jerusalem in 1917. Now the center of Jewish nationalistic activity definitely shifted to London.

Chaim Weizmann in England and Louis D. Brandeis in America emerged as the focal personalities in this shift of operational bases. Both of these men were to add to the confusion about Zionism among Jews, who, under the guise of unity, were being led blindfold onto the devious path of Jewish nationalism, the end of which they did not or could not foresee.

Weizmann was by birth a Russian Jew who had come to make England his home. A chemist by profession, he perfected an important technique for the manufacture of TNT during the last war. For this discovery, it is said, he refused any personal reward from the British Government. He asked only that Britain seriously consider some commitment to the "Jewish people" with regard to Palestine.

This story has become legendary in the history of Zionism. Like all legends, it gives only a romanticized version of some of the facts.

Weizmann had been active in Zionism for years. He had attended the Congresses as a delegate. He had opposed Herzl on the Uganda proposition. To him, Zionism meant Palestine. He had organized the first party in Zionism, known as "the Democratic Fraction." This party opposed the autocratic character of Herzl's leadership and Herzl's constant emphasis upon diplomacy and the charter. It was a full-blooded, Jewish nationalistic group which, in the spirit of Ahad Ha'am was interested in an intensification of Jewish nationalism among all Jews, no matter where they lived. If such a nationalistic sentiment could be achieved among Jews, this group knew that the Jewish state would come in its own time. And they were prepared to wait.

By nature, Weizmann was the perfect leader for such a Zionism. He had the background of unemancipated Jewry which Herzl had lacked. He was more suave than Herzl. Perhaps, as a scientist, he had more patience than did the volatile newspaper man and author.

Weizmann busied himself during the early years of the war with speaking and proselytizing for Zionism in England. He did this among Christians as well as Jews. He won over E. M. Scott of the influential *Manchester Guardian* and that paper has advocated Zionism as one of its major policies ever since. Meeting in small groups, in private homes, these men planned a diplomatic coup. Very few Jews knew even Chaim Weizmann's name, yet this man was about to launch the individuals whom he lumped together in this "Jewish people" upon a political policy that would profoundly affect their lives and become a pivotal point in their history.

First, with the wave of a wand, Weizmann, by fiat, declared an end to the antagonism between nationalists and anti-nationalists among Jews. The old differences that had dated from the days of Herzl and Rothschild and Montefiore were to be dissolved in a new solution called "synthetic Zionism." By thus applying chemistry to politics, Weizmann satisfied himself and Zionists that no one could any longer not be a Zionist. This, despite the fact that he did not hesitate to add, "I regard political Zionism as the synthesis of all our activities. The practical work is a means to further the political objective."

That much of the practical work had been contributed by men who would hold with no part of Zionism did not seem to matter. No protest could be made to the synthesis because of the "unity" which became an end in itself.

Weizmann's synthesis was not without purpose, for he was ready to present his synthetized "Jewish nation" to the powers of the world. It is no wonder that the world believed him, for Jews were confused about themselves. The goal held out was the salvation of four million Jews in Russia, and Pales-

tine was held up as the only way in which this rescue could be accomplished. To this formula "all ideological considerations" were to be submerged. All, that is, but Zionism!

Such talk made it possible for the British Government to negotiate with a "Jewish people." As early as 1916, the Foreign Office sounded out the Russian Government with regard to a formula "relating to Palestine which would satisfy the aspirations of Jews." There was nothing altruistic about the proposal. Because of Zionism's reiterated formula of a "Jewish people" with common political ambitions, England was about to enter into a political-national deal with this "Jewish people." The purpose of such negotiations involving Jews and Palestine was to be "the conversion of the Jewish elements in the East, the United States of America and other places to the cause of the Allies."

This was the reverse side of the coin that Herzl had pitched into the circle of power politics. Herzl had spent his life trying to convince some power that his "Jewish nation" would be of value politically or financially. He had offered the bait of financial aid to Turkey and of a diminution of activity by Jews in the revolutionary parties of the despotically governed states. He had failed to produce a sufficiently attractive offer, but the concept of a "people" as an entity to be offered in a bargain had been established.

In 1916-17, at a critical stage of the war, the Zionist fiction of a "Jewish people" became a token for which powers were bidding.

Lloyd George was frank to admit that the sudden interest in Jews and Palestine and Jewish nationalism was "due to propagandistic reasons." The Palestine Royal Commission Report of 1937 reports that Lloyd George

"outlined the serious position in which the Allied and associate powers then were (1917). The Romanians had been crushed. The Russian Army was demoralized. The French Army was unable at the moment to take the offensive on a large scale. The Italians had sustained a great defeat at

Caporetto. Millions of tons of British shipping had been sunk by German submarines. No American divisions were yet available in the trenches. In this critical situation it was believed that Jewish sympathy or the reverse would make a substantial difference one way or the other to the Allied cause. In particular, Jewish sympathy would confirm the support of American Jewry. . . ."

Lloyd George then continued, "The Zionist leaders gave us a definite promise that if the Allies committed themselves to giving facilities for the establishment of a national home for the Jews in Palestine, they would do their best to rally Jewish sentiment and support throughout the world to the Allied cause. They kept their word."

To read again this arrogant pledge by Zionist leaders is to feel an irrepressible indignation, for myself, my family, my Jewish friends, all of whom are just ordinary Jews. For this promise to "rally Jewish sentiment and support" to the Allied cause constitutes one of the most obscene libels of all history. Only callousness and cynicism could imply that Jews in the Allied nations were not already giving their utmost to the prosecution of the war.

It was not only a libel; it was also a fraud. For Weizmann and his confrères did not have a "Jewish people" to deliver. Jews participated in the war as Americans or Britons or, on the other side, as Germans or Austrians.

But the whole formula was consistent with Zionist thinking. Weizmann could repeat Herzl's boast on the occasion of the Uganda offer: Governments would negotiate with Jews. The Zionist purpose was achieved, no matter what were the aspirations of millions of common people of Jewish faith.

Back of this maneuvering, Zionists were memorializing the British Government with a series of statements setting forth their interests in Palestine. Meanwhile, in America, Justice Brandeis was appealing to Woodrow Wilson, also on the basis of personal friendship, urging Wilson's support of Zionist demands. In 1916 Weizmann could say to a conclave of

British Zionists, "I am entitled to state in this assembly that His Majesty's Government is ready to support our plans."

As word of these developments seeped out to the public, anti-nationalist Jews began another of their last-minute oppositional demonstrations. In public statements in the London *Times* the Board of Deputies of the British Jews and the Anglo-Jewish Association protested "against the upbuilding of Palestine on a political basis." But Jewish nationalism had done its work too well. It was too late effectively to oppose a permanent organization by hastily thrown together shock troops of emancipated Jews.

On November 2, 1917, the British Government, through Lord Balfour, issued the Balfour Declaration.



The Balfour Declaration will remind you a little of Mark Twain's observation about the weather.

Not only do Jews and Zionists talk about it. Mr. Churchill talks about it. So did Mr. Roosevelt; so does Mr. Sumner Welles. Arabs talk about it. Political commentators pontificate on it. Senators orate about it. Mayors sign their names to petitions related to it. So do college professors and lawyers and merchandise experts and butchers and bakers and candlestick-makers.

It is also true that all of these people talk about the Balfour Declaration as if they were talking about different things.

Yet it is an important document. With the growing interest of the Western powers in the Near East, all political commitments in that part of the world are sure to take on more importance. Arabian oil, the altering political scene in India, the growing influence of the U.S.S.R., the emergence of the

Arabian people in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the re-awakening of China and the consequent value of routes to the Far East—all of these make the Asia-Minor area one of the places in which all people of the world will have a greater interest tomorrow than they had yesterday. And the Balfour Declaration is part of the political history of that part of the world.

The Balfour Declaration is also inseparably related to Zionism, and thus the whole question with which I am concerned in this part of the book has a relationship to a great many people in the world. And since Zionism has sought to link inseparably the destiny of Jews to Palestine and the Balfour Declaration, it is certainly a document of interest to the average Jew.

What is the Balfour Declaration? Whence did it come? Where has it taken the Jew?

Much of its antecedent history is contained in the account I have given of Herzl and the early years of Zionism. During those years, no one but Herzl and a few intimates perhaps dreamed of anything like a Balfour Declaration. For to most Jews, Zionists were visionaries. But England, France, Germany and Russia were all anticipating the imminent collapse of Turkey and its empire and each of these powers had ideas as to what would be done with the dismembered parts.

This was common knowledge, even to amateurs in secret diplomacy. It was this situation that Herzl tried desperately to exploit for a charter for Zionism. If there had not been a Zionist Organization, constituted as a political machine, claiming that Jews wanted a political stake in the political games of the world powers, there would not today be a Balfour Declaration.

The impact of World War I completed the disintegration of Turkey. The Western powers were certain that this disintegration would come, and even during the war they were pursuing their plans for the distribution of Turkey's empire.

The full story of these negotiations would take volumes. While the details are fascinating to a student of diplo-

macy, they are not all pertinent to the Balfour Declaration. I mention some of the diplomatic steps that preceded the Balfour Declaration, only because I think it important that the average Jew realize how deeply enmeshed in world politics he has become. Also, so that all who want to assist Jews in achieving what they most want may see how the Balfour Declaration was inextricably bound up with world politics in that area of the world where politics have always been more baffling than anywhere else.

The diplomatic antecedents of the Balfour Declaration were, in the first place, the creation of the Zionist movement and the fiction of a "Jewish people," "homeless," eager for nationhood and willing to make political deals to solve its problem of "homelessness."

There was also the desire of the Western Powers to dismember the Turkish Empire and the troublesome problem of what to do with a Holy Land sacred to three religions. Here was something approaching the perfect combination for which Herzl had desperately searched. Here was a stream of colonial interest into which, by shrewd manipulation, Zionists might launch the Jewish ship of state.

Early in the war, England decided that one approach to the defeat of Turkey would be to separate the people in the Arabian peninsula from Turkish loyalties and win them over to the Allied Powers. The almost incredible reports of Lawrence of Arabia tell of one aspect of this plan. But there were other, more nearly conventional diplomatic approaches.

The record of one of these diplomatic supplements to Colonel Lawrence's efforts is to be found in a series of documents known as the *McMahon Letters*, an exchange of correspondence between Husain Ibn 'Ali, Grand Sharif of Mecca, and Sir Henry McMahon, then high commissioner of Egypt. Eight letters comprise this correspondence. The first is dated July 14, 1915, the last January 30, 1916. In these eight letters, Husain and McMahon discuss the terms upon which the Arabs would throw in their lot with Britain and France against Tur-

key and Germany in the vitally important war area of the Near East.

The goal of the Arabs was independence. The goal of Great Britain was the winning of an ally and protection of her vital communication links in that part of the world. The eight letters represent the attempts of spokesmen of both parties to agree upon terms. In discussing the boundaries of the proposed independent, Arab territories, these letters never reached a definitive answer to the fate of Syria, which then included Palestine. England contended that Syria was never included in the promises made by McMahon to the Arabs. The Arabs insisted that they had never forfeited their claim to the territory of Palestine, but that to expedite the alliance with Britain, Husain had been willing to defer settlement of disputed questions. In support of this contention, Husain's fourth letter to McMahon is quoted.

The letter, dated January 1, 1916, contains this sentence: ". . . We shall deem it our duty, at the earliest opportunity after the conclusion of the war, to claim from you Bairut and its coastal regions which we will overlook for the moment on account of France." McMahon pleaded that he could make no disposition of Syria [Bairut] because of other commitments that England had with France.

Thus it is clear that there was never any agreement upon this question, clearly understood and unqualifiedly accepted by both parties.

Against this first confusion of interests over the disposition of Syria (including Palestine) there was projected in April-May, 1916, the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Involved in the negotiations which led to the formulation of this document were the governments of Great Britain, France and Russia. Only those parts of the agreement involving British and French interests are pertinent to the history of the Balfour Declaration.

The Sykes-Picot Agreement is of simpler construction than the McMahon correspondence. It pledges France and England "to recognize and uphold an independent Arab State

or a Confederation of Arab States . . . under the suzerainty of an Arab Chief." That section of the Near East which roughly corresponds to modern Palestine was to be under "an international administration, of which the form shall be decided upon after consultation with Russia, and after subsequent agreement with the other Allies and representatives of the Sharif of Mecca." In northern Syria, France was to be "at liberty to establish such direct or indirect administration or control" as she "may desire," or as she might "deem fit to establish after agreement with the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States." The same provision was made for English control in what was later to be known as Iraq.

A new element of confusion was thus injected. In the McMahon correspondence the fate of Syria (including Palestine) had been left undetermined. Now, in the Sykes-Picot Agreement, that fate was decided and Palestine, separated from northern Syria, was to be placed under international control, to be agreed upon by the interested parties, now four in number.

The source of confusion was that the Arabs had never forfeited their claim to Syria and, for eighteen months, knew nothing of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Information of the existence of this document reached Husain in December 1917, when the Bolshevik party in Russia began to publicize the secret documents found in the archives of the Czarist régime. The text of the Sykes-Picot Agreement was sent to Husain by the Turks, who hoped to convince the Arab Leader that he had been duped. Accompanying the revelation was an offer of a separate Turkish-Arab peace. Husain rejected the peace offer at the urging of the British government, which sought to assure him that the agreement had been only "provisional" and that "the striking success of the Arab revolt, as well as the withdrawal of Russia, had long ago created an altogether different situation."

But the Sykes-Picot Agreement was an indispensable forerunner to the Balfour Declaration. Without it, England

could not have made any further disposition of Palestinian interests.

However, the separation of Palestine from Syria was only a half-way house to Zionist need. An international control in Palestine was not to Zionist liking. And Russian and French interest in the country had somehow to be circumvented. The withdrawal of Russia from the war solved one part of the problem. There remained France.

In March 1917, Balfour suggested to Weizmann that if France could not be otherwise satisfied perhaps an Anglo-American protectorate could be arranged. Weizmann objected that such a plan would create too many difficulties. Instead, Nahum Sokolow, one of Weizmann's aides, then went to Paris and by the end of April succeeded in convincing French statesmen to agree that "an Allied victory in the Middle East would mean recognition of Zionism."

So, Zionist policy became clear. It would seek a "British Protectorate over a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine." In May 1917, Balfour came to America. Here he saw Brandeis, who in turn had the ear of Wilson. Meanwhile, Weizmann was keeping Brandeis posted. "England," he informed the American,

"was not yearning to annex Palestine, and would hardly care to oppose the internationalization, which would be fatal to Zionist hopes. . . . Hence, Zionist policy must be to keep to that simple demand for a British Protectorate, rejecting all other schemes which would tend to raise fresh jealousies, and bring about some joint control. The American Zionists grasped the point. A Jewish national diplomacy was in being."

Balfour returned to England in June. Weizmann prevailed upon Lord Walter Rothschild to accompany him to Downing Street, where negotiations entered a serious stage.

The proposed formula, recognizing Jewish national rights in Palestine, was vigorously opposed in the Cabinet by Edwin Montagu, Secretary of State for India. But it was a

losing battle. Anti-nationalist Jews had treated Zionism as visionary and had consistently underestimated its persistence in conditioning Christian thinking as to what Jews wanted to become. Zionist propaganda meanwhile had built a bandwagon of sentimental, romantic public opinion about the "return of Israel to its ancestral home." And that bandwagoned opinion did not make subtle discrimination between so-called practical and political Zionism which continued to intrigue some Jews.

On November 2, 1917, the Balfour Declaration was made public. It is an historic irony that during the same week, the Russian Revolution reached a definitive stage. Within the same week, Jewish nationalism was thus accorded official recognition and the four million Jews of Russia, in whose name this whole movement had so largely been fostered, started on the road that would emancipate them in Russia and turn them away from Zionism, toward integration.

The text of the Balfour Declaration was contained in a letter written by Balfour to Lord Walter Rothschild, which reads as follows:

Foreign Office
November 2nd, 1917.

Dear Lord Rothschild,

I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet.

His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist federation."

A. W. James Balfour.

The letter, called "a statement of policy" in the British Royal Commission's report in 1937, became a part of the permanent peace settlements at the end of World War I only in 1920, when the Treaty of Sèvres made final disposition of the former Turkish provinces, placing them, through the system of mandates, under the supervision of France and England which were, in turn, responsible to the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations.

The years between 1917 and 1920 saw the beginnings of a controversy about the meaning of the Balfour Declaration, a controversy that was to widen in scope and deepen in intensity with the passing years. For the document used language without precedent in diplomatic history. The term "national home" was an innovation in international affairs. Moreover, it sought to satisfy a multiplicity of inharmonious interests.

With a single stroke the Balfour Declaration sought to reconcile the following often incompatible groups: Arabs, Zionists, non-Zionists, France, England, Christians, Moslems, Jews. According to Dr. Weizmann, the last sentence was so worded as "to prevent anti-Semites from seizing upon the Balfour Declaration as a weapon whereby to bring about the disfranchisement of the Jews." (It is interesting to observe that Weizmann himself, for all the talk of Zionism being a solution to the Jewish problem, was not unmindful of the fact that the realization of Zionist aims might create new problems for Jews.) Added to all these interests was Wilson's insistence upon the right of self-determination of peoples in the construction of the post-war world.

Because of the ambiguity of the document, Zionists pursued a tireless campaign until 1924, when the status of Palestine as a Mandated Territory was fully legalized by the League of Nations.

In March 1918, Weizmann went to Palestine as a member of a commission to survey the country and explore its possibilities for development. Arabs were already fearful of the

implications of the Balfour Declaration, now added to the severance of Palestine from Northern Syria in the Sykes-Picot Agreement.

Weizmann tried to dispel Arab fears of Zionist aspirations for a Jewish state in Palestine when he stopped off in Cairo, en route to the Holy Land. So convincingly did Weizmann make protestations of moderate aspirations that one of Cairo's leading Arabic newspapers undertook to allay apprehensions. The paper, *al-Muqattam*, was owned by Dr. Faris Nimr Pasha, one of the earliest and most vigorous Arab nationalists.

In January 1919, Emir Feisal and Weizmann signed an agreement, the main provisions of which were that in the future "constitution and administration of Palestine all such measures shall be adopted as will afford the fullest guarantees for carrying into effect the British Government's Declaration of the 2nd of November, 1917."

Jewish immigration and close settlement on the land were to be facilitated. There were to be no religious tests for civil or political rights. "Mohammedan Holy Places shall be under Mohammedan control." To the Feisal-Weizmann Agreement was added a clause, signed by both men, in which the Arab representative qualified this agreement by these terms:

"Provided the Arabs obtain their independence as demanded in my Memorandum dated the 4th of January, 1919, to the Foreign Office of the Government of Great Britain, I shall concur in the above articles. But if the slightest modification or departure were to be made (sc. in relation to the demands in the Memorandum) I shall not then be bound by a single word of the present Agreement which shall be deemed void and of no account or validity, and I shall not be answerable in any way whatsoever."

On both of these occasions, for whatever reasons of policy or expediency, Weizmann, as official representative of the Zionists, seems to have spoken in terms of such moderation as to placate Arab nationalists. This, too, was apparently a

part of Zionist technique and of synthetic Zionism. For, back in England, to a group of Zionists, Weizmann could say, "States must be built up slowly, gradually, systematically and patiently. We therefore say that while a creation of a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine is our final ideal—an ideal for which the whole of the Zionist Organization is working—the way to achieve it lies through a series of intermediary stages." A dangerous, double game was thus started.

In February 1919, the Zionist delegation was given a hearing by the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference in Paris with Weizmann as one of the chief spokesmen. He was asked by Robert Lansing, American Secretary of State, what he thought was the exact meaning of the term "a Jewish national home." "Did that mean an autonomous government?"

Weizmann replied:

"The Zionist Organization did not want an autonomous Jewish government, but merely to establish in Palestine, under a mandatory power an administration, not necessarily Jewish, which would render it possible to send in to Palestine 70,000 to 80,000 Jews annually. The Zionist Organization asked permission, at the same time, to build Jewish schools where Hebrew would be taught, and, in that way, to build up gradually a nationality which would be as Jewish as the French nation is French and the British nation British. Later on, when the Jews formed the large majority, they would be ripe to establish such a government as would answer to the state of the development of the country and to their ideals."

Despite official and public utterances which refrained from mentioning a Jewish state, it was becoming apparent that such a state was the objective of Zionism and that the Balfour Declaration was regarded as sanction for such a project. The moderation with which the Zionists spoke publicly of their aspirations showed that they were aware of the resistance that would be encountered should there be any frank and public avowal of the political aims of their movement.

Such resistance was already in the process of crystallization. It was at least implicitly reflected in an event of July 2, 1919. On that date, the General Syrian Congress unanimously passed a series of resolutions, designed to express the wishes of "Moslem, Christian and Jewish inhabitants" of the lands involved in the Near Eastern negotiations. These resolutions, ten in number, were premised upon

"the basic principles proclaimed by President Wilson in condemnation of secret treaties and cause us to enter an emphatic protest against any agreement providing for the dismemberment of Syria and against any undertaking envisaging the recognition of Zionism in southern Syria (Palestine); and we ask for the explicit annulment of all such agreements and undertakings." Accordingly, the sixth resolution denied the right of France to any part of Syria and resolution seven rejected "the claims of the Zionists for the establishment of a Jewish Commonwealth in that part of southern Syria which is known as Palestine. . . . Our Jewish fellow-citizens shall continue to enjoy the rights and to bear the responsibilities which are ours in common."

One thing becomes clear in this recitation of history of the early years of the Balfour Declaration. Arab nationalism has been a real factor in the Near Eastern Area.

Meanwhile, Mr. Wilson, disturbed by these complexities involving the fate of the people who lived in the territories that had formerly constituted the Turkish Empire, urged the "dispatch of an inter-Allied Commission to Syria and Palestine to discover the wishes of their peoples." He failed to secure agreement for such a commission. Instead in June-July 1919, he sent an American delegation which reported to him privately.

This commission, known as the King-Crane Commission, reported that "Arabs wanted complete independence for a united Syria and Palestine, but if supervision was necessary, their first choice was the United States, their second Great Britain."

THE JEWISH DILEMMA

The King-Crane Commission further reported that, "A national home for the Jewish people is not equivalent to making Palestine into a Jewish State." The establishment of such a state, the Commission advised, would gravely "trespass upon the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine," and even ventured the opinion, after studying Zionist literature "that the Zionists looked forward to a practically complete dispossession of the present non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine by various forms of purchase." Moreover, the Commission reported that despite wide varieties of opinion on other matters, the entire Arab world was in great opposition to a Jewish state. And the report concluded with the affirmation that if the creation of such a state was to be the interpretation put upon the Balfour Declaration, that interpretation would have to be implemented with force.

"No British officer, consulted by the Commissioners," the report says, "believed that the Zionist programme could be carried out except by force of arms."

What use President Wilson and our State Department made of this report is unknown. It is significant, however, that while Presidents since Wilson have endorsed the Balfour Declaration, none has endorsed the idea of a Jewish state in Palestine.

Subsequently, the British Government made several attempts to clarify the meaning of the Balfour Declaration. The most definitive of many such statements was made by Winston Churchill in June, 1922. This statement was in reply to a statement made by an Arab delegation which informed the British Colonial Office that "the people of Palestine could not accept the Balfour Declaration or the Mandate and demanded their national independence."

In reply Mr. Churchill, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, said:

"When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be an-

swered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people * as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride. But in order that this community should have the best prospect of free development and provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essential that it should know it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance. That is the reason why it is necessary that the existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed, and that it should be formally recognized to rest upon ancient historic connection.

"Unauthorized statements have been made to the effect that the purpose in view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine. Phrases have been used such as 'Palestine is to become as Jewish as England is English.' His Majesty's Government regard any such expectation as impracticable and have no such aim in view. Nor have they at any time contemplated the disappearance or subordination of the Arabic population, language or culture in Palestine. They would draw attention to the fact that the terms of the [Balfour] declaration referred to do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a home should be founded in Palestine.

"This, then, is the interpretation which His Majesty's Government place upon the Declaration of 1917, and, so understood, the Secretary of State is of the opinion that it does not contain or imply anything which need cause either alarm to the Arab population of Palestine or disappointment to the Jews."

This definition was accepted by the Zionist Organization which informed the British Government that "*the activities of the Zionist Organization will be conducted in conformity with the policy therein set forth.*"

* In the same statement, Churchill defined "national" when he defined the Jewish community in Palestine as: "This community, then, with its town and country population, its political, religious and social organizations, its own language, its own customs, its own life, has in fact 'national' characteristics."

On June 30, 1922 the Congress of the United States passed a joint resolution, the wording of which was practically that of the Balfour Declaration, except that it omitted the clause regarding "the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country." Yet there is little doubt that the wording of this Congressional resolution took into account the findings of the King-Crane Commission.

Finally, in July 1922, the Council of the League confirmed the draft Mandate for Palestine and included the complete text of the Balfour Declaration, in its original form and without any clarification of its meaning.

Other articles of the Mandate set forth the responsibilities of the British Government in more specific terms. Britain was to place "the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home . . . and the development of self-governing institutions." (Article 2.) Local autonomy was to be encouraged. (Article 3.) "An appropriate Jewish Agency" was to be created "as a public body for the purpose of advising and cooperating with the administration of Palestine" and "to assist and take part in the development of the country."

"The Zionist Organization, so long as its organization and constitution are in the opinion of the Mandatory appropriate, shall be recognized as such agency." (Article 4.) Jewish immigration was to be facilitated, as long as "the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced." Close settlement of Jews on the land including "State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes" was to be encouraged. (Article 6.)

England was responsible for "preserving the existing rights and securing free access to the Holy Places." (Article 13.) Freedom of worship was a responsibility of the Mandatory and "no person shall be excluded from Palestine on the sole ground of his religious belief." Each community was to be allowed to maintain its own schools and its own language. (Article 15.) English, Arabic and Hebrew were to be the official

languages of the country and any inscriptions on stamps or money must be printed in both Arabic and Hebrew. (Article 22.) Trans-Jordan, that area of Palestine lying east of the Jordan River was excluded from the provisions of the Mandate and definite settlement of the status of that territory was postponed. (Article 25.) "The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of this Mandate." (Article 27.)

In September 1922, the League of Nations, over the protest of the Zionists, approved the separation of Trans-Jordan from Palestine.

Finally, in August 1924, the status of Palestine as a Mandated Territory was formally recognized.

The Balfour Declaration, for all its ambiguity, was now a part of international law. Palestine and Zionism were now deeply involved in the intricacies of international diplomacy. These intricate diplomacies were the birth pangs of "a Jewish nation." There was warrant for the statement made two decades later that the "Balfour Declaration was not intended to be an immigrant aid scheme, an effort to open up a new avenue for Jewish immigration" but "a political national act designed to rebuild the national life of the Jewish people in its homeland." Zionism had never pretended that it was anything else.

I have found the greatest difficulty in having the average Jew realize the true character of this document that has projected Jews as a political entity into one of the critical areas of the world. Most Jews, I believe, think of the Balfour Declaration as a generous, charitable gesture, which can do no harm and which may do good. They dismiss the nature of a political commitment made in the name of a "Jewish people." They overlook the fact that in many ways this document is the Magna Carta of Jewish nationalism, that it has helped create the impression that the aspirations of the average Jew is that of a separate, political entity.



I have thus far considered the Balfour Declaration only in terms of the relationship with this "Jewish nation" with political powers. I am not interested in "degrees" of Jewish nationalism, accepting a lesser degree and rejecting a greater degree. The whole premise is medieval and unacceptable.

First, it is to be noted that Balfour instructed Lord Rothschild to "bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation." This Rothschild did. But the Zionist Federation of England did not accept the Declaration for the Zionist Federation of England. It did not even accept it for the World Zionist Organization. With unprecedented fanfare, the Declaration was accepted in behalf of "the Jewish people," a presumption not surprising.

The ghosts of Herzl and one hundred and ninety-seven Jews who declared by fiat that a Jewish nation existed in 1897 could applaud this technique, for it was the same kind of high-handedness that had declared to those Jews who might dissent, as Herzl had declared to the integrated French Jews a score of years earlier, "Very well, this is no concern of yours. This is an affair for Jews alone."

All kinds of Jews everywhere were thus committed by the Zionists to whatever political involvements accompanied the Balfour Declaration. The anti-nationalist Jew was trapped—and reacted by refusing to believe it had happened. He did not reject it as the ovum out of which a strengthened Jewish nationalism would hatch. He continued the historic error of appeasement.

He did not organize for emancipation. He simply stood up and pointed to the nationalist Jews and said, "Not for me. I choose to interpret the Balfour Declaration as a lovely, humane act and we will both work together as long as

we understand that I do not choose your interpretation of what has happened." But this too was synthetic Zionism. It furthered Zionism—and Jewish nationalism—despite the fact that the anti-nationalist Jew was to protest periodically.

In the United States, the American Jewish Committee, in England, the Anglo-Jewish Association, in France, the Alliance Israélite Universelle, were regarded as anti-nationalist organizations. If there were to be leadership toward integration it was only right to expect these great institutions to reject the whole premise upon which England had negotiated with Zionists as spokesmen for a "Jewish people" in a political agreement leading to a "national" home.

But these organizations continued the historic error of anti-nationalists. They accepted the Balfour Declaration, protesting that it did not imply a Jewish state, that it was to be considered only in a philanthropic, refugee, benevolent, cultural spirit. In so doing they overlooked the fact that the essence of the Declaration was political; that it sanctioned a "national" status for Jews and that all Jews were committed thereby to national-political status. Thus the institutions which had been organized for defense of the hard-won rights of emancipation surrendered by default to a pre-emancipation concept.

All efforts to organize a formidable and articulate opposition to the whole national thesis of the Declaration were tabooed by "statesmanship" and "practical considerations." In America, Mr. Louis Marshall opposed Dr. David Philipson when the latter attempted to convene a meeting of anti-nationalists to consider effective dissent. Mr. Marshall said, among other things, that such a meeting would be an ungracious act in the face of England's generosity. So, again, there were only a few isolated protests.

But what of the Jewish John Does? If Jews had, in fact, become a nation-in-being, then a political deal of so fundamental a character should have had a full and free discussion and a democratic referendum.

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A pretense at such a democratic procedure was the convening of an American Jewish Congress in December, 1919. Of approximately 3,500,000 Jews who lived in the United States at that time, some 335,000 votes were counted for delegates to attend this Congress.

Nothing prevented the rest of the 3,500,000 from participating in the elections, nothing but the undeniable fact that they had so little feeling of belonging to a "Jewish people" that they were unmoved by anything that resembled political machinery for Jews. In what other "nation" would the possible acquisition of a country have created so little concern as to enlist less than 10% of the "nationals"? A forthright organization would never have convened on that "mandate." It would have admitted the fundamental error in its premise. It would have admitted that integration had worked so well that American Jews had no political interest aside from American political interest.

That did not mean they had no concern with the welfare of their co-religionists overseas. They were, however, unpersuaded by the Zionist doctrine that theirs was the only solution to the "Jewish problem." And American Jewry had demonstrated its concern with something more direct than politics during the war, by raising and distributing unprecedented sums for the relief of European Jews.

The acceptance by default could justify a Zionist Manifesto, which among other things declared, ". . . the whole Jewish people must now unite. . . . The whole Jewish people must come into the Zionist Organization."

It justified such a statement as this, from Ormsby-Gore:

"I can say that whether you come from Russia, from Salonica, from Bokhara, from Poland, from America, from England or from Yeman, you are bound together in Palestine by the ideal of building up a Jewish nation in all its various aspects in Palestine, a national centre for Jewry all over the world to look to."

No one noticed the neat differentiation that anti-nationalist Jews made between assistance to cultural and economic projects as different from political aspirations. Indeed, why should anyone have noticed it? For Zionists had declared over and over again that culture, economics and all aspects of "practical" Zionism were only means toward their political ends.

Had average Jews been informed of the pitfalls they would have rejected the proposal, for they have never really acted as if they accepted it. They still refuse in the main to act as if they were members of a "Jewish nation" and are inclined to resent anyone who tries to tell them that they are.

The other manifestation of the essentially nationalistic character of Zionism, as a total philosophy for all Jews, was revealed in a document issued in October, 1918, known as the Copenhagen Manifesto. Spurred by its success in Palestinian politics, Zionism revealed that it was interested in more than Palestine by making demands upon the Peace Conference that were related to all Jews. It was determined to exercise its self-appointed prerogative of acting as a parliament for a "Jewish nation."

Among other nationalistic demands, the Copenhagen Manifesto asked for "national autonomy, cultural, social and political rights for the Jewish population of countries largely settled by Jews, as well as of all other countries whose Jewish population demands it, and admission into the League of Free Nations." Following the issuance of the Manifesto, "Jewish National Councils" were formed throughout Eastern Europe to demand recognition of Jews as a national minority.

This Manifesto and the action inspired by it led directly to a system of national minority rights in Central and Eastern Europe. The formulation of the doctrine by Zionists and their leadership in promoting it was no accident. My reader will recognize it as the inevitable consequence of Jewish nationalism which sought the recreation of the corporate Jewish community of medieval days. Once again, despite its

occasional words, Zionist action revealed that the movement would not or could not stop at Palestine. It was being offered as a complete philosophy for Jewish life. Herzl had early coined the slogan, "Conquer the Jewish communities." In the peace proposals a quarter of a century ago Zionism determined to carry on under Herzl's and Zionism's basic doctrine, "We are a people—one people."

Anti-nationalists missed the point. Once more the anti-nationalistic institutions attempted to make an academic differentiation between "religious, educational, charitable and other institutions" and political nationalism. Once again instead of a bold, unambiguous dissent, the American Jewish Committee, the Anglo-Jewish Association and the Alliance Israelite Universelle gave a meek answer. A special committee of Jews was organized to attend the peace negotiations to plead for the principle of national minority rights. To the Zionists, these minority rights were political. To the anti-nationalists they were merely cultural, religious and charitable. But they projected Judaism into the politics of the East and Central European states, where Jews actually became separate, political entities.

These national minority-right agreements were instigated by Zionism as an inevitable manifestation of its primary purpose to create a Jewish nation. This was the same Zionism which, whenever it was challenged, would repeat in assuaging language that it did not seek to involve the Jews outside of Palestine in any equivocal relationship with Palestine or a "Jewish people."

One more event during these fast-moving years illustrates with striking clarity the real purpose of Zionism.

I have alluded to the fact that within the period of a week, the Balfour Declaration was issued and the Russian Revolution reached a definitive stage. At a single stroke, the Revolution emancipated those very Jews for whom, previously, no solution other than Zionism would be efficacious, according to Zionist spokesmen. Soviet Jews no longer had need of

Palestine—or any other refuge. The lever of the suffering of Russian Jewry, which Herzl had often used in attempts to pry a charter for Palestine from some power, was gone.

Here Weizmann faced the catastrophe almost simultaneously with victory. But he had an answer. He simply denied that Zionism was ever designed to provide refuge for oppressed Jews when he said:

“Some of us—some of our friends even, and especially some of our opponents—are very quick in drawing conclusions as to what will happen to the Zionist Movement after the Russian Revolution. Now, they say, the greatest stimulus for the Zionist Movement has been removed. Russian Jewry is free. . . . Nothing can be more superficial, and nothing can be more wrong than that. We have never built our Zionist movement on the sufferings of our people in Russia or elsewhere. These sufferings were never the cause of Zionism. The fundamental cause of Zionism was, and is, the ineradicable national striving of Jewry to have a home of its own—a national center, a national home with a national Jewish life. . . . We therefore look forward with confidence to the future of Zionism in Russia.”

The assurance that emancipated Jews wanted Jewish “nationhood” was unjustified but here again was an unequivocal statement from an authoritative Zionist.

The next decade of Zionist history would exploit to the full this incredulity of anti-nationalist Jews, and the world’s unawareness of Zionism’s objectives.

Zionist tactics took two directions. There were, in the first place, the diplomatic affairs of Palestine to handle. The Arabs were not reconciled to the aggressive nationalism of Zionists. A series of riots began in 1920 and continued until 1939. In the face of these disturbances, the ambiguity of the Balfour Declaration kept Jews embroiled in an endless game of politics. Palestine became more and more a focus of attention and Jewish “nationalism” was more than ever before the eyes of the world.

The effect on the life of the average Jew was, for the moment, not perceptible. He settled down to the task of helping rebuild a world that had come perilously close to disaster through history's worst war. Many Jews attempted to rebuild their lives in new places and become a part of that voluntary shift of populations which followed the last war. Of the nearly two million immigrants to America from 1915-1920, nearly eighty thousand were Jews. In 1921, one hundred nineteen thousand Jews came to the United States. The small immigration figures for Palestine over a comparable period reveal nothing of this "ineradicable national striving of Jewry" to have a national home of its own with "a national Jewish life."

From 1917-1921, nineteen thousand Jews were Palestinian immigrants. And in only three years, before the rise of Hitler in 1932 did the figure top ten thousand. In some years it was as low as 2,178 and there were times when more Jews left Palestine than entered it! The average exodus from Palestine, until the Hitler era, was nearly 30% of the immigration. Palestine obviously played no important rôle in the life of ordinary Jews anywhere in the world.

Zionists themselves did not act as if they were confident of this ineradicable desire to build a national home. They began to fear that they were holding an empty bag. If there were not enough Jews with ineradicable strivings for nationhood, then help must be obtained from Jews who did not have that urge. A working agreement must be found with anti-nationalist Jews, for there was neither enough money nor membership in the Zionist movement to make good the commitments into which Weizmann had entered. This imperative need, not of Palestine but of Jewish nationalism, determined the new direction in which Zionism moved after 1920. It had to devise an intra-Jewish diplomacy to capture anti-nationalist Jews. Synthetic Zionism would be put to work.

Typical of the "synthetic" results of this policy was the fate of a woman's organization in the United States, the

Hadassah. This organization had been founded in 1912 as "The Daughters of Zion." Its purpose was to improve the medical, sanitary and hygienic conditions in Palestine. Later its name was changed to Hadassah, the Hebrew name for Esther of the Bible.

Now, as a result of this intra-Jewish diplomacy, Hadassah became the Women's Zionist Organization of America. Like everything that touched Palestine, Hadassah became a medium for the dissemination of political-nationalistic propaganda. Subtly at first and later more forthrightly, it engaged in all of the politics of the Zionist Organization.

I have repeatedly had the revealing experience of talking to Jewish women who were convinced anti-nationalists but who belonged to Hadassah because they wanted to do something for refugees. They did not know that they were counted as component parts of the Zionist Organization and that part of their dues went to finance political propaganda. They did not know that they were included whenever Zionism wanted to make a display of numbers in order to prove its right to speak for "the Jewish people."

I was told the following story in a community I visited. Hadassah was about to send bills to its members for their annual dues. A bold spirit in the local organization had decided to have printed on the statements the bare fact, "Women's Zionist Organization of America." When the statements were received the local community was in a furor. Many anti-nationalists learned for the first time that they belonged to an organization that sought to nationalize Jews. There ensued a telephone diplomacy ending in the explanation that an error had been made. The statements used had been old ones. New ones would be mailed shortly. This procedure was adopted and the revealing commitment was eliminated. I never learned how many of these innocent women were satisfied by this confession of error.

But they are not to be blamed for their confusion.

The leaders of anti-nationalist thought owed these people a responsibility which had not been discharged.

The cry for "Jewish unity" continued to paralyze independence of action. Jews, voluntarily, in the midst of freedom imposed a censorship upon themselves. Profitable or not from the viewpoint of expediency, its morality is certainly questionable when so few Jews were in possession of the truth they needed to know in making a decision that involved a turning point in Jewish history.

The policy of synthetic Zionism was further developed at the first international post-war gathering of Zionists at London in 1920, at a meeting called by Weizmann. The outstanding fact about this meeting was the presence of a large delegation from the United States, headed by Louis D. Brandeis.

The climax of the meeting was a violent dispute between Brandeis and Weizmann.

The story of Brandeis' association with the movement of Zionism is something of an enigma. He made relatively few statements of his position; but there is no doubt that the association was a strong one.

Brandeis became interested in Zionism in 1912. He came to it without any previous interest in, or contacts with, Jewish life. He did not profess Judaism. His support of Zionism was a signal victory for the movement—the first major conquest in the American scene. Brandeis would have been more than human had he not been flattered by the accolades given him by the grateful Zionists who had so far failed to convince American Jewry of the soundness of the "nationalistic theory."

I have already recounted Brandeis' rôle in influencing Wilson favorably on the Balfour Declaration. Now, in 1920, Brandeis determined to attend the meeting which Weizmann had called in London. Influenced by the American Zionists, it was natural that Brandeis went to London expecting to wield a powerful influence there.

He was, however, to be disappointed because in Europe, meeting face to face with veteran politicians of the movement, he ran into the flinty core of nationalism in Zionism. And he discovered that he could not melt that core down nor whittle it away.

The test came on the question of the Palestine Foundation Fund. Weizmann and those who understood Zionism wanted "a *national* fund with a *national* budget." Money to finance the projected development of Palestine was less important to them than the way in which the money was collected and disbursed. The mechanism for both of these activities must bear the *national* stamp. Herzl, only a few years before, had insisted that the bank was less important than that the character of the bank be *national*. In accordance with this insistence upon nationalism, "Zionists were obligated . . . to tax themselves to the extent of a tithe and non-Zionists were to be won over to contribute like amounts voluntarily."

Moreover, Zionists definitely envisaged the use of the money for a continuation of political activity and propaganda. The very technique of collecting the money, through annual budgets and solicitations would have the advantage of "constantly directing interest to Palestine." Zionists were not satisfied that the last word in the political future of Palestine had been said in the Balfour Declaration. Weizmann had advised them that the way to a Jewish state was slow and gradual. Zionists accepted the declaration as a beachhead, and had no intention of demobilizing the army.

Zionists claimed that the Declaration required greater centralization of power in the hands of the Zionist Executive and for an increase of political propaganda. Meanwhile, synthetic Zionism was to induce anti-nationalists to finance the "practical projects."

To all this, Brandeis took exception. For him, the Balfour Declaration was sufficient political guarantee. Zionist political propaganda could therefore cease. He favored one great collection of needed money, from private sources and

without the machinery of nationalized collection agents in each country to make annual solicitations. Eventually, he hoped that Jews might erect in Palestine a kind of model society, patterned upon the kind of liberal social justice for which he had become renowned in his legal decisions. He opposed the centralization of power in the World Zionist Executive. He favored local organizations of people interested in advancing Palestinian development.

This was not Zionism, however, and Brandeis failed to convince the London meeting that it was. He sustained an unmistakable defeat. He returned to America and in 1921, in Cleveland, Ohio, when the question of American support for the Palestine Foundation Fund was put before the convention of American Zionists, Brandeis attempted to maintain the position he had defended in London. He was again defeated and left the Zionist Organization, in any official or leading capacity. He continued to support Palestinian development "by economic processes and obtained the cooperation of the Joint Distribution Committee and Jewish Colonization Association to that end."

This is the story of Brandeis and Zionism. Known as a Zionist, despite the fact that he was affiliated with the movement for hardly a decade, he frequently acted more like an anti-Zionist than many professed anti-Zionists. Weizmann had referred to this quarrel as the battle of "Pinsk vs. Washington." It was that; and Brandeis knew there was no meeting ground.

Why he never publicly rejected a movement with which he so fundamentally differed; why after such a defeat he retained any identity with it at all is a matter of conjecture. It may have been that he had the reticence on the subject that most men in public life seem to have. Or perhaps, since he had for so long been unidentified with anything pertaining to Jews, he hesitated now, after this brief interlude, to renounce this short-lived association. Brandeis lost out to Weizmann, and a companion fund to the Jewish National Fund

was set up, known as the Palestine Foundation Fund. The moneys collected by the fund were to be used in "promoting and furthering the religious, cultural, physical, social, economic, agricultural and general welfare of the Jewish settlers and inhabitants in Palestine, now or hereafter resident therein, and to aid, encourage and promote Jewish life in Palestine."

The actual distribution of the money is carried out by the headquarters of the Fund in Jerusalem. The authority for the disbursement lies with the Jewish Agency, and the office of the Palestine Foundation Fund serves as the treasury of the Jewish Agency. Since its inception, American Jews have contributed over twenty million dollars to the fund.

Much of this money has gone into the capitalization of practical projects in Palestine such as The General Mortgage Bank of Palestine, the Palestine Electric Corporation and the Palestine Potash Company.

The Fund does not escape the imprint of Jewish nationalism. Its organization was along lines parallel to the Zionist Organization. It conceived it to be within the declared purposes of the fund to maintain farm schools in New Jersey for the purpose of training American Jewish youth for life in Palestine. It maintained the Zionist Archives and Library in New York. Above all, it contributed to the Jewish Agency which even at that time was very largely the World Zionist Organization.

In 1935 the fund was incorporated with the Jewish National Fund into the United Palestine Appeal. Subsequently, the United Palestine Appeal was joined with the fund-raising activities of the Joint Distribution Committee into the United Jewish Appeal. The Jewish corporate community moved on. Once again, Jews, nationalists or not, were compelled to subsidize Jewish nationalism if they wanted to assist unfortunate Jews through the established philanthropic institutions. A movement that had haughtily disdained philanthropy was not averse to being financed by philanthropists.

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In 1921, the Twelfth Zionist Congress met in Karlsbad. Weizmann, who had been acting head of the movement during the war years and the years of the peace negotiations, was officially named President.

The Congress was concerned almost exclusively with financial problems. Palestine needed development. The land was poor. Zionist labor groups urged and encouraged large immigration, without regard to the requisite capital necessary to sustain the immigrants. Apparently no "Jewish people" had come forth to support the adventure out of an "ineradicable urge" to build a Jewish nation.

In 1922, a plan to create a World Jewish Congress was projected. The Congress would then elect an enlarged Jewish Agency to include anti-Zionists, and the enlarged Agency would replace the Zionist Organization which had been serving in the capacity of a Jewish Agency in accordance with the terms of the Mandate. This plan failed.

Weizmann then determined on a direct approach to anti-Zionists in England and the United States. He failed with English Jewry but in the United States, Louis Marshall again headed a group of "non-Zionists," who were willing to negotiate with Weizmann. It is interesting to observe that the Jews of the country which held the Mandate, and who were therefore in the front-line of the political barrage over Zionism, rejected Weizmann's synthetic Zionism, while American Jews entered into negotiations.

Mr. Marshall convened two "Non-Partisan Conferences" to consider Palestinian problems, in 1924 and 1925. Out of these conferences slowly evolved a plan whereby non-Zionists were to be represented in a reconstructed Jewish Agency.

As a result of these "non-partisan conferences," Mr. Weizmann's synthetic Zionism and Mr. Marshall's unwillingness to offend Great Britain, the ordinary Jew was to be labeled a "non-Zionist." The fallacy of passive resistance to Jewish nationalism is reflected in the label chosen. By refusing to

champion emancipation and integration aggressively, anti-nationalist Jews were now forced to designate themselves with a wishy-washy label derived from Jewish, nationalistic terminology, one that permitted a passive acceptance of Zionism although implying passive resistance. A clever exercise in semantics!

The Balfour Declaration and its acceptance by disorganized anti-nationalists implied that Jews everywhere had been saddled with responsibilities and commitments to Palestine. The neat qualifications placed upon the acceptance of commitments may have been real to Mr. Marshall and his intimates. They were not real to the world.

Many Jews were no more in favor of a "Jewish people" and a "Jewish nation" now than they had ever been. In fact, it seems a safe assumption that more were opposed to it than in the days of the Rothschilds and Montefiores. Two decades of emancipation had been at work and democracy had been extended in the peace which followed the first World War. It was to designate these anti-nationalistic Jews, committed by default to the Balfour Declaration, that the term non-Zionism was created.

What did the term mean? Zionists were the strong nationalists, all-out for a Jewish State, committed to the ideology of "a Jewish people." Anti-Zionists were their opposites, believing in integration. Non-Zionist was a new term. To interpret that term requires a good deal of self-contradiction, for the contradictions are inherent in the motives which produced the "non-Zionist." But as anti-nationalist Jews watched the earlier encroachments on their position and thought Zionism visionary, so here they seem to have continued the same policy of defeat by default. It was not enough for emancipated Jews to pull the Zionist chestnuts out of the fire through philanthropy. The rescuers had to be given a name which implied a neutrality toward the philosophy that had put the chestnuts in the fire to begin with. Nor was it enough that there be non-Zionists. There had also to be a philosophy of non-Zionism.

The creation of this anomaly was the first step in the newest chapter of the sorry, lamentable tale of appeasement of Zionism by anti-nationalist Jews. And it was the worst appeasement so far, for it was now more than failure to organize an effective opposition to the segregating ideology of Zionism. The anti-nationalists, and along with them, hordes of the non-thinking, had been subtly captured by that term.

Even more ironical is the fact that "non-Zionism" came into being at a time when Zionism was bankrupt. In 1928, England had issued 2400 entrance certificates to Palestine. It would have required approximately £20,000 to finance the migration of that number of people. But the World Zionist Organization did not have that sum in its treasury and it succeeded in raising only about a fourth of it by a private appeal. The Palestine Foundation Fund was a dismal failure. A report to the Sixteenth Zionist Congress in 1929 revealed that "there are many cases where members of the Zionist Organization of America, the Hadassah and other Zionist bodies have made no contribution to the United Palestine Appeal at all." Dr. Weizmann admitted that he had been forced to enter upon these negotiations with anti-Zionists because "the Zionists on the one hand have not been strong enough and there were, on the other hand, non-Zionists willing to work with even greater energy for Palestine than many Zionists."

The most divisive force since Sabbatai Zevi in the lives of Jews was on its knees. The attempt to convince Jews that their salvation lay through Jewish nationalism was a failure. It had pledged a Jewish "people" which did not exist to a policy it could not sustain. In this beggared condition it came to the leaders of emancipated Jewry and emancipated Jewry through mistaken generosity surrendered! Continued, vigorous opposition to Zionism was ruled out and a sort of "fellow-traveler" philosophy called non-Zionism was evolved.

The negotiations between Weizmann and Marshall continued in the conversation stage until 1928. In October of that year, at the Biltmore Hotel in New York City, a confer-

ence was held as a preliminary to the actual creation of the Enlarged Jewish Agency. De Haas says of this conference that "like hundreds of similar Jewish gatherings, it was nothing but a propaganda meeting which automatically referred everything to the conveners of the meeting."

Marshall had no mandate from any but a few associates and while de Haas admitted that he was "probably acting in accord with what he considered to be the psychology of the non-Zionist, that is all the mandate he has." De Haas further observed that:

"The natural order of development of the Extended Jewish Agency should be that those non-Zionists who wish to cooperate in carrying out the provisions of the Mandate should gather all like-minded to their aid, and obtain the support of non-Zionist organizations whose concurrence would materially strengthen their position." Instead, "those non-Zionists who have actually come forward have done so entirely in their personal capacity. . . . No representative institution has engaged itself in support of the cause and not one of the non-Zionists supporting the Agency has so far even attempted to assure himself that the organizations to which he is attached do in *any measure* agree or even sympathize with the Jewish Agency 'Jewish Unity' plan. For example, of the dozen non-Zionist rabbis who are lending vocal support to the Agency plan, we have yet to hear of more than one who is pressing it seriously on his congregation and arousing his members to a sense of the responsibilities and obligations involved in the project. And throughout the rest of the world the *Zionist Organization is put to the task of creating non-Zionist groups which are to be represented in the Agency.* The results are necessarily absurd." (Italics mine.)

De Haas neglected to observe that Zionism had consistently fought off attempts of anti-nationalists to organize. But he was, nevertheless, justified in his criticism: It was really an Alice in Wonderland sort of set-up.

De Haas was equally critical of Weizmann. The negotiations with Marshall had been on a personal basis, as

had much of Zionist diplomacy. After the agreements were reached the others were faced with a *fait accompli*. This had been true of the Balfour Declaration. Now, Weizmann was bargaining with the nationalism of Zionism and he would confront the Zionist Congress with a *fait accompli* and Zionists disapproved of the method. It did make a difference whose ox was gored!

The Agency plan was condemned by Zionists as "the furtive act of making a secret treaty," as a "sell-out," as a compact that was "put over."

But Weizmann had a mandate born of desperation. He regarded the Zionist situation "as hopeless and helpless unless the non-Zionists come to the rescue."

This confused diplomacy in which men were acting without mandates from anyone makes it evident that the "Jewish people," which Weizmann had pledged to political obligations in the Mandate, was non-existent. A "people" does not make treaties with itself. These were frantic diplomatic attempts to reconstruct a substitute for "a Jewish people" so that the average Jew, who was really the victim in all this, would not appear to have walked out on obligations assumed in his name.

The ordinary Jew had no opportunity to say whether he wanted to be a "non-Zionist" or not. For instance, I authorized no one to make anti-Zionism unpopular by creating a stultifying compromise, to make me a participant in a "Jewish Agency" to supervise a "national home" for Jews. I mandated no one to engage in power politics for me to feed the fiction of a "Jewish people" and to help foster the notion that Jews were uncertain of their right to the homes in which they lived. I never believed that Zionism was any part of an answer to the problems facing me as a Jew. And I was unwilling to throw it a life-preserver, now that it was drowning in the sea of its own fallacious estimate of what Jews wanted. If I wanted to do anything in the way of helping Palestine, I wanted to do it—and have it understood that I was doing it—

as a beneficence. If I wanted to help unfortunate Jews, I did not want to cast them or myself into the pattern of a separate nation in order to help them. And I did not want to be made to appear to do so. In short, I had nothing to gain and everything to lose by this misalliance.

But no one asked me. I was just a garden-variety Jew.

The mandate-less leaders continued to negotiate. In the 1928 conference, the self-appointed, or Zionist-appointed non-Zionists resorted to the historic misconception that they could pull the teeth of Zionism's nationalism by using different words in talking about Zionism and Palestine. They would work for "the upbuilding of Palestine" instead of for "the Jewish National Home." The Agency, in fact, would be transformed from an instrument to carry out a political mandate to something that would create "Palestineans of Jewish faith." "American pragmatism" was to be the sole basis of non-Zionist participation.

The non-Zionists were as confused as the designation they allowed to be applied to themselves. But the Zionists saw the alternatives clearly. De Haas wrote ". . . either the Agency is to be emptied of political aims to satisfy non-Zionists or the non-Zionists must undertake to engage in Jewish nationalist politics."

There should have been no doubt that would happen. As long as the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate were the basis of Jewish interest in Palestine, Jews were in politics, as Jews. And if the Agency was to represent Jews in Palestinian interests, it would have to be a political representation. Non-Zionists did not insist on public dissent from the Zionist interpretation of the Declaration or the Mandate. All previous "upbuilding of Palestine" had been swallowed up in Zionist propaganda as achievement that could not have been realized without the politics of Zionism. Zionists had a propaganda machine that repeated this with wearying persistency. There was still no propaganda for emancipation and integration.

Nevertheless, upon this absurd basis, in Zurich in

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1929, following the close of the Sixteenth Zionist Congress, there was produced the Enlarged Jewish Agency.

A constitution had been drafted with meticulous care for language, even if ideas and ideologies were garbled. Here, at last, the Zionist dream of a "Jewish parliament" had convened. It would legislate for the "upbuilding of Palestine." But since Palestine was not to be called "the Jewish national home," it might be anybody's guess why Jews, who lived in every country of the world should have a "Parliament" for Palestine!

There were 224 members of the Council, divided equally between representatives elected by the Zionist Congress and "representatives" of non-Zionism. For if de Haas is to be believed, the new "non-Zionists," really just average Jews, considered Palestine a far-off, never-never land. Calling them non-Zionists did not change them. And so, the non-Zionists had a difficult time mobilizing a delegation. De Haas asks:

"Of what value to the upbuilding of the Jewish National Home (*sic*) will it be if six Palestineans disguise themselves as non-Zionists in order to sit on the left or right side of the Agency table? What gain is there in the election of a French Socialist who is a Zionist, on the non-Zionist side; of what value is the projected indirect election of English Zionists to represent the non- and aggressive anti-Zionists of England? Will agreement between Polish Zionists to elect the Polish non-Zionists help?"

De Haas was as mystified as my reader must be. If I cannot clarify this mystery of non-Zionism, it is because there is no clarification possible.

Despite de Haas' pessimism, the Agency was a victory for Zionism. The President of the World Zionist Organization is *ex officio* the president of the Agency. Zionists had the assurance of a solid fifty per cent of the membership to begin with and this fifty per cent was composed of instructed delegates. The task of finding non-Zionists was left to the Zionists. They were assured, therefore, of a majority. Whenever non-

Zionists dissented, the justified taunt was thrown at them: "Whom but yourselves do you represent?"

The formation of the Agency, following the Balfour Declaration by a decade, achieved these things:

- (1) It created an illusion of "Jewish unity."
- (2) That "unity" took on increasingly the form of the Zionist dogma of Jewish nationalism.
- (3) It made Palestine appear central and dominant in the lives of Jews.
- (4) It provided a formula which made it easy to make anti-nationalism appear ungenerous. With Zionism propagandized as the *only* solution to the "Jewish problem," anti-nationalists were made to appear as if they opposed assistance to unfortunate Jews.
- (5) It was an association in which anti-nationalists were included without exercising any control.
- (6) It released the Zionist Organization from sole responsibility for implementing the Mandate and made good Weizmann's otherwise impossible and unauthorized promise of support by a "Jewish people."

This last did not meet with unqualified approval among Zionists. To many of them, de Haas observed, "the organization is THE thing;" they were disturbed about what possible use the Zionist Organization might serve, except to elect delegates to the Agency. But they were not perplexed for long. If an agency combining Zionist nationalism and anti-nationalist wealth could be created to care for Palestine, Zionism could turn to the business of Zionism: it could more energetically than ever promote Jewish nationalism everywhere. Moreover, it would be fortified in this promotion by the growth of the community in Palestine. Zionism would concentrate upon "propaganda" and a "cultural" program.

Oddly enough, Marshall and the non-Zionists agreed to this "new" emphasis. In his address to the first session of the Agency, Marshall said, "I am more earnestly moved than ever because of a decision taken by your Congress recently, emphasizing the importance of Judaism, our holy and immortal

religion. Thus the program is complete. . . . Now let us think of work and work together."

Mr. Marshall may have thought Zionist "propaganda" and "culture" meant Judaism. There were numbers of Zionists who did not make that mistake. Herbert Solow wrote in the *Menorah Journal*, of Marshall's reference to religion:

"Somewhat less palatable to the Zionists (except the Mizrachi or orthodox party) was the reference to their 'holy religion.' While it was not clear whether Marshall meant orthodoxy or reform, many Zionists did not care which he meant. By many, both brands were regarded more as inevitable nuisances than as 'our holy religion.' To these it sounded as though their worst fears were being justified; Marshall meant to make of Palestine not a Jewish National Homeland, but a religious center; he wanted to transform the upbuilding of Palestine from a national movement to a religious exercise. . . . As one delegate put it, 'Mr. Marshall made a big speech in favor of God. . . .' Nor did the oft-repeated puzzlement of the American non-Zionist delegates about the aims of Zionism ('I don't understand what these men want with Palestine when they say they are not interested in making it a religious center') add to the joy of the non-religious element among the Zionist delegates."

Marshall failed in an attempt to have a provision made in the Agency's constitution providing that "within the domain of the work of the Extended Jewish Agency in Eretz Israel, the protection of religious needs be included."

"Propaganda" and "culture" meant different things to the Zionists and Mr. Marshall. In his address, Mr. Marshall had also said, "We Americans speak with another tongue." He was to learn bitterly that this was so. For Zionists were not slow in providing their own interpretation of the propaganda and culture, for the propagation of which the energies of the Zionist Organization had now been released by the "pragmatism" of the non-Zionists.

Weizmann declared:

"... today, when a new generation has grown up, we feel that it is time that we displayed renewed devotion in bringing Zionism before the Jewish world as a question calling for a moral decision. . . . What we have to aim at is to win over the youth to decide in favor of acknowledging its national responsibilities."

Selig Brodetsky, a member of the Zionist Executive, was still more explicit. The partnership with non-Zionists made an increase of Jewish nationalism a "must." Otherwise, the purpose for which Jews were interested in Palestine might be misunderstood.

"Just because we are entering into a partnership with non-Zionists, we must take all possible measures to increase our own activity and assure our Zionist future. . . . We have unfortunately neglected this department [propaganda] in recent years owing to more pressing claims, but we realize it is necessary to lose no time now in doing all possible to secure the adhesion of the younger generation."

More brutally frank than either was Abraham Goldberg of New York, member of the Administrative Committee of the Zionist Organization of America, member of the Jewish Agency Council and a staunch supporter of Weizmann and of Louis Lipsky, outstanding leader of American Zionists. Mr. Goldberg said:

"The non-Zionists will build Palestine. We can help a little but not much. They have the money and they know how to do it. It is better so. We will be relieved of chasing pennies and of the complicated tasks of administering the work in Palestine. We can devote ourselves to the great work of Zionism: (*sic*) the winning of the Jewish world and especially of Jewish youth to Zionist ideology. . . . We are free at last to win the masses of Jewry for Zionism. This is our future work."

Small wonder the world and Jews are confused about Jews!

Since 1929 the Zionist Organization has devoted its energies to this task. Its "Jewish nation" is still pitifully small. In the United States, for example, of five million Jews perhaps a hundred thousand belong to the Zionist Organization, many of these in the belief that the Zionists do benevolent, refuge and philanthropic work in Palestine. But not a penny of Zionist Organization funds is spent in Palestine. In 1942, for example, the Zionist Organization of America collected and spent \$232,835.11, to which was added about \$70,000 allocated to it by the United Jewish Appeal. The items for which this amount was disbursed reveal that Mr. Abraham Goldberg knew whereof he spoke in 1929. The principal sums were allocated to an Executive Department (\$23,518.33), Public Relations and Education Department (\$10,926.53), Membership Department and Speaker's Bureau (\$54,168.53), Publications (\$48,937.38), Internal Administration (\$35,076.62), Subsidies to Youth and Hebrew Organizations (\$14,534.94), American Zionist Youth Committee (\$18,333.33), General Expenses (\$11,066.92). The word "Palestine" occurs only once in the list, in an item called "Palestine Department." I do not know its activities, but the sum allocated to it was \$4,545.85!

There was nothing among emancipated, integrationalist Jews to match this concentrated, organized machine. Yet, emancipated Jews had made it possible. By their silence in the face of this renewed onslaught of nationalism, the world has become more confused about Jews than ever at a time when confusion is unspeakably tragic.

Maurice J. Karpf, non-Zionist member of the Agency from the United States, makes this summary of the reasons for the failure of the Agency. Against the history that I have recorded above, it appears to be an accurate estimate.

The Zionists, possessing an organization as against the disorganization of the non-Zionists,

"embarked upon a policy, almost from the beginning, of whittling down the non-Zionist influence and participation in the Agency. To accomplish this end, they took advantage of a clause in the Constitution of the Agency whereby any member of the Zionist Organization who was not appointed to the Agency by the Zionist Organization could serve on the Agency as a non-Zionist. In this way, a number of Zionists came to serve on the Agency as non-Zionists. . . .

"The Agency was destined to fail because of the attempt to make unequals equal and equals unequal."

It was a bitter climax of irony that the formation of the Jewish Agency served to provoke new political disturbances in Palestine.

There had been riots in 1929 and 1921. The disturbances of 1921 saw the union of Christian and Moslem Arabs, two groups that theretofore had been at loggerheads. Now, as if to make the King-Crane Committee prophetic, the Arab world was demonstrating that whatever may have been its differences on other questions, it was unified in opposition to Jewish political control of Palestine.

The most serious riots in a decade of turbulent politics occurred in 1929. Britain sent a commission to investigate the causes of the disturbances. The report graphically stated:

"The enlargement of the Jewish Agency was not unnoticed by the Arabs. They knew that it meant an increase in the pressure of world Jewry on Palestine and in the material resources behind it. They saw too that it had revived the self-confidence, not to say aggressiveness, of the less restrained inhabitants of the National Home." The report continues, to observe that Arabs saw in the recent Jewish immigrant "a movement created by an important international organization supported by funds which, judged by Arab standards, seem inexhaustible."

So, the Jew migrating to Palestine was no longer a human seeking peace, security and opportunity. He was "a

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movement" and it appeared to Arabs "improbable that such competitors will in years to come be content to share the country with them."

There were more riots in 1936. This time the British Commission investigating the causes issued the most comprehensive report that had been made on Palestine since the Balfour Declaration. The report issued in 1927 revealed that Britain believed that it would be futile to attempt to resolve the longstanding conflict between Jews and Arabs in any co-operative adventure between the two groups. It was suggested therefore that the attempt be given up and Palestine be partitioned. A small section of the land was to be delivered over to "the Jewish people." There they might establish their Jewish state. The Arabs would control the rest of the country, except for a small strip of territory running from Jerusalem to Haifa. This strip of land would remain under Mandated control.

The Commission's report provided an alternative to partition. If, for any reason, the plan was found to be unworkable, Jewish immigration would be limited to 12,000 a year and there would be a virtual stoppage of land sales to Jews.

At the Twentieth Zionist Congress in 1937, in Zurich, Zionist reaction to the proposal was sharply divided. Zionists split into the Ayes and the Noes, the former ready to accept partition, the latter rejecting it. The European Zionists comprised the majority of the first group. The American Zionists provided the bulk of the Noes. Weizmann himself favored partition.

Here again were the old patterns that have recurred so often in this story. The Ayes were afraid that without the state idea, Zionism would disintegrate for it would lose support in Eastern Europe. They were afraid that Jews "would lose interest in Palestine; that new outlets will be created (for immigration of Jews from Eastern Europe) and money,

interest and energy will be diverted from Palestine to other countries."

They were afraid, in other words, that there was no "ineradicable" striving in a "Jewish people" to build a national life in Palestine; that if this artificial conditioning of Jewish life should cease and if all Jewish energies were not funneled through the bottle-neck of Jewish nationalism by means of such stultifying compromises as the Jewish Agency—Jews would become just normal human beings. They would no longer have an ambiguous status before the world. The Partitioners would prevent this by saddling a Jewish state, however small, upon the backs and consciences of the Jews of the world.

The Zionist Congress evaded a discussion. The Executive Committee of the Jewish Agency was authorized to negotiate with the British Government "with a view to ascertaining the precise terms of His Majesty's Government for the proposed establishment of a Jewish state."

In 1938 Britain sent a Commission to work out the boundaries of the proposed partition. The Commission, known as the Woodhead Commission, reported that it was unable to reach any satisfactory agreements on the question of boundaries. Since the Arabs rejected partition in principle, this report saved Zionism from a decision that would have been embarrassing.

Finally, in 1939, Britain called a conference of Arabs and Jews in London. It was hoped that a working agreement between the two groups might be evolved. No compromise was reached and in May 1939, the MacDonald White Paper was issued as the British Government's own answer to the complexities of Palestinian politics.

The White Paper of 1939 provided another detailed review of the stormy history of Palestinian politics.

The statement established these major objectives as the aims of the British Government:

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- (1) The "establishment within ten years of an independent Palestine state" and the "termination of the Mandate."
- (2) "The independent state should be one in which Arabs and Jews have a share in the government in such a way as to insure that the essential interests of each community are safeguarded."
- (3) The establishment of the state was to be preceded by a transitional period, during which Arabs and Jews were to be given increasing responsibilities in the government.

Jewish immigration was limited to 75,000 for a period of five years, until March 31, 1944, and certain restrictions were put upon the sale of land to Jews.

The effect of the White Paper would have been to freeze the Jewish population to approximately one-third the population of Palestine. The statement itself was issued upon the basis of Churchill's 1922 definition of the meaning of "a National Home."

Mr. Weizmann, representing the Zionists, protested to the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations and to the British Government. The League Commission rejected the White Paper, but Parliament ratified it.

Zionists argued their case upon the basis of politics. That Palestine and its politics involved the Jews of the world, through Zionist spokesmanship, became clear in these political debates. Mr. Weizmann reminded the world, time and again, of "the will of Jews today to establish themselves as a people in Palestine." And, "the National Home of the Jewish People in Palestine is a home which is to be 'reconstituted'—a term implying a restoration of Jews to the position occupied by them *in the past*." The White Paper was attacked because it was part of a policy "to whittle down the status of the Jewish people by limiting Jewish rights in regard to Palestine to those of the existing Jewish population of the country" as if there could ever be any stabilized political situation anywhere if "nationals" of other lands, who resided in other

countries were forever to maintain an organic relationship with Palestine. Mr. Weizmann drove the point even harder by differentiating between the Mandates for Syria and Iraq and that of Palestine. The former, he said ". . . were not designed to serve any such unique purpose as the promotion, in the countries to which they applied, of a national home for the original population of those countries, long exiled but now anxious to return."

These statements were all contained in a letter, written by Weizmann, in behalf of the Jewish Agency, on May 31, 1939.

That there was no reference made to Article 15 of the Mandate, which provided that "No person shall be excluded from Palestine on the sole ground of his religious belief" is an amazing revelation. It indicated the degree of defeat of non-Zionists in the Agency. It indicated that Zionism was again primarily concerned with the political character of the "charter" to Palestine and of the Jews of the world. Once again "the Jewish people" and their "political-national" rights were the paramount consideration. It was solely upon that basis that Zionism argued its demands.

The White Paper of 1939 met with general disapproval in the western world. It came at a time when Jews in Europe faced their darkest hour. Most of the world did not understand that the White Paper was an expediency of World War II, just as the Balfour Declaration had been an expediency of World War I. The Balfour Declaration had bestowed privileges upon Jews in Palestine. The White Paper of 1939 had imposed disabilities, below the status of equality, upon Jews. In the field of power-politics in which Zionism worked, this may have been part of the game. But by that "eternal justice" which Pinsker had scorned as a basis for the solution of "the Jewish problem," neither document would have been issued.

The White Paper policy was maintained in defiance of the League of Nations and the expressed public opin-

ion of the western world. It stood up because, although many people protested, no one was willing to assume responsibility for what might happen among the Arabs if the White Paper had been abrogated.

Zionism, nevertheless, was undeterred. It still had no opposition among Jews to say to the world that Jews, in desperate need of sanctuary, were just ordinary people who did not insist that before they were rescued they be imprinted with the label of Jewish nationals.

As if in open defiance of the events that had precipitated the crisis in Palestine, American Zionists, in 1942, again flaunted the demand for a Jewish state before the whole world. In May, at the Biltmore Hotel in New York City, the largest convention of American Zionists ever to assemble issued a statement known as The Biltmore Platform. In the face of the most agonizing tragedy ever to be visited upon Jews, the Platform concerned itself primarily with three demands. It interpreted the Balfour Declaration as guaranteeing a Jewish Commonwealth. It demanded a "Jewish military force, fighting under their own flag and under the High Command of the United Nations" and finally,

"that the gates of Palestine be opened; that the Jewish Agency be vested with control of immigration into Palestine and with the necessary authority for upbuilding the country, including the development of its unoccupied and uncultivated lands and that Palestine be established as a Jewish Commonwealth integrated in the structure of the new democratic world."

Into the travail of a world engulfed in its second total war, there were projected the words which Weizmann had expediently muted in 1917. Out of the agonies of this war, Zionists hoped to achieve their Jewish state.

They wanted tacit recognition of that state established in a "Jewish Army." They wanted the sovereign power of controlling immigration into a country in which Jews were

one-third of the population. They wanted self-government in that country postponed and implied that the basis for determining when Palestine was to have self-government should be the attainment of a Jewish majority.

With Europe under Axis control, the center of Zionist activities had shifted to the United States. Zionists were wary of the traditional anti-Zionism of American Jews. In forty years of history they had recruited few supporters. Their emphasis here, therefore, was upon rescue and sanctuary for the oppressed Jews of Europe. But they did not neglect to organize an Emergency Committee which labored with mounting zeal to inject Zionism's political-nationalism into every crevice of the American scene.

I recall an incident that involved a Christian minister who was touring the country in behalf of Hadassah and Zionism in 1942. He made a stirring appeal for support of Zionism, and repeated the shibboleths about the "homelessness of Jews." He gave a vivid description of the life of Jews in a benighted Europe. Then he closed with the observation that the only way in which the Christian world could requite the Jews was by supporting Jewish demands for a state in Palestine.

The man's obvious sincerity appealed to me and I talked with him after the meeting about the theme of his address. I told him very briefly, over our coffee, something of the history I have told here, and then I asked him, "Doctor, how, as a Christian minister can you, with conscience, admit the failure of Christianity in Europe by agreeing that the position of the Jew there is a hopeless one and that the *only* restitution the Christian world can make to Jews is to abdicate the fight for Christian morality and pack Jews off to a segregated country of their own?" He thought for a long time and finally said, "I can't answer you. I've never thought of this question in that light before."

I have in my files hundreds of letters from Christians who repeat this minister's confusion. And I also have

hundreds of letters from Jews who say, "I don't want a Jewish state or a Jewish nation. I just want to belong to any movement that helps my fellow-Jews in Europe." Their tragedy is that they have never been told. They are still part of the price non-Zionism is paying for the Jewish Agency. They are a part of the profit Zionism is collecting from default and appeasement. More and more of the world is coming to believe that Jews are a separate, unassimilable group—and want to be understood that way.

In 1943, American Jews were provided with a carbon-copy of the American Jewish Congress of 1919. Elaborate plans were made for elections of delegates and at a much-ballyhooed meeting at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York, an American Jewish Conference met on the 29th of August, 1943. The extent of anti-nationalist protest was to insist that the original name, The American Jewish Assembly be changed to The American Jewish Conference. The American Jewish Conference labored and labored to bring forth "Jewish unity." It brought forth instead, as its crowning achievement, the mouse of the Zionist Biltmore Platform.

Integrationalist Jews took some heart as the American Jewish Committee withdrew from the Conference. They took a little more heart as the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, the National Council of Jewish Women, the B'nai B'rith, the Jewish Labor group, the Central Conference of American Rabbis and others declared that they would co-operate with the Conference in matters pertaining to rescue and rehabilitation, but that on the question of a "Jewish Commonwealth," they would maintain a position of neutrality.

This question, most of these organizations declared, was a matter for individual Jews to decide. As indeed it is. The admission constituted the first real break in the false front of Jewish corporate life since the Balfour Declaration. Here, at least in the United States, there was no "Jewish people." Delegates to the Conference, it was declared by these

neutral organizations, had voted as individuals. The Conference had been attended by 502 delegates. All but four voted for the "Commonwealth" demand, according to official accounts. But since the delegates acted as individuals, the vote meant nothing except that 498 Jews had supported the Biltmore Platform. At least history can never record of this Conference that which it recorded of Herzl's first Zionist Congress; no one could say that in the Waldorf-Astoria in New York in 1943, the Jewish "people" had asked for a Jewish state.

No one, that is but Zionists. A few months after the American Jewish Conference adjourned, the Emergency Committee of the Zionist Organization climaxed a whirlwind campaign ostensibly designed to seek the abrogation of the MacDonald White Paper. But there was a rider to the White Paper abrogation demand, insisting on the establishment of a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine, in the name of "the Jewish people."

The demand for the "Jewish Commonwealth" was incorporated in a resolution which was introduced into the United States Senate and House of Representatives. The introduction of those resolutions into both houses had been preceded by a campaign in which Zionism took full advantage of every mistake and default that anti-nationalists had committed. They claimed credit for all the work done in Palestine as Zionist achievement. They used the tragic flight of harassed Jews to Palestine as a manifestation of world Jewry's ineradicable striving for a national Jewish state. They pointed to the investment of \$100,000,000 by American Jews in Palestine as a kind of lien upon the land and implied that the government of the United States could only adequately safeguard that investment by sanctioning a Jewish state.

Zionists had organized many committees for the abrogation of the White Paper in local communities in America. When the hearings on these resolutions were held, thousands of telegrams poured into Washington urging support of

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the resolution. How many thousands of the senders knew that when they urged support of *H.R. 418* and *419*, they were pressing for a Jewish state as well as for abrogation of the White Paper, I do not know.

I was present at those hearings which took four days of the House Foreign Affairs Committee's time at a moment when the world was engaged in a desperate war for human freedom. As I listened to the testimony and saw the ghosts of Herzl, Weizmann, Hess, Pinsker and others sitting in war-time Washington in 1944, I wished that every one of the five million Jews of America might have been sitting there with me. I wanted them to hear the things that were said in their behalf, by men in whom many reposed faith. I wanted my average Jew who thinks Zionism has some relationship to his Judaism hear Abba Hillel Silver say, Zionism is a "secular movement." I wanted my Jewish John Doe to hear Mrs. Frances Bolton ask whether endorsement of these resolutions meant that America would be expected to implement such endorsement "with military action." I would have liked him to hear Dr. Carl Friedrich affirm the fact that by default the ordinary Jew was made a part of all this because "the promises involved in the Balfour Declaration were made not to the Jews of Palestine, but to all Jews."

I wish all Jews could have heard Dr. Israel Goldstein, as President of the Zionist Organization of America, deprecate any opposition to the resolution as representing less than 10% of American Jews and urging the Committee to ignore those dissents even though they emanated "from men of ever such great wealth or high social position." This was the President of the American branch of that organization which fifteen years earlier had come begging the non-Zionists to build Palestine because "They have the money and they know how to do it!"

I wish, too, that the average Jewish woman who thinks the Hadassah organization is a philanthropic movement designed to provide medical care for Palestinian cit-

izens and to transport Jewish children out of the hell of Hitler's Europe—I wish that kind of generous Jewish woman could have heard Mrs. Judith Epstein, speaking for Hadas-sah, say, "We are an integral part of the Zionist movement, the objective of which is the reestablishment of Palestine as a Jewish Commonwealth. Toward the achievement of that objective *all our work and efforts are directed.*" (My italics).

Yes, I wish the ordinary, non-political American Jew had been in that jam-packed committee room for those four tense days. For, as Dr. Silver observed, they, like the days of the Balfour Declaration, marked a turning point in Jewish history.

It mattered little, really, that the War Department sent a letter to the House Foreign Affairs Committee to tell these statesmen what they should have known in the first place: that the political situation in the Middle East was so fraught with danger that "further action [on these resolutions] at this time would be prejudicial to the successful prosecution of the War." That mattered little, for there was no need for Palestine as a Jewish state *at that moment*. The appeal for the abrogation of the White Paper was lost because it was unnecessarily linked to a demand for the "Jewish Commonwealth."

But Zionism was served even if Palestine and the average Jew has not been. For four days, its spokesmen held forth in the press on the "Jewish Commonwealth" and "the homelessness of Jews" and "the Jewish people." The ends of Jewish nationalism were served. Before the resolutions were tabled, an official Zionist publication had expressed the fear that

"there was the danger that *the abrogation of the White Paper—on which everyone agreed*—would obscure the demand for a Jewish Commonwealth. The discussion [of the Resolutions] shifted the center of gravity to the point of the Resolution which is most decisive for the future of world Jewry. Around this debate—if there is to be any debate—in

Congress will center. *This and not the White Paper must be given emphasis* in all Jewish and non-Jewish support of the resolution."

The fear was unfounded. Zionists prepared their testimony with the "proper" emphasis. The ghost of Herzl, rejecting sanctuaries for oppressed Jews, saw disciples sitting in the chairs occupied by Zionists. Zionism survived a political defeat that would have sent an ordinary political machine reeling; it not only survived, it won a victory. For it introduced Jewish nationalism into the American political scene with vigor and drama and sensationalism. It was Palestine and the average Jew everywhere that suffered defeat.

If the average American Jew had been in Washington during those four days, I think he would have taken himself out of this fantastic Hollywood realm of Jewish nationalism.

Where would he go? Had he been in Washington with me he might have found a clue even in all that confusion. He might have seen a glimmer of light in the position taken by four men who represented a young organization with a membership at that time of 2500 Americans of Jewish faith, The American Council for Judaism. It represented the first attempt in nearly fifty years to organize and to articulate a program for the emancipation and integration of Jews. The formation of that organization and its participation in the Washington drama are a vital part of the history of emancipation with which the next chapter deals.

PART III~For Free Jews In a Free World



*E*mancipation was the fulfillment of the desires of ordinary human beings who happened to be Jews, to be free. This desire in all men antedated nations. Consciously or unconsciously, man has struggled to realize his fullest expression as an individual. To assist man in that struggle is the ultimate purpose of freedom. That is the meaning of our faith in the inalienable rights of individual men.

The preparation of man for freedom from controlling, corporate forms of state and church and for a world in which he might discipline and govern himself, is a long, historic process. In Europe it began in a discernible way with the Renaissance and reached a definitive though not final form in the great political revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

That process of preparation and realization took several centuries. During that time, Jews were isolated from the prevailing currents of life by ghetto walls and legal discriminations. But the will to be free lived on in their hearts. Only because of their isolation, the articulation of the desire came later in many countries for Jews than for other Europeans.

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The expression of the wish for emancipation as a conscious program for Jews was first made by an eighteenth century German Jew, Moses Mendelssohn. The first tools to implement that expressed wish were provided by an eighteenth century German Christian, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing. Their friendship is a classical example of the process of emancipation. The story contains all of the basic ingredients of that process as the way by which men of good will, with faith in freedom, may meet and solve the problems they face.

Mendelssohn was born in Dessau "as insignificant and wretched an object as almost all poor Jewish children." His youth was spent in the accepted pattern for Jewish boys of that day, with its emphasis on the study of the Talmud. Early in life he was appalled by the degradation into which Jewish life had fallen. He was insistent that Jews were as good as other men and that what they needed was opportunity to move with the expanding freedom that was on the march through Europe. He was also insistent that Jews must prepare themselves to take advantage of freedom. They too would have to pass through processes resembling the changes that had come about in European life.

His first efforts in that direction were confined to a persistent attempt to improve his Hebrew style. Mendelssohn was determined to use a pure, classical Hebrew prose. He was distressed at the debased Hebrew used by his contemporaries.

Mendelssohn's efforts to urge self-improvement upon Jews did not go unnoticed. In another corner of Germany Gotthold Ephraim Lessing was preparing to dedicate his life to the enlightenment of Germany. Lessing "the first free-thinking man in Germany," was a dramatist to whom "the theater was a pulpit" from which to expound the liberal ideas that were to bring forth a new world. A mutual friend brought Mendelssohn and Lessing together because of a common interest in chess. The two men became inseparable friends.

Both men believed that Jews were far better than their stereotypes, products of the oppression and degradation to which Jews had been subjected for a thousand years. Mendelssohn resolved to educate Jews to take their places in a more hopeful world. Lessing believed that all men should have greater freedom and that no society could be free in which any of its members were enslaved.

Mendelssohn, therefore, began with the conviction that there was nothing in the character of either the Jew or the non-Jew that prevented them from understanding each other and living with each other, as normal human beings. He proved this true by his own affection for Lessing and Lessing's increasing devotion to him. Mendelssohn sought constant self-improvement. Lessing was determined that what this man was able to create would not be unnoticed because he was a Jew.

It is important that in his efforts for emancipation, Mendelssohn began with himself—even before he knew Lessing. All of his life he continued a conscious, persistent effort at integration, in its fullest, richest sense. Through Lessing's help he began to study German and became as much a stylist in that language as he had been in Hebrew. As Mendelssohn integrated his life into the Germany in which he lived, Lessing opened more and more doors in that Germany to him. And soon Mendelssohn was counting the finest minds of Germany as his friends and intellectual companions.

His natural interest was in philosophy. He participated in several of the essay contests sponsored by various centers of learning in Germany and in one such contest, sponsored by the Berlin Academy, competed with and emerged the victor over Emanuel Kant. It was probably this achievement that led Frederick the Great to confer upon Mendelssohn the "privilege" of a *Schutz Jude* (protected Jew); a guarantee that Mendelssohn would be protected by the crown and would not be driven from Berlin.

This privilege however was only Mendelssohn's

personal emancipation. The fact that it was a privilege conferred upon him at the whim of an Emperor made clear the low estate in which Jews lived and the immensity of the problems confronting them in a struggle for equality.

Mendelssohn was aware of this. He accepted the award. His personal achievement merely proved to him that the determination with which he had approached his own problem was the pattern that would lead to the improvement of the status of all Jews.

In all of this process of self-improvement and integration, Mendelssohn sacrificed nothing of his religious faith. He stood forth in Germany as an outspoken defender of Judaism and, on occasions, pleaded for it certain distinctions over Christianity. In a heated controversy with a fanatical Christian minister, he used public letters, through which the debate was carried on, to criticize the Christian world for holding the Jews in a degraded position in civil life. He emerged from this controversy with the plaudits of many of the outstanding men of Germany.

But mere defense of Jews, he knew, was not enough. No advance was ever made simply by staving off attack. The way from the Ghetto was out; the restraints imposed upon them by a bigoted world must be removed and Jews would have to liberate themselves by adapting themselves to the emerging patterns of the world of which they hoped to become a part.

Moses Mendelssohn made one significant contribution to this inner emancipation of Jews. Because he wanted his children to understand the Bible in its purest and simplest spirit, he prepared a translation of the Old Testament for their use. He was prevailed upon to publish this German translation of the Biblical text for general use among Jews.

Its publication raised a storm of protest from "official" Jewry, a pattern that was to last until our own time. This was the conflict between the corporate Jewish community—"the Jewish people"—and people who were Jews. Here

was the origin of the struggle that would determine whether Jews might be humans first, or whether they willingly accepted the consequences of artificial separation and segregation. In 1779 an interdict was issued against the Mendelssohn translation. "All true to Judaism were forbidden under penalty of excommunication to use the translation." Mendelssohn's opponents frankly admitted the fear that "the Jewish youth would learn the German language from Mendelssohn's translation more than an understanding of Torah."

Thus the historic issue was joined. In the joining there began to emerge the dilemma in which the average Jew was held. He faced a world that did not understand him. It did not understand him because it had isolated him centuries before in order to prevent the spread of Judaism as a universal religion. A more liberal world was slowly preparing to free itself from medieval, corporate controls. Somewhat more slowly—but surely—it was preparing to admit the Jew into that world. Upon the very threshold of his freedom, the Jew was halted by organizations with "vested interests of considerable magnitude." Those vested interests lay in keeping Jews different and segregated, in fostering a feeling of difference and segregation. "Official" Jewry spoke to the world that was preparing to welcome Jews and in effect said in their behalf, "We do not wish to come into this world you offer us unless we can do it unchanged, in the garb of our own medievalism, first as separate and segregated Jews and secondarily as free humans."

Mendelssohn was undeterred by this dogmatic insistence on a difference which he knew was artificial. In defiance of his opponents he set down a principle which later disciples of integration might have followed. "The more the so-called wise men of the day object to it [the translation] the more necessary it is. At first I only intended it for ordinary people, but now I find that it is much more needful for rabbis."

In a fanaticism that was almost unbelievable, the

translation was publicly burned and condemned by Jews but neither the men nor the institutions with vested interests in the status quo could stem the tide. The Mendelssohn translation was read everywhere openly or covertly. Jews hungered for the opportunity to be free human beings. Mendelssohn had shown them how they might be both free and Jews, even though the process he advocated meant a progressive dissolution of "the Jewish people." Judaism could survive though "the Jewish people" might disappear. Judaism was of the spirit of man. It was universal in appeal.

"Official" Jewry could not prevent emancipation, for freedom was in the air of the western world. But it could and did confuse Jews in their thinking about their religious traditions. It could and did confuse non-Jews in their estimates of what Jews wanted for themselves. It could and did hamper the process of growth and development toward freedom which I have called integration. All this was dramatized in "official" Jewry's reaction to the Mendelssohn translation of the Bible.

Thus, a conflict in Jewish life! Jews were prevented from appearing as ordinary people in the countries in which they lived and when opportunities for integration and emancipation came to them, later than to most, they were restricted by other Jews in their acceptance of the benefits. Baron, in his *A Social and Religious History of the Jews* is frank to admit that Jews had a "growing sense of inferiority throughout the emancipation era" and "were extremely sensitive to all signs of approval from outside." This tendency has been noticeable among Jews who have so obviously gloried in the achievements of Jews and are often too supplicatingly grateful for the equality that is their due. "Official" Jewry saw to it, by such acts as opposition to the Mendelssohn translation, that "Jewish enlightenment was, on the whole, much less radical than the European movement. . . ."

Advocates of a "Jewish people" justified this braking of the process of emancipation and integration by making

a high virtue out of early discrimination and persecution; by maintaining that without a "Jewish people" there could be no Judaism. Almost unconsciously, the men who wanted to preserve a "Jewish people" regardless of the fate of people who were Jews, differentiated between Jews and other human beings. They continue to do so, consciously or unconsciously today. "The European or American had his language, literature, state, etc., manifold expressions, conscious or unconscious, of his national life. The Jew had no such immediate substitutes for tradition." This utterly false and unjustified juxtaposition of "Europeans," "Americans," and "Jews" is an inevitable consequence of the concept of "Jewish peoplehood" as a national entity.

But Mendelssohn's translation, born of the emergent forces of freedom, was not to be denied. It "speedily resulted in a veritable renaissance of Jews. . . . The inner freedom of the Jews . . . dates from this translation."

This gradual, inner emancipation of Jews came face to face with the unyielding dogmatism of Jewish separatism and led to a new phenomenon in Jewish life, the philosophy of Jewish assimilation.

By Jewish *assimilation* is meant a conscious and willing attempt on the part of Jews to divest themselves of affiliations with Jewish life and to lose their identity in the non-Jewish world. This escape has been justifiably condemned by both Jews and Christians. I am not here referring to a transference of true religious conviction from Judaism to some expression of Christianity. By assimilation I mean the conscious efforts of Jews to dissociate themselves from Jewish life; attraction to another religion may or may not follow.

Assimilation was a direct result of this conflict between inner freedom in the lives of ordinary Jews and the stubborn resistance to that freedom maintained by advocates of the "peoplehood" of Jews. Mendelssohn pointed the direction in which humans who were Jews might find a normal status in the Western world. It was a natural, human desire

that led Jews to follow that direction. Across the broad road to freedom, "official" Jewry placed the obstruction of dogmatic "Jewishness." They hampered the process of integration and inner emancipation. To get around the obstacle some Jews went out into the free world by removing Judaism from their lives. It was an inevitable development.

The charge of encouraging and desiring assimilation has been hurled at believers in emancipation. The truth is just the reverse. As the irresistible tides of freedom touched the lives of Jews, designers of Jewish life had the alternative of adapting Judaism to a new world. Where they failed to meet the challenge, freedom swept Judaism away. For the Jew was not to be denied his own fullest development by the dogmatics of reaction. That assimilation has failed as a solution to the Jewish problem may be true. That fact does not deny the logic out of which the impulse to assimilate was born.

Mendelssohn encountered the problem of assimilation in the lives of his own children, who as enlightened citizens of their day, turned away from an attachment to things Jewish when the obdurate leaders of Jewry hobbled the pace of integration.

While Mendelssohn was urging integration upon other Jews, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing was providing the other, indispensable ingredient of emancipation. For no matter how strenuously Jews may exert themselves in preparation for freedom, there must be men of good will who out of enlightened self-interest see reason in securing freedom and equality for all men. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing was the prototype of such men in every age.

His contributions to emancipation for Jews took two forms. First, he advanced the personal career of Moses Mendelssohn at every opportunity. He recognized in Mendelssohn an individual of great worth. Lessing was determined that his worth not be lost to the world because Mendelssohn was a Jew. As the foremost dramatist of Germany in his day, Lessing's acknowledged literary standing made his advocacy

of Mendelssohn's literary contributions the most important element in Mendelssohn's career. It was Lessing who first had some of Mendelssohn's essays published; who introduced Mendelssohn to the circles of leaders of German thought; who opened the doors to the man who had prepared himself to enter a new, emergent world. Both the preparation and the opportunity to utilize it were important. They are the opposite sides of the coin of normal life patterns for Jews.

Lessing also exerted his great influence through his own writings. He wrote a number of plays, dealing with the problem. In the best of them, *Nathan the Wise*, Lessing drew the picture of the hero, Nathan, from the character of Mendelssohn and argued for the equality of the three great religions, Judaism, Christianity and Mohammedism.

Official Jewry had opposed Mendelssohn's efforts at inner emancipation of Jews. Christian prototypes opposed Lessing's attempts to win external freedom for the Jews whom Mendelssohn was preparing to be free. Thus reactionaries in both groups joined hands to prevent the fullest fruition of the efforts of these two men. But the force of emancipation was not to be denied. In the life-story of Mendelssohn and Lessing the pattern by which men who were Jews might be free was made clear.

Recognizing that Jews wish peace, security and opportunity in the places they have called home, it becomes obvious that emancipation and not Zionism is the liberal, modern world's answer to the so-called "Jewish problem." We find in the Mendelssohn-Lessing story then the following elements as indispensable to emancipation.

(1) Enlightenment among Jews to the point where they realize that freedom implies a reciprocal process. Unnecessary, antiquated and meaningless vestigial differences must be eliminated. The characteristics, so often described as peculiar to a "Jewish race" or a "Jewish nation" or a "Jewish people" are really not Jewish at all. They are the caricatures of humans who are Jews, drawn by men who

maliciously desired to enslave Jews in an age of darkness and superstition. They create divisiveness in a world where mutual understanding is increasingly necessary. And, as Mendelssohn accurately pointed out, these accretions of a distorted, ghettoized life are not the essentials of Judaism. Mendelssohn's procedure was really simple in design. He went back to the first principles of Judaism. *Those first principles conceived of Judaism as a universal religion. In thus going back, he properly eliminated the corruptions of Judaism which were in the nature of a Jewish nationalism. They copied the medieval concept of a union of church and state. He stripped Judaism of its national limitations and brought it forth free and purified for a new world.* That was why he could, with impunity, teach the Bible to his children and later to other Jews in German. Its truths as religious truths were as valid in German as in Hebrew.

(2) Enlightened Christians such as Lessing, must secure acceptance of the truth that men who wish to be free in an interdependent society must free other men. There was nothing of condenscension in Lessing's labors in behalf of Jews. He did not plead for toleration of Jews. He was not even primarily interested in Jews. But he was determined on freedom for all. For his day as for ours, one of the leading problems was the establishment of the primary principle of justice—dealing with individual men for what they are, in and of themselves.

(3) The greatest opposition to emancipation derived from sources of reaction among both Jews and Christians. The two groups of reactionaries pursued a course that in effect constituted an alliance. Both insisted upon dealing with Jews as an entity known as "the Jewish people."

(4) The alternative to emancipation of the Jew is complete assimilation in a free world; and oppression or persecution for differences needlessly maintained in an illiberal world. But in an illiberal world, even assimilation will not guarantee average Jews peace, security and opportunity.

(5) The artificial retarding of emancipation in order to preserve a "Jewish people" upon separatist grounds, produces a sense of inferiority in Jews and deprives them of the opportunities for normal living. Insofar as there is this abnormality, Jews present a problem to the world; and there are always charlatans who will exploit that circumstance.

(6) Jews, therefore, owe it to themselves and to the world to normalize Jewish life by dropping the medieval vestiges of "Jewish nationhood" and "Jewish peoplehood"; to accept the inalienable rights and responsibilities of individual men who are free because they deserve freedom and have prepared for it and who will lose freedom when they ignore the responsibilities and expect only the rights.

Some will say that the Lessing-Mendelssohn saga proves nothing because neither Lessing nor Mendelssohn was an average person. True, they were both exceptional men. But the inference is false. One may as well say that ordinary Americans cannot live in freedom because they are all not George Washingtons or Thomas Jeffersons or Abraham Lincolns.

The Mendelssohn-Lessing formula was applied with differing degrees of enthusiasm and correspondingly varying degrees of success in most of Europe.

Emancipation, concerned as it was with human beings, had to take and work with human beings as they were. It had faith in human beings, as Mendelssohn and Lessing had faith in them. It had the kind of fighting faith that has led men in every age to challenge the stultifying formulas of slavery and to goad man forward. But since it worked with human beings, since it sought the release of human spirit rather than its compression into dogmatic artificialities, its development was as uneven as the development of man.

Despite these difficulties, a century before the despairing prophecies of Herzl, the Mendelssohn-Lessing formula proved it worked.

Mendelssohn had become known to practically all the Jews of Europe. Regardless of "official" Jewry's opposition to his attempts to prepare Jews for entrance into an expanding world, Jews turned to him—and not to "official" Jewry—for assistance in realizing that very human goal.

In 1781, for example, the Jews of Alsace found their condition intolerable. They decided to petition King Louis XVI of France for an alleviation of their tragic position. They turned to Mendelssohn to assist them.

Mendelssohn, in turn, employing the formula that worked so well with Lessing, turned to another friend and great liberal spirit, Christian Wilhelm Dohm. With Mendelssohn's assistance Dohm composed one of the most comprehensive and penetrating analyses of "the Jewish question."

He decided not to write a specific appeal for the alleviation of the distressed Jews of Alsace. Using that tragedy only as a point of departure, Dohm fashioned an historic bill of rights in behalf of all Jews everywhere. His document, *Upon the Civil Amelioration of the Condition of the Jews* was finished in August, 1781.

The thesis of the document is important enough to consider in some detail; we need to be as much interested in technique as well as results. Dohm departed somewhat from Lessing's approach. He made no sentimental appeal for Jews on the basis of their great religious heritage, as Lessing had done in *Nathan the Wise*. Dohm's appeal was directed to the heads of states. It was designed to appeal to the enlightened self-interest of rulers. It sought to apply the principles of the emerging social sciences: Wastage of any human resources was a crime against society, and human resources were being wasted in the prevailing blanket-legislation regulating a "Jewish people."

Dohm began with the assertion "that it was a universal conviction that the welfare of states depended upon increase of population. . . . Yet, despite this universally recognized principle, the same governments did all within their

power to prevent Jews from maintaining even a minimum basis of life." Dohm then recited in sharp, incisive words, the long list of discriminations suffered by Jews.

What reasons could have prompted European states to fly in the face of their own best interests in pursuit of such policies? Is it possible that industrious and good citizens are less useful to the state because "they are Jews and are distinguished by their form of worship?" asked Dohm. "The chief book of the Jews, the Law of Moses, is regarded with reverence also by Christians."

Dohm reviewed the whole history of Jews in Europe, their enjoyment of full civil rights in the Roman Empire; their degradation and the loss of those rights at the hands of the Byzantines and the Huns of Germany and the Catholic Monarchs of Spain. "In Spain, amongst Jews and Arabs," Dohm reminded Christian Europe, "there had existed a more remarkable culture than in Northern Europe."

Finally, he concluded his arraignment of the Christian world with these words of strikingly comprehensive vision:

"These principles of exclusion, *equally opposed to humanity and politics*, which bear the impress of the dark centuries, *are unworthy of the enlightenment of our times* and deserve no longer to be followed. It is possible that some errors have become so deeply rooted that they will disappear only in the third or fourth generation. But this is no argument against trying to reform now; because without such a beginning, a better generation can not appear."

Dohm's argument was almost legalistic in design and scientific in spirit. In this it represented an advance over Lessing's more poetic and romantic picture of Nathan. It was not alone for Jews that Dohm was concerned. The appeal might have applied to any oppressed group, by varying the specific historical references. The premise from which he argued was universal: Any society that wanted to realize its fullest potentialities must release the fullest potentialities of

all its members. To the degree that humans were compressed within formulas that restricted their lives, society suffered.

This eighteenth century German Christian thus set down the working basis of freedom. In that basis, Jews were just an incident. They were to be neither above nor beneath the elementary premise. Because of the validity of the premise itself, Jews were to have full equality with all men.

Dohm, like Mendelssohn, realized that Jews had to undergo internal liberation before they could fulfill all the obligations and take advantage of all the privileges of equality. Four hundred years of evolution from the days of the Renaissance had passed them by in their enforced isolation. Because of this, Dohm believed Jews should not yet fill public offices. But in all other aspects of their lives they should be afforded opportunities to eliminate this lag and to prepare themselves for emergence onto the stage of a freer and more enlightened world.

To this end, he advocated

"equal rights with all other subjects. In particular, liberty of occupation and procuring a livelihood should be conceded them so that they would be attracted to handicrafts, agriculture, arts and sciences; all without compulsion. The moral elevation of the Jews was to be promoted by the foundation of good schools of their own, or by the admission of their youth into Christian schools, and by the elevation of adults in the Jewish House of Prayer. . . ."

Jews were to have

"freedom in their private religious affairs . . . free exercise of religion, the establishment of synagogues, the appointment of teachers, maintenance of their poor, if considered wise, under the supervision of the government. Even the power of excluding refractory members from the community should be given them."

There was another and no less important part of Dohm's recommendation.

"... It should also be impressed upon Christians, through sermons and other effectual means, that they were to regard and treat Jews as brothers and fellow-men."

Mendelssohn took exception to one point suggested by Dohm in his program. Dohm implied an attachment between Judaism and the state in his request that the state recognize Judaism's right to excommunicate unruly members of the community. Mendelssohn's personal experience with his translation of the Bible probably enabled him to see the hidden threat to freedom inherent in this alliance. In any event, it was contrary to his part of the emancipation formula—inner liberation of Jews.

Accordingly, he was moved to write a brief statement in March 1782, as a preface to a translation of a book by a seventeenth century Jew. Mendelssohn gave his preface the title of *The Salvation of the Jews*.

The statement was a majestic appeal for a pure Judaism, to which men would come in full freedom of conscience or not at all. The moral precepts of Judaism must attract men by their inherent worthiness. Men were not to be clubbed or intimidated by the power of excommunication into being Jews.

"Alas! my brethren, you have felt the oppressive yolk of intolerance only too severely; all the nations of the earth seem hitherto to have been deluded by the idea that religion can be maintained by an iron hand. You, perhaps have suffered yourselves to be meshed into thinking the same. Oh, my brethren, follow the example of love, as you have till now followed that of hatred!"

This was the ideological death-blow to "the Jewish people" and the exaltation of Judaism. Henceforth, Jews were bound to each other only by their voluntary acceptance of their religion—Judaism. Mendelssohn knew the way by which Judaism could recapture its once great glory. Let Judaism purge itself of the alloys forcibly smelted into it by the pres-

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sures of a dark and medieval age. Let it cleanse itself of all notions of restrictive, corporate power over the lives of men. Let it envision the hopeful pattern of the emerging world, in which church and state would be separated. Let Jews emancipate themselves so that as free and enlightened individuals they might take their places in a free and enlightened world.

Mendelssohn enlarged on this revolutionary idea in 1783 in a book which he called *Jerusalem or Upon Ecclesiastical Power and Judaism*. Here, Mendelssohn argued with nobility of thought and expression for one of the cardinal principles of the modern world—the separation of church and state.

Immanuel Kant was moved to remark in a comment on the work:*

“I consider this book the herald of great reform. . . . You have succeeded in combining your religion with such a degree of freedom of conscience as was never imagined possible, and of which no other faith can boast. You have, at the same time, so thoroughly and clearly demonstrated the necessity of unlimited liberty of conscience in every religion, that ultimately our church will also be led to reflect how to remove from its midst everything that disturbs and oppresses conscience, which will finally unite all men in their view of the essential points of religion.”

In design and conception, the inner emancipation of Jews was complete. Had Mendelssohn's experience and thought been actively pursued by Jews; had Jews organized to promote such a conception of Jewish life, they would have been understood by the non-Jewish world, and would have emerged from the European chaos as human beings who wanted to be distinctive only in their religious faith; and they would have come to that faith in utter freedom.

What a contrast this majestic view of Mendelssohn's

* Kant, like many Europeans of his day, seems to have been unaware of the religious toleration, freedom of conscience, and separation of church and state that had long been practiced in various American colonies, and at the time he wrote, prevailed in the new Republic.

is, compared to the rigid dogmatics of Jewish nationalists who insisted upon preserving medieval forms of a "Jewish people" and "a Jewish nation" because they were afraid that, in freedom, Judaism would perish! Mendelssohn sought to attract humans to Judaism by constantly increasing the excellence of his religion. Jewish nationalists, "official" Jews, substituted coercion for excellence and insisted upon preserving a Judaism that maintained artificial barriers between Jews and other men. They demanded of the Jew that he carry a burden of extensive differences. And they sought to accentuate the differences, believing that only by preventing escape could they keep Jews as Jews.

Dohm's work was published in August, 1781. Its logic and power were not without practical results. In Austria, Emperor Joseph was impressed by the Dohm statement. It coincided with his own desires to liberalize Austria. He had already issued a Toleration Edict to Protestants. Improvements of the lot of Jews therefore followed naturally and Dohm's program pointed a way.

In October 1781, a series of laws were issued providing for instruction of Jews in "handicrafts, arts and sciences." Universities, hitherto closed to Jews, were to admit them. Jewish primary and high schools were to be established and Jewish adults were "compelled" to know the language of the country because "in the future only documents written in that language would possess legal force." Jews were to be considered fellow-men everywhere and "all excesses against them were to be avoided." The body-tax was abolished. Jews were to have "equal rights with Christian inhabitants."

These laws, of course, did not mean the kind of equality men think of today. Austria was not a democracy. These decrees were, in a way, an expansion of the kind of privileged status Mendelssohn had known in Berlin. But for a few exceptions, they were the same kind of precarious rights that all men knew in monarchies where the kingly power was only moderately checked or not checked at all. By and

large, Jews were admitted to as much freedom as other men had.

There were discriminations in this imperfect and precarious freedom, for Jews were not permitted to live in a few cities. In Vienna, only a few Jews were welcomed. They were not allowed a synagogue in the capital city. But progress had been made! Nowhere, at anytime had men ever leapt headlong into complete freedom.

What was important was that the chains of a thousand years' forging had been broken. Thus, a century before Herzl wrote his *Jewish State*, hoping to arouse interest in the "Jewish problem," liberal men were aware of the problem and were taking action designed in the pattern of the emerging, liberal world, to offer a solution. Jews were to become equal partners with their co-nationals.

Emperor Joseph's acts did not fail to arouse criticism. Not all of his subjects approved this extension of opportunity to Jews. But Joseph could withstand the criticism that came from reactionary Christian sources.

What was less understandable, was the unrestrained opposition of "official" Jewry. They vigorously protested against Jewish youth learning "natural sciences, astronomy, and religious philosophy." They were afraid "that through school education and partial emancipation, young men would be seduced from Judaism and that the instruction given at high schools would supercede the study of the Talmud." These considerations led "the rabbis and the representatives of tradition to oppose the reforming Jewish ordinances of Emperor Joseph."

But progress was not to be denied. Here and there the schools provided for in the Emperor's edicts were built and Jews took advantage of them. Especially in Trieste and Venice, Dohm's ideas, as carried out by the Emperor, took hold. While "official" Judaism was unyielding, Jews evaded the obstruction.

The stage was thus set in Germany and Austria for the complete assimilation of large numbers of garden-variety

Jews, and "official" Jewry had only itself to blame, because it insisted that to preserve Judaism a separatist entity must be preserved. That was true only as "official" Jewry wanted to preserve a medieval Judaism. Thus it put Jews in an anomalous position. On the one hand, men like Mendelssohn and Dohm were fighting to have Jews accepted as fully equal citizens. On the other, the "official" Jews resisted every attempt to achieve integration. The average Jew was therefore caught in the dilemma. Some sought assimilation as the way out. Most, however, unprepared for free choice themselves, followed the "official" leaders. Mendelssohn represented "danger" and "heresy."

How different the recent history of Jews might have been had someone with the qualities of leadership, and with the resources to match those of reaction, organized an effective program to advance Mendelssohn's and Dohm's idea! How different the life of the Jewish John Does might have been everywhere, if his "official" leaders had had the faith in Judaism that Mendelssohn possessed, and had been willing to free Jews inwardly, trusting in the majesty of Judaism as a religion. How different history might have been had the "official" spokesmen designed a Judaism to meet the requirements of a new and promising age. All this, "official" Jewry failed to do. Because it failed, Jews emerged from the medieval world an ambiguous entity. They neither belonged to that old world, nor were they free of it. They were touched by the freedom of the new world and prevented from fully absorbing it. They were themselves confused—and the world was confused about them.

In a way, the average Jew gave the answer by emancipating himself whenever he had the opportunity. When his Judaism did not keep pace with emancipation, he assimilated. *Where it did, he proved that it was possible to be an integrated citizen and a faithful Jew.* But because no effective agency, down through the years, was ever created to foster integration as a solution to the Jewish problem, the average Jew was

eclipsed by the vigorous, relentless pressuring of "official" Jewry, constantly reminding the world at the price of freedom that Jews were different and were to remain different and segregated. Half of the process of emancipation was "a Jewish problem" as the Mendelssohn-Lessing formula had revealed. Jews, like other men, had to prepare themselves for freedom. To the extent that they neglected their part of the process, the formula might be expected to fail. If Jews themselves put obstacles in the way of equality, there was nothing much a world could do about it.

When Mendelssohn died in 1786, he left an unforgettable influence on the lives of Jews. He had demonstrated singlehandedly that, given the opportunity, Jews could break out of enforced segregation into the emerging libertarian culture of the new world.

In Berlin, Mendelssohn left a large devoted following. Jews had become acknowledged leaders in Berlin's intellectual life. Dozens of literary salons developed that became the talk of the Prussian capital. In social and intellectual affairs, Jews met on a plane of equality with Christians. This did not mean that they possessed civil or political equality. But that was not a Jewish problem. Eighteenth century Prussia was not a democracy.

There were special discriminations against Jews: poll taxes, special business taxes, denial of right to fill public offices, even inequality in courts. In 1787-88, a group of Berlin Jews made an effort to have these discriminations removed and met with only meager success. Some individual Jews were singled out for equal status. The equalization, oddly enough, was not put in any positive way. It was simply stated that these "exceptional" Jews "were not to be treated as Jews" in public acts.

Nevertheless, the progress of an enlightened Jewry was noticeable. Civil and political equality was simply not an accepted principle in eighteenth century Prussia—nor was it really and genuinely accepted in twentieth century Prussia. The "problem" was basically not Jewish. It was Prussian.

The Mendelssohn formula had, however, worked. What was needed was the democratization of the middle European states, to establish the principle of equality in laws that would be above the whims of men. The realization of that goal is still one of the major problems of the world. This is the Christian half of the "Jewish" problem.

I have thus far dealt only with Germany and Austria. Farther to the east, in Poland and Russia, there was nothing at all of the Mendelssohn-Lessing formula applied. These states themselves and the Jews within them continued to live in despotism until the twentieth century. But in the years following World War I, when new states were in the process of formation, the equality of their Jews was taken for granted, as I have pointed out earlier. No one had to fight for equal rights for Jews. This, in itself, unmistakably reveals the tremendous progress made by emancipation. A century and a half ago, the idea of equality for Jews was revolutionary. In 1918-1919 it was an accepted fact. History proved that emancipation works.

For a truly classical picture of the progress of emancipation of Jews in Europe, one must turn to France.

Here, a man by the name of Cerf Berr was the spearhead of the battle for equality. Berr, a friend of Mendelssohn, lived in Strasbourg where he seems to have engaged in the manufacture of arms. At least his occupation was such that it provided him with access to important officials of France.

From Louis XVI of France he secured the privilege of owning land and property. In his several factories he purposely sought to employ Jews, having in mind their withdrawal from the petty trading and usury to which the European world had forced them.

Using his personal influence and wealth, Berr put forth Dohm's bill of rights for Jews at court. He was, moreover, encouraged to press for the emancipation of French Jews by the favorable reception accorded Dohm's proposals by Joseph of Austria.

France had good intellectual precedent for the practical effort to grant Jews full citizenship. Montesquieu, whose thinking pointed the way for the whole concept of liberal democracy had said:

“You Christians complain that the Emperor of China roasts all Christians in his dominions over a slow fire. You behave much worse towards Jews, because they do not believe as you do. If any of our descendants should ever venture to say that the nations of Europe were cultured, your example will be adduced to prove that they were barbarians. The picture that they will draw of you will certainly stain your age, and spread abroad hatred of all your contemporaries.”

This was the kind of broad, slashing criticism which the whole world needed. When that world learned to think in terms of universal enlightenment, for its own preservation, as Dohm and Montesquieu suggested, the “Jewish problem” would be solved. There was no “Jewish problem” in reality. The titans of human thought, from whose free spirits a new intellectual climate was being formed knew that the plight of the Jew was an indictment of civilization. The degradation of Jews was to them symbolic of the evils that would have to be overcome before all men could be free.

It was against the background of such enlightened self-interest that Cerf Berr projected Dohm’s proposals into the court of Louis XVI. The effort met with favorable reception. Louis had convened a commission of Jews to make recommendations for the improvement of the status of their co-religionists. A number of reforms were instituted, among them the elimination of the hated and degrading poll tax.

Up to this point, the emancipation of French Jews followed the pattern that Dohm’s proposals had suggested to Joseph of Austria; benevolences granted by a monarch to a group of his subjects. Except for the United States, no nation at that time could be said to be a fully effective democracy, and, in America, the Declaration of Independence was only

a decade old. If there was an element of toleration and paternalism in these advances made by Jews toward freedom, it is because the freedom of all men, in these countries, rested upon precarious bases. History was relentlessly driving the monarchs of Western Europe to the wall, but it would require another half century of time before there was victory for the revolutionary doctrine of representative government.

In France, the Mendelssohn-Lessing process had its first full European opportunity, for France was the first of the continental states to try to establish a democracy. As a result, it affords us the first opportunity to observe emancipation in its natural habitat.

Two Christians supplied the Lessing content of the now proven formula: Count Mirabeau and the Abbé Grégoire.

Neither of these men was a special pleader for Jews. Both had their eyes set upon a more intelligent world. In the path to that world, the distressing condition of Jews stood as an obstacle. The elimination of this obstacle was an incident in a program of broader objectives. With these men, following the pattern of Mendelssohn and Lessing as interpreted by Dohm and Montesquieu, another principle emerges in the technique of emancipation.

The most satisfactory basis upon which emancipation of Jews can be built is a policy broader in scope than "the Jewish problem." Special pleading for Jews, as an end in itself, results in conditions as precarious as special discriminations. In fact, almost as uncompromisingly certain as the law of gravity, it is true that the very existence of special pleas for Jews results in special resistances against them. Only when the status of Jews is an inextricable part of the structure of democracy; only when the status of Jews is liberalized as an inevitable consequence of general liberalization, does the Jew become secure.

This truth is what makes the solution of "the Jewish problem" simple, if men of good will can but understand it. For in so approaching a solution, men perform a service for

themselves. Emancipated Jews ask only this: full equality of rights and responsibilities. No society can ever be free or secure that denies that demand.

It was upon this basis that Mirabeau and the Abbé Grégoire brought the "Jewish problem" to the attention of a France that was already on the threshold of a democratic revolution. While they spoke of Jews, their primary interest was in liberalizing France.

Mirabeau had been closely associated with Mendelssohn in Berlin, where he had been on a secret diplomatic mission in 1786. He was so inspired by what he had found in Berlin that he determined to begin the fight for the emancipation of the Jews of France. This was to be an integral part of his historic contributions to the French Revolution. Accordingly, he wrote a challenging exposition of the problem, *Upon Mendelssohn and the political reform of the Jews*.

Once again, the value of Mendelssohn's heroic efforts to integrate himself inspired a program that led to the emancipation of Jews in a whole nation.

Mirabeau could write, for all of France to read, "May it not be said that his example, especially *the outcome of his exertions for the elevation of his brethren*, silences those who, with ignoble bitterness, insist that the Jews are so contemptible that they cannot be transformed into a respectable people?"

Mirabeau penetrated to the very core of the problem with which this book is concerned. He knew what Jews wanted. They possessed no ineradicable yearning for a nationhood of their own—even in a Messianic sense. Their inclinations to such a pattern were a negative, defensive mechanism, product of the conduct of the Christian world. With any opportunity for freedom, as Mendelssohn had proven, Jews wanted only peace, security and opportunity as integral parts of the nations in which they lived.

Mirabeau's enormous influence in the pre-revolutionary days of France made the "Jewish question" one of national importance and an integral part of the larger problems

facing a nation that was bankrupt from absolutist misrule and decadent feudalism, a nation whose intellectuals and generous spirited men and women looked to the American experiment for example in preparing for freedom.

Several years before Mirabeau's efforts, there occurred an interesting incident among the Jews of Bordeaux that illustrates the thesis of this book, although in no exemplary way. By and large, the Jews of Bordeaux were of Spanish-Portuguese descent. They had come to Bordeaux centuries before, after the expulsion from Spain. And from the advanced culture of the Golden Age of Spanish Jewry, they considered themselves superior in every way to German Jews. They even formulated prohibitions against inter-marriage with Jews of German derivation.

About the middle of the eighteenth century, some German Jews began to drift into Bordeaux. The native, Spanish-Portuguese Jews considered these German Jews "foreigners." They resented their presence.

What is important here is not the narrow-minded attitude of these natives of Bordeaux. In this aversion to "foreigners" they were simply children of their time. Our own world, two centuries later, is not yet free of this unjustified consciousness of "foreigners." We condemn the prejudice and understand it—particularly in eighteenth century Europe!

What is important in the attitude of these Spanish-Portuguese Jews is that as long ago as the middle 1700's, they had no sense of Jewish "nationality." Their motives were anything but commendable, but the historic truth is important. Later men would take the fact and with constructive and benevolent motives, use it for the emancipation of average Jews.

For the Bordeaux Jews made evident to King Louis, and the French, the nonsense of "a Jewish people." A man named Isaac Pinto assumed the leadership in the objective of the Bordeaux community, to obtain the power to "expel the foreign Jews . . . from the town within three days."

To secure this power, Pinto prepared a statement

about Jews. It is an interesting coincidence that at the same time Voltaire was engaged in slandering the Jews. In charging that he had been cheated out of 25,000 francs by a London Jew, he considered himself justified in blaming and condemning the whole "people." Pinto's activities in behalf of the Bordeaux community's unworthy objective to banish "foreign Jews," oddly, became a further exposition of the character of ordinary Jews, and an answer to Voltaire.

Pinto's statement asserted that Jews "widely scattered, have assumed the character of the inhabitants of the country in which they live. An English Jew as little resembles his co-religionist of Constantinople, as the latter does a Chinese Mandarin; the Jew of Bordeaux and he of Metz are two utterly different beings."

Divorce statements from motives for issuing them: another step had been taken, in the Mendelssohn pattern, toward the liberation of the Jews. Before he could be liberated as an average human being, the Jew had to be liberated from the segregating concept of "a Jewish people." Pinto's statement, widely publicized in France, was a step in that direction.

The thesis that Pinto put forward is, moreover, indispensable to any intelligent approach to the whole "Jewish problem" commonly called "anti-Semitism." The cardinal premise of anti-Semitism is the concept that "a Jewish people" exists. Individual Jews were prevented from emerging out of that archaic pattern to participate as free individuals in a new world premised upon the inalienable rights of individual man. Thus à la Voltaire, a whole "people" could be charged with the traits of any individual and every individual bore the burden of collective characteristics.

Through his document, Pinto roundly attacked Voltaire for blaming a whole "people" for the real or imagined shortcomings of an individual. He might have written the same protest against ascribing virtues of individuals to a whole "people." What Pinto and most Jews have ever wanted, since emancipation dawned as a possibility, was a normal status as

individual men. They wanted and want; neither collective sin nor collective virtue.

The truth is—that the Jew emerged from the ghetto, limping between two worlds. He did not boldly or completely follow the Mendelssohn half of the emancipation formula. He did not forthrightly renounce the feudal concept of “peoplehood.” And so he had a share of guilt in fostering the world’s misunderstanding.

Joined with Mirabeau in the effort to liberalize the position of Jews as an integral part of the emancipation of all of France was a young Catholic priest, Abbé Grégoire. Grégoire had won recognition and election to the national assembly through an essay which he had submitted to the Royal Society of Science and Arts in Metz, on the subject, *Are There Means to Make the Jews Happier and More Useful in France?*

The first days of the French Revolution were not auspicious for a bright future for Jews in France. In the excesses of the first days, Jews were paradoxically lumped together with the hated nobility that had once oppressed them, and the new spirit that prevailed, immediately following Bastille Day, made common enemies of both. Jews registered a strong protest with the National Assembly and in August 1789, Grégoire published a pamphlet *Proposals In Favor Of the Jews*.

Finally, on August 4, the first Republic was born.

Immediately, Jews petitioned for admission as full citizens in the new-born republic. There was no unity in the demands they submitted. Jews from Bordeaux, Paris, Metz, communities from Lorraine, all offered separate and different petitions. The Jews of Bordeaux asked only that their equalization as citizens be sealed by law. The Parisian Jews sent a deputation of eleven men to the National Assembly, asking that their equal status be guaranteed by law and adding that “the example of the French people would induce all the nations of earth to acknowledge Jews as brothers.” The community of Metz added the request that their “oppressive taxes be removed and the debts which they had contracted in conse-

quence of the taxes be made void." The communities of Lorraine asked that "the authority and autonomy of the rabbis in internal affairs be established and recognized by law."

It was sometime before the assembly actually came to grips with the "Jewish" problem. It is important to observe that before it was seriously discussed, the fundamental principles of democracy were established as the law of France. Thus, "the Jewish question" was not one of separate privilege or distinction. Its solution came in the irresistible logic of events by which all of France was moving.

First the "Rights of Man" became the fundamental premise of the Republic. Included in these inviolable rights of men, as in the United States, was freedom of worship.

The importance of conceiving of Jews as a religious community, and not as a separate, national entity, was thus becoming clear. As a religious sect, the way was now free for the full participation of Jews in the life of France.

With freedom of worship established as a pillar of the Republic and with the principle of inalienable rights of individual men as the cornerstone of the whole structure, the basic principle of dealing with the "Jewish problem" was established. It was succinctly stated by the liberal Clermont-Tonnere, "To the individual Jew everything; to the Jews as a nation nothing!"

And it was a fair principle. In a world in which men were to be judged on the basis of the inherent sanctity of the individual, Jews might not expect special dispensation for such a medieval hangover as "a Jewish nation."

There was, of course, opposition to the idea of complete, legal emancipation. Debates on the "Jewish question" commanded sporadic interest from August 1789 to January 1790. Finally, the Spanish-Portuguese Jews of Bordeaux, through Talleyrand, petitioned for and received legal recognition as citizens of France. This was only a partial victory, but it established the needed precedent.

On January 29, 1790, the Jews of Paris petitioned

for legally recognized equality. The halls of the National Assembly rang with eloquent support of the petition, not alone for the Jews of Paris, but for the Jews of all France.

A few reactionaries in the Assembly managed, by parliamentary maneuvering, to postpone a final decision on the hotly debated question. But the tendency was unmistakable. If the new and uncertain National Assembly was intimidated by a few reactionary members from a frontal attack on the status of Jews, it was not deterred from handling the question otherwise. In April 1790, it was declared that the Jews of Alsace were "under protection of the laws, and that the magistrates and National Guard were to take precautions for their security." In July, it was declared that "the Jew taxes should be remitted . . . and that every tribute, under whatever name—protection money, residence-tax, or tolerance-money—should cease."

Finally, in September 1791, the long, complex deliberations over the details of the constitution drew to a close. No final disposition had yet been made of the status of Jews. As the story goes, the motion for adjournment was before the assembly when the deputy Duport arose to say:

"I believe that freedom of thought does not permit any distinction in political rights on account of a man's creed. The recognition of this equality is always being postponed. . . . I demand that the motion for adjournment be withdrawn, and a decree passed that the Jews of France enjoy the privileges of citizenship."

Apparently, with the harassing details of the constitution settled, the true character of the liberal assembly emerged. Duport's speech was greeted with enthusiastic applause. It was suggested that anyone who spoke in opposition to the motion be called to order, since now he would be opposing the Constitution itself. On September 28, 1791, Jews awoke to their greatest day. A great power of the world had recognized them as full and equal citizens, free to maintain

their distinctive religion and enjoy complete integration in the nation's life. Emancipated Jews might well memorialize that day!

One of the most prominent French Jews, who had been among the leaders in the struggle for emancipation, caught the significance of the event. Isaac Berr, in an open letter to French Jews, wrote:

"at length the day has arrived on which the veil is torn asunder which covered us with humiliation. We have at last obtained the rights of which we have been deprived for eighteen centuries. How deeply at this moment should we recognize the wonderful grace of the God of our forefathers! On the 27th of September we were the only inhabitants of this great realm who seemed doomed to eternal humiliation and slavery, and the very next day, a memorable day which we shall always commemorate, didst Thou inspire these immortal legislators of France to utter one word which caused 60,000 unhappy beings, who had hitherto lamented their hard lot, to be suddenly plunged into the intoxicating joys of the present delight. This nation asks no thanks, except that we show ourselves worthy citizens."

Berr then went on to urge upon his fellow-Jews their responsibilities in the light of their new status. The Lessing part of the formula had reached its fullest development. It was now incumbent upon Jews to provide the fullest expression of the Mendelssohn half.

" . . . Let it be acknowledged, dearest brethren, that we have not deserved this wonderful change by our repentance or by the reformation of our manners. . . .

" . . . Let us examine with attention what remains to be done on our part . . . and how we may be able to show in some measure our grateful sense. . . .

" . . . The name of active citizen, which we have just obtained, is without a doubt the most precious title a man can possess in a free empire; but this title alone is not sufficient; we should possess also the necessary qualifications to fulfill the duties annexed to it. We know ourselves how very deficient we are in that respect. . . . We must then, dear

brethren, strongly bear this truth in our minds, that, till such a time as we work a change in our manners, in our habits, in short, in our whole education, we cannot expect to be placed by the esteem of our fellow-citizens in any of those situations in which we can give signal proofs of that glowing patriotism so long cherished in our bosoms.

"God forbid that I should mean anything derogatory to our professed religion. . . . If during our tribulation we have derived some consolation from our strict adherence to our religion, how much the more are we bound to remain firmly attached to it now! . . . I shall not therefore address you on this head. . . . But I cannot too often repeat to you how absolutely necessary it is for us to divest ourselves entirely of that *narrow spirit, of corporation and congregation, in all civil and political matters not immediately connected with our spiritual laws. In these things we must absolutely appear simply as individuals, as Frenchmen, guided only by a true patriotism and by the general good of the nations.*"

We must . . . "avail ourselves of the resources offered to us, by sending them (our children) to share the advantages of national education in public schools. . . . By means of that union in schools, our children, like those of our fellow-citizens, will remark from their tender youth that neither opinions nor difference of religion are a bar to fraternal love; and that everyone naturally embracing the religion of his father, all may, in fulfilling their religious duties, fulfill also that of citizenship. . . ." (My italics.)

Jews were, of course, to be faithful to their religion. Had not the fight for emancipation been made for that purpose? But to the infant, modern state, the emancipated Jews owed the obligation of eliminating from their own lives the vestiges of feudalism. The Bible was to be translated into French. Their "youth was to be taught French, so that the barrier of language might not divide citizens of France from citizens of France." The corruption of German (Yiddish) which prevailed among the Jews of France as a symbol of isolation from the national culture was to be eliminated.

Together with the rest of France, Frenchmen of Jewish faith outrode the Reign of Terror. Finally in 1795, in

the Constitution of the Directory, which was a refinement of the Constitution of the Assembly of 1791, "the adherents of Judaism" were "put on an equal footing" without question, with all Frenchmen.

A classical chapter in the drama of emancipation had closed. Henceforth, the fate of the Jews of France was the fate and destiny of French freedom.

Two crises in the history of French Jewry are worthy of study here. They have been exploited by Jewish nationalists to prove the ephemeral nature of emancipation. Any fair analysis of them proves the opposite.

The first of these crises occurred as part of the threat that Napoleon represented to the freedom of Europe. Napoleon, as a part of his military campaign in the Near East in 1799, in typical Bonaparte manner, commanded the Jews of Asia and North Africa to march with him against the Turks. Napoleon promised to restore Jerusalem to its "original splendor" when Palestine was conquered. The romanticism of the idea, put forth as something desired by Jews, showed how completely the Corsican ignored the whole meaning and momentum of the liberal Revolution, but his dream of conquering Syria and becoming Emperor of the East failed, and with it, the idea of restoration of Palestine to the Jews.

However, Napolean entered the continent still imbued with romantic ideas about Jews. He was, therefore, the victim of every Jew-baiter in the stubbornly class-conscious Germanic countries into which his armies moved.

Finally, in 1806, the befuddled Emperor was moved to place the "Jewish question" before the State Council. Napoleon "attached great importance to the matter."

The Council met twice. Staunch defenders of French liberalism advocated the cause of French Jews. Napoleon was "annoyed." He was not the kind of man to accept criticism of his opinions as "unfounded." On the other hand, he hesitated to take a step that would make him appear ridiculous. That this thought even occurred to the willful conqueror, only

fifteen years after the emancipation of French Jews, is itself a mark of the progress made.

How to extricate himself from this dilemma? Napoleon finally hit upon a scheme: He would order a meeting of representative Jews from all of the provinces of his empire. To these representatives the Emperor would put such questions as: "Did Judaism exact of its followers hatred and oppression of Christians?" "Were Jews a nation within a nation or only a religion?" Thus, Jews, themselves, through the answers given by their representatives, would decide their fate.

The decree ordering the meeting of these representatives was couched in harsh terms. It began with the irrelevant order, "The claims of Jewish creditors in certain provinces may not be collected within the space of a year."

The second part ordered the assembly of Jewish notables because "certain Jews in the northern [Germanic] districts having by usury brought misery upon many peasants, the Emperor had deprived them of civil equality. But he had also considered it necessary to awaken in all who professed the Jewish religion in France a feeling of civic morality, which, owing to their debasement, had become almost extinct amongst them. For this purpose, Jewish notables were to express their wishes and suggest means whereby skilled work and useful occupations would become general among Jews."

More than a hundred of the outstanding Jews of France, Germany and Italy met in the Hôtel de Ville in Paris, on July 26, 1806. They knew little in detail of what the tempestuous Bonaparte would put before them.

The day before the assembly was to meet, the official paper *Moniteur* carried a long and detailed, but somewhat distorted résumé of "Jewish" history, from the days of the end of the Babylonian exile to the current time.

The document is interesting, not because of its recitation of "history," but because it reveals the confusion already befogging emancipation as a result of "official" Jewry's opposition to emancipation and the dereliction of Jews in fulfilling

the Mendelssohn part of the emancipation formula. Such questions as the following were suggested in this preview of the gathering called for the next day: "That the religious and moral separation of Jews from the rest of the world . . . if not prescribed, was at any rate tolerated by the Jewish law. How otherwise is the fact to be explained that those Jews who at the present time exhort high rates of interest, are most religious and follow the laws of the Talmud most faithfully? Had the distinguished Jews in Germany, such as their famous Mendelssohn, great reverence for the rabbis? Finally, are those men among us who devote themselves to the sciences, orthodox Jews?"

The inferences, were, in most cases, false. But Jews were here in jeopardy because of their failure to organize for integration, and their consequent victimization by the restrictive segregating policies of "official" Jews.

The Jewish nationalist will scorn all this as theory. He will say with Hess, Pinsker and Herzl that it made no difference what Jews did, they would be persecuted anyhow; that anti-Semitism was an inevitable companion of Jews wherever Jews were a minority. Yet, history has proven him wrong. And these questions submitted by Napoleon indicate the source of confusion to be the unwarranted and unjustified maintenance of medievalism *within* Jewish life. Why was it that the world was not confused about Mendelssohn but was confused about "the Jewish people?"

Whether by design or not, I do not know, the first meeting of the assembly was scheduled for a Saturday. The representatives were immediately plunged into a violent quarrel. Should they respond to the call, despite the fact that it was the Sabbath? Or should they risk having it said that Judaism was incompatible with the exercise of civil functions? Should they refuse to meet and go through the business of organizing themselves upon parliamentary lines? The lengthy dispute ended in the defeat of those who held out for defiance of the Emperor. An Italian Jew, Abraham Furtado, had led the fight to proceed

with the business of the assembly and he was elected the presiding officer.

On July 29, with the formalities finished, the representatives of the Emperor submitted twelve questions for authoritative answers. It was a fearful moment. Upon the answers to those questions hung the future of Jews for a long time to come in many places of the world. For France's liberal attitude toward Jews had, as the Paris community had observed in its petition, inspired similar action in other countries. Besides, Napoleon's power was extensive.

Among the questions, officially put, were these: Did the French Jews regard France as their country and Frenchmen as their brothers? Did they consider the laws of the state binding upon them? Was the validity of a divorce granted by French law recognized by Judaism?

Most of the questions created no difficulty. In an enthusiastic affirmation, the assembly said that Jews considered France their country and Frenchmen their brothers. There was no difficulty about polygamy or divorce. The problem of intermarriage presented a delicate situation. It was finally answered that Judaism allowed such marriages. The rabbis however, were opposed, just as Catholic priests were opposed, to intermarriage.

In all particulars Napoleon was satisfied with the answers he received. It was announced that "His Majesty guarantees to you free practice of your religion and the full enjoyment of your political rights."

However, Napoleon the romanticist was not to be satisfied with so simple a status. Jews must offer some guarantee with their answers. At Napoleon's command they must convene the Great Sanhedrin—which had gone out of existence long before the completion of the Talmud in the sixth century!

Thus, in the very face of the affirmation of emancipation, Napoleon sought to revive an institution that had been dead for over a millenium. A Sanhedrin was organized, largely

under the leadership of the determined Furtado, and denied its own power by declaring that

"Judaism consisted of two wholly distinct elements—the purely religious, and the political—legislative laws. The first mentioned are unalterable; the latter, on the other hand, which have lost their significance since the downfall of the Jewish state, can be set aside."

Here, the Mendelssohn principle emerged in theory again. What Napoleon had envisioned as a "Jewish parliament" dealt a death blow to the concept of a "Jewish nation." How different from Herzl's self-instigated "parliament" that was to convene at Basle some ninety years later!

The Sanhedrin rendered emancipation one other service. It voluntarily turned over to the state the proper, civil functions of the state. It officially declared it was

"prohibited for any Jew to marry more than one wife; that divorce by Jewish law was effective only when preceded by that of the civil authorities; that marriage likewise must be considered a civil contract first; that every Israelite was religiously bound to consider his non-Jewish neighbors, who also recognize and worship God as the creator, as brothers; that he should love his country, defend it, and undertake military service, if called upon to do so; that Judaism did not forbid any kind of handicraft and occupation, and that therefore it was commendable for Israelites to engage in agriculture, handicrafts and arts, and to forsake trading; and finally, that it was forbidden to Israelites to exact usury either from Jew or Christian."

How the medieval entity of "the Jewish people" was dissolving was attested by protests filed against the Sanhedrin by Jews in Germany and England. Not that they took issue with any of the pronouncements. But some of them saw the anomaly of any such group any longer speaking for "Jews." An English Jew, for example, wrote, asking pertinently, "Has any one of our brethren in Constantinople, Aleppo, Bagdad,

Corfu, or any one of (English) communities been sent as deputy to you, or have they recorded their approval of your decisions?"

At how many less justified "Jewish parliaments" since then would such a pertinent question have created consternation!

Napoleon, however, failed to keep his part of the bargain with the Jews as well as with the principles of the Revolution. And as he moved relentlessly toward his denouement, he carried most of Europe with him into confusion. Jews suffered as an integral part of the jeopardy in which the Corsican had thrown the whole world. When Europe came to the task of creating order out of the Napoleonic chaos, the full rights of Jews in Western Europe were accepted as a matter of course.

There was another crisis in the life of the emancipated Jews of France. I have mentioned it before in connection with the history of Jewish nationalism: The case of Captain Alfred Dreyfus. Herzl seized upon this case as proving that emancipation could never succeed. Because the Dreyfus case touched off the movement of Zionism, the truth of that episode should be better known.

By 1894, France had lived through a century of precarious democracy. It had witnessed the birth of three republics. Its freedom had been under constant challenge by the military reactionaries and by the clerical party that was never reconciled to a permanent divorce of church and state.

Captain Alfred Dreyfus was the first Jew attached to the General Staff of the French Army. At the time of his appointment, France's Third Republic was facing another serious crisis, in which the royalists, clericalists and the reactionary military caste were the leaders of a new attempt to destroy democracy.

The problem France then faced was the preservation of its whole structure of freedom in the face of reactionary attacks. "Jews, Freemasons, Protestants, financiers, republicans" were lumped together in the broadside attack.

The government constantly repudiated the slanders, particularly those that sought to discredit Jewish officers in the Army. Nevertheless, on November 1, 1894, one of the most scurrilous of the papers reported the arrest of Alfred Dreyfus on the charge of high treason: revealing military information to the Germans.

I need not review the details of the fantastic intrigue. But more important than Dreyfus as the victim was that all of France split over the Dreyfus case, divided into Dreyfusards and anti-Dreyfusards. Dreyfus was condemned but, finally, the government was forced to re-open the case and the whole ugly plot was revealed.

Not satisfied at their judicial defeat, the royalists then revealed their true intentions and attempted a revolution. This was put down with force. Dreyfus was pardoned—and much later completely acquitted. The people of France “recognized that they had been deceived and brought to the brink of revolution by a combination of royalists, nationalists, clericalists, and anti-Semites.” Finally, in 1902, Clemenceau conclusively proved the innocence of Dreyfus and the cabinet, led by Clemenceau, “in order to prevent recurrence of similar dangers, curtailed the rights of the Catholic congregations” and “the severance of State and Church was effected.”

It was upon this scene—a struggle between democracy and its enemies in which democracy won—that Herzl looked down and hailed the *failure* of emancipation!

We have a right to re-evaluate his evaluation. A Jew had been unjustly accused, tried and found guilty of the crime of high treason. As a result a whole nation had been convulsed.

This was no crisis that was “Jewish” in character. The fundamental issue in France was democracy itself: and it survived the crisis. Emancipation had not failed—it had worked. The fate of the Jew, Alfred Dreyfus, was symbolic of the fate of French democracy and had roused the whole nation.

Where, in all the world, a century before, would more than half a nation have come to the defense of a Jew? Had Herzl possessed a knowledge of history he would have seen in the Dreyfus case a brilliant, heartening proof of the success of emancipation. A world that had treated all Jews as Pariahs for 1500 years, had, within the space of a century, come to see half of a nation concerned to redress an injustice to one Jew. The Dreyfus case is history's "Exhibit A" to prove that Jews are stronger as integrated Frenchmen or Americans or Englishmen of Jewish faith, than if they stand segregated and apart.

From the days of the Dreyfus case until our own times when the democracies of Europe staggered under the blows of Adolph Hitler's Third Reich, the position of Jews in France was never seriously questioned. The French Jews attained integration. They flourished under the Mendelssohn-Lessing formula. There were of course voices of defeatism and mistrust as there always are. But the liberation of the human spirit is not a one-time task. From the 60,000 Jews whose destiny was debated by the first National Assembly, the Jewish population of France grew to 250,000 before Hitler's legions broke through the Maginot Line.

I have told the story of the emancipation and integration of French Jews because it is a classical example of the application of the whole technique of emancipation. It is a story replete with difficulty, heartbreak and setbacks. But it is also the heroic story, in miniature, of man's conscious struggle to be free. In the world's better tomorrow, Frenchmen of Jewish faith will reap the harvest of freedom, in a France reborn out of the deathless hopes of all lovers of freedom.

The prediction made by the Jews of Paris that France's liberation of Jews "would induce all the nations of the earth to acknowledge the Jews as brothers" contained a large measure of truth. The pattern inspired a more liberal attitude to adjust "the Jewish Question" on a much broader plane. The spirit of "liberty, equality and fraternity" perme-

ated all of the continent except the Eastern corridor of barbarism. This surge of freedom for all men emancipated western Europe's Jews.



"Official" Jews of the sort that had plagued Mendelssohn were not always eager for the freedom offered Jews. In more than one place, "vested interests" which had a stake in the maintenance of "a Jewish people" fought tenaciously against emancipation.

One such example was the Jewry of Holland. And I tell the story in detail for it dramatizes the choice which elsewhere Jews faced and failed to make. It accounts for much of the confusion about Jews that has trailed them through a century and a half of emancipation. It is a prototype of the choice Jews face again today in another fluid period of history.

In 1794, Holland was the home of 50,000 Jews. "They were suffered to exist only as corporate bodies, little commonwealths, as it were, in the midst of larger ones." They were barred from public office and from the guilds.

As the spirit of the French Revolution swept into Holland, there was a general tendency to remove these disabilities and to admit Jews to full equality. But as in France, reaction and ignorance did not surrender without a struggle. Notorious among the reactionaries was a man by the name of Van Swieten who wrote a violent anti-Jewish pamphlet entitled *Advice to the Representatives of the People*, in which he protested that "owing to their origin, their character, their history and their belief in the Messiah, the Jews remained strangers, and could not be absorbed by the state."

I want my reader to compare that description with the description of Jews given by Hess, Pinsker and Herzl. If

he will turn back the pages of this book and make that comparison he will understand why "this statement [Van Swieten's] was in a measure accepted by the official representatives of Judaism as correct." And then my reader will begin to understand the choice between Jewish integration and a "Jewish people."

The great historian Heinrich Graetz says,

"Strangely enough the rabbis and administrators of Jewish affairs, especially the powerful Parnassim in Amsterdam . . . were averse to equalization. They feared that Judaism would suffer from the great freedom of the Jews and from their new duties. . . ." (My italics.)

In a circular letter they declared that the Jews renounced citizenship, seeing that it was opposed to the commands of "Holy Writ."

A thousand names were signed to the circular letter—which was presented as the decision of Holland's 50,000 Jews!

The issue of Judaism was thus injected into the choice as a smokescreen to confuse the real issue. Holland's Jews, however, were not to be denied their freedom. Some among the 49,000 Jews who had not signed the circular letter defied "official" Jewry. Outstanding Jews presented a petition to the National Assembly and "the Jewish question" came up for discussion in August, 1796. Excitement and tension was high, not alone among the Christians, but also among Jews, those who followed "official Jewry" and those who had the courage to dissent. Of course, reactionary Christians made good use of "official" Jewry's refusal of equal rights and claimed that the petitioners had no mandate to speak for Jews.

But neither reactionary Christians nor reactionary Jews could stem the tide of freedom. Liberal Christians set the pattern. In enlightened self-interest, they urged the emancipation of Jews. They wanted no Achilles' heel in their own liberal states. They had a right to say to garden-variety Jews,

as well as to garden-variety Christians, "If you want to live in this brave new world, you must adapt your lives to its principles." So, in 1796, in September, Holland's Jews were admitted to full equality of citizenship, with the decree containing the queer proviso, "for those who wished to make use of it."

Immediately, the diehards of reaction, the defenders of "the Jewish people," set up the clamorous cry that "Jewish unity" had been broken. The new citizens of Holland of Jewish faith gave blow for blow. They demanded that "regulations which endowed rabbis" and other Jewish community officials with powerful authority over the lives of ordinary Jews should be altered "in accordance with the spirit of the age." Naturally, the leaders refused the demand and threatened those who had made it with fines.

But the new ideas had stripped them of their power and Holland's Jews were not to be fooled by their imprecations. Those who wanted to be free individuals in a world in which individual freedom was a basic ideal created a new congregation. In 1797, two members of the liberal congregation were elected to the second National Assembly as deputies from Amsterdam. Holland was the first country in Europe where Jews were also selected for appointment to public offices filled by that procedure.

This prestige, bestowed generously and willingly on members of the dissident group, had its effect and Holland's Jews came overwhelmingly to the Mendelssohn viewpoint. Today, their children's children will rise up and call them blessed. For as Dutch statesmen contemplate a Holland reborn, Jews are so integrated into the life of the nation that it is not even considered necessary to single them out for special mention. Their status is secure. Their future is of the future of Holland.

In France, the struggle had been largely one of establishing the Lessing half of the emancipation formula. In Holland, the reverse was true. Holland was eager to help her Jews. "Vested interests" in Jewish life, Jewish communities,

unity-mongers, almost threw the opportunity away. The historic importance of the story is that a few determined Jews devoted to true freedom and integration rejected compromise and appeasement. They knew that the Mendelssohn contribution was an indispensable part of freedom. They organized for integration, and proved the efficacy of organization. And gradually, they built the security of Dutch Jews into the foundation of Dutch freedom.

It is a simple, obvious lesson today as, once again, in an hour of world revolution and decision, the Jew comes before the world, asking for an answer. For the answer that the world will make will be based upon what the Jew wants to be. And the answer will pattern his life for a great many tomorrows.

The story of the emancipation of English Jews is somewhat different from either that of France or Holland. Since the days of the Magna Carta, England has been moving toward freedom. A powerful state church that persecuted other Protestant sects and Catholics was one of the chief obstacles in the way to England's liberation. The story of the religious refugees from England who settled the North American continent is testament to this truth. But England was also the Mother of Parliaments.

Jews had been banished from England in the thirteenth century. In the seventeenth century, during the era of Cromwell, Jews returned—unofficially, through a peculiar set of circumstances.

The followers of Cromwell were serious students of the Old Testament. It was even proposed that Cromwell's Council of State should be comprised of seventy members, patterned after the ancient Sanhedrin.

Against this background an Amsterdam Rabbi, Menassah ben Israel, projected the thesis that the days of the Messiah were near at hand; that when those days came, Israel would return to Palestine. But before the final Messianic cycle could come, it was necessary that the dispersion of the Jews

be complete. That meant that there must be Jews in every land—England included.

The Amsterdam rabbi stated this thesis in a Latin document which he sent to a friend in England, to be read before Cromwell's Parliament in 1650. It was precisely the thing to appeal to the Puritans. The idea of a return of Jews to England received favorable consideration. There were lengthy negotiations repeatedly interrupted by war between England and Holland until in December, 1655, with Menassah ben Israel in England, Cromwell assembled a commission to discuss the return of Jews to England. The decree of 1290, which had banished them forever, was the chief obstacle. The commission was to determine whether or not this decree was still in force.

The question the commission had to decide was whether admission of Jews to England was contrary to the law or not. If it was not, under what conditions were they to be admitted? Opposition—as always—came from the clergy and Royalists. It was decided that, legally, there was no reason for refusing to admit Jews since the decree of 1290 had been a proclamation of the crown, without the consent of Parliament.

In an attempt to persuade the clergy, Cromwell himself took up the case for admission and revealed the reason for his interest in the problem. "The pure gospel must be preached to the Jews to win them to the church. But how can we preach to them if we do not tolerate them among us?"

Cromwell was unable to convince the commission. He therefore resolved to decide the matter himself. Jews were to enter England through the back door.

This policy was announced through a verdict in an interesting law suit. A Marrano * was charged with engaging illegally in business in Puritan England. Cromwell ordered

* Marranos were Jews who secretly practiced Judaism while outwardly conforming to the Catholic Church. This subterfuge resulted from the alternative offered the Jews of Spain and Portugal by the Inquisition, that of conversion or exile.

the man's acquittal, declaring him a Jew and therefore not restricted by the disabilities suffered by Catholics.

This declaration, by indirection, legalized the residence of Jews in England.

Most of those who came were of Spanish-Portuguese origin and their numbers were never large. Their position was of course anomalous until emancipation.

The attainment of a status that afforded peace, security and opportunity for average Jews was not difficult in England. Even in the years preceding the granting of full equality, England's Jews were shown great consideration. They were never summoned to appear in a court of law on the Sabbath, for example, and they knew no discrimination in economic endeavors, such as plagued the Jews in many of the nations of the continent. To be sure, this was not emancipation. It resembled rather Mendelssohn's status of a "protected Jew." The chief disabilities imposed upon Jews were an "alien tax" and the requirement that to become full citizens they must have the sacrament of the Anglican Church administered to them. (It is interesting, by the way, to observe, that in the collection of the alien tax, Jews were considered as foreigners, not as Jews. They were Spaniards, or Portuguese, or Germans or Frenchmen. This was only a legal fiction, of course, for it was the fact that they were Jews that made them subject to the tax in pre-emancipation days in England. The reluctance to classify Jews, as Jews, and the at least legal refusal of British officials to acknowledge a "Jewish people" is indicative of the advanced thinking of English society.)

Finally, in 1753, a petition was presented to Parliament urging that Jews "be treated as natives of England without being compelled to obtain civil rights by taking the sacrament." The petition had the warm support of the government.

Once again, "official" Jews came forward to becloud the scene and to confuse Christians in their thinking about Jews. These "official" Jews joined hands with reactionary Chris-

tians to argue that Jews "were to remain without a home until gathered to the land of their fathers."

Nevertheless, a bill passed the House of Lords, permitting Jews of England and Ireland with three years of residence in these countries to be naturalized. They were not to occupy "any secular or clerical office, nor to receive the Parliamentary franchise." The bill was accepted by a majority of the House of Commons and ratified by George II.

The English Church organized a protest. In 1754, a weak ministry, intimidated by scattered acts of violence and organized propaganda, annulled the act. The effect of the annulment was more psychological than real. And it is doubtful if even the negative psychological results offset the beneficial psychological results that enactment of the Naturalization Act had produced. Jews in England continued to normalize their lives. They enjoyed the esteem of their fellow English neighbors. They earnestly pursued the Mendelssohn formula of integration.

They were elected to public office, with the exception of Parliament, where the old requirement of the oath "on the true faith of a Christian," provided a technical barrier. Finally, in 1847, Lionel de Rothschild was elected as a representative to Parliament from the city of London, despite this legal technicality. From 1847 to 1851 bills were repeatedly offered to confirm this election and to seat him. Each time the bill passed the House of Commons only to be defeated by the strong clerical influence in the House of Lords. Finally, David Salomons was elected to Parliament from the district of Greenwich. He did not wait for any confirmation of the election, but on three different occasions entered the House and participated in the debates. Salomons was fined £500 for each such defiance of the law and the highest court of England upheld the fine in 1852.

This legal sanction of an oath "on the faith of a true Christian," moved the liberal party to take determined steps. In 1858, the emancipation of England's Jews, almost a com-

plete reality, became legally recognized when both houses of Parliament passed a bill abolishing the sectarian form of the oath of office.

It is not surprising that as England's Jews face forward to the better world that men hope will be built on the courage of Dunkirk, they have organized The Jewish Fellowship in opposition to Jewish nationalism and to work for a continuance of the process of integration and emancipation. They have learned, from life itself, the utter fallacy of Zionism's misgivings about emancipation. Citizens of the Mother of Parliaments, they know that a freer tomorrow belongs to a world that will be built on the hopes of men, of Jewish or Christian or any other faith, and that such a world has no place for the medieval, church-state entity of a segregated "Jewish people."

In the rest of Europe, except for the states in the Central European corridor, emancipation and integration followed these historic patterns. Everywhere, it was dependent upon the two-fold character of the Mendelssohn-Lessing formula. And everywhere, the fundamental issue was never freedom for the nationalistic entity of "a Jewish people" but the general freedom of human beings, among whom were some of Jewish faith, through the extension of the processes of democracy and education.

In Italy, for example, after the defeat of Napoleon and the Congress of Vienna, the position of the Jews deteriorated, as did the status of freedom in all of Italy. In large areas, in Piedmont-Sardinia and the Papal States, there was a resurgence of "fully medieval conditions" which lasted until 1848, when a wave of liberalism swept through Europe, and in Italy saw the beginnings of unification and the first definitive steps toward democracy. True to pattern, the general trend toward democracy saw a revival of the attempt to secure equality for Jews. A Christian, Massimo d'Azeglio, in vigorous public declaration, identified full equality for Jews with the

whole cause of a more liberal and united Italy. The Mendelssohn content of the formula was provided by Isaacs Artom, intimate associate of the great Italian liberal, Cavour. And once again the formula worked. By 1871, the equality of Jews in Italy was so firmly established and has continued upon such an unshakable basis that not even Mussolini's Fascism successfully discriminated against Jews. Insofar as that régime prepared the way for the alliance with Hitler and destroyed democracy, it set the stage for the sufferings of Jews, and all others in Italy. Yet, at the first breath of freedom, following the occupation of Italian territories by United Nations' troops, the principle of equality was spontaneously re-asserted.

Throughout the rest of Western Europe, emancipation and integration continued at a steady pace during the nineteenth century. Denmark admitted its Jews to full equality by progressive legislation between 1814 and 1849. The same process occurred in Sweden between 1860 and 1870 and in Norway from 1851 to 1891. Switzerland emancipated its Jews in 1874.

Thus, by the time that Pinsker called emancipation a failure—and within only a century of time—half the Jews of the world had been freed from an isolation and discrimination that had lasted for nearly fifteen hundred years. Ahad Ha'am the “cultural Zionist” more accurately assessed the situation. Emancipation had worked like a miracle. Millions of Jews were, after fifteen centuries, at peace in a new world. The danger was, as the “cultural Zionist” so prophetically foresaw, that they would be too much at peace. The “Jewish people” would dissolve and only people who were Jews in religion would be left. Therefore, by some means, the medieval concept must be kept alive. Across this universal trend toward emancipation, Zionism dragged its befogging revival of Jewish nationhood.



Two more chapters in the story of emancipation must be told. One is the record of the temporary failure of the Mendelssohn-Lessing formula in the very place of its birth, Germany, and the rest of the feudal corridor. The other is the record of what is perhaps the fullest realization of the hopes of Mendelssohn and Lessing through the implementation of their example in the United States.

Why did the Mendelssohn-Lessing formula fail in Central and Eastern Europe?

The answer is that it failed because, until 1918, the spirit of freedom and democracy had not reached the heart of the continent. The whole world went to war in 1914 to defend itself against an eruption of a kind of medieval imperialism. Except for Russia's tenuous alliance with the Western Powers, it was a war between the states in which democracy had flourished and those in which it had never been tried. That a "Jewish problem" should have continued to exist in the states in which democracy had practically no influence is not surprising. The Mendelsohn-Lessing formula did not fail. It had never been adequately tried. In those states, there were neither sufficient Mendelssohns nor Lessings. And, moreover, not Jews alone, but all men, lived in a precarious kind of freedom reluctantly granted by stubbornly maintained ruling castes.

It is the more remarkable that in the face of such stratified society, in which so much of the evil of feudalistic days survived, Jews could mark any improvement of their status at all. It is testament to the virility of emancipation that it defied adverse conditions and won even grudging concessions from governments patterned by archaic notions.

It might almost be said that what little and temporary successes emancipation could claim in Germany, Russia and Austria-Hungary are a conclusive proof of the hardness of the plant that sprang from the Mendelssohn-Lessing seed. For the years from the mid-eighteenth century to the first quarter of the twentieth century saw an over-all progress in the status of Jews in these countries.

Emancipation met temporary setbacks and momentary defeats, and these brought disasters to Jews, but after brutishness had run its course, freedom moved ahead and Jews emerged further along than before on the road to freedom.

In the weak heart of Europe, there were no revolutions to cleanse away the dry-rot of feudalism. Here, the struggle to be free, for all men, was—and still is through this second world war—a story of heartbreak and failure. Only here and there in this corridor of blood and sorrow, has the modern world built a bastion of freedom. It is to complete the final break-through and to wipe out the last remnants of a thorough-going tyranny on the rampage that once again the free world is at war.

There are many names that will some day be written in bold letters as the pioneers of freedom in these Central and Eastern European States. They are the names of men from many nations who, in one way or another tried to be the Tom Paines, Patrick Henrys and Jeffersons of Central and Eastern Europe.

It was inevitable that as reaction set in after the Congress of Vienna, Jews in Central and Eastern Europe should be deprived of recent rights grudgingly granted. The failure was not the failure of emancipation, for it had not been tried. In Western Europe, where it was established as an integral part of life, it weathered the post-Napoleonic confusions and the rights of Jews were not questioned.

The resurgent discriminations against Jews are of great interest to the student of the so-called "Jewish problem." These publicly proclaimed policies of segregation reveal their

own inconsistencies. In Germany, especially, Jews ignoring "official" Jewry's opposition, had pursued the Mendelssohn policy. They integrated their lives in almost every conceivable manner. They dropped the strange dress of the ghetto. They learned the language of the nation in which they lived. Many of them purged their Judaism of its outworn, nationalistic elements and, in keeping with Mendelssohn's program, began to develop a system of reforms that were designed to make Judaism a pure, ethical religion.

The Jew-baiters were, therefore, at a loss to find any visible difference in Germans of Jewish faith. Without "official" encouragement or leadership, Jews were demonstrating their adaptability to the country in which they lived. They no longer possessed "racial" or "national" characteristics to mark them out. Reactionaries, determined to resist the onward moving tide of freedom, had to create artificial differences, therefore. Badges or "a national cockade," or "some mark of distinction so that the German who could not recognize his Hebrew enemy by face, gait or speech, might do so by the doubtful badge of honor." Such was the content of a statement issued by one Friedrich Ruhs.

Even in this vortex of reaction, emancipation had worked to a degree. Religion was apparently considered the basis of difference between Jews and Christians, for these artificial markings could be discarded if Jews converted to Christianity. Emancipation however, was never more than partially successful because in Germany Christianity became a tool of the state and the basis of the state was blood and race. Undignified and narrow-minded as the offer of conversion was, it was the more disgraceful as a national policy because it was never sincere. It was a ruse put forth by crudely provincial philosophies. It did not even have the questionable justification of sincere but misguided religious zealots. Nevertheless, it was a gesture that an inferiority-complex ridden Germany made to the power of the ideas of emancipation. Jews *really were not different*. There was nothing immutable in their lives or char-

acter that prevented them from living at peace with other men. Thus, even Germany was compelled to damn emancipation with faint praise. Yet the general failure of democracy in Germany prevented the formula from achieving practical results.

The principle of emancipation was conceded in the reconstruction of Europe at the Congress of Vienna. Germany continued as a motley amalgam of separate, autonomous states, combined into a Germanic federation. A number of the individual states legally emancipated Jews, but for the federation as a whole, the idea received only lip-service. Germany again proved her lack of enlightenment, compared to the rest of Europe.

Many Christian voices spoke out for equality for Jews; ineffectively, however, for in many ways Germany's Christianity was as superficial as its culture. The world was not moved by this discrepancy. English newspapers put forth the suggestion that German towns that discriminated against Jews should be denied their own freedom. Similar protests were voiced by Frenchmen. Much of the world was morally indignant at this degradation of Jews. Over a century later, in 1932, the liberal world might have re-read the history of these Congress of Vienna days with profit. It might have then learned that the same, ugly blood-race-earth fantasy was about to be spewed forth out of Germany in a second World War. It might have observed that, prophetically, in April 1932, a blood-cultist called Adolf Hitler began a long series of aggressions against democracy with an economic boycott against the Jews of Germany. The Western World might have spared itself the bloodshed of Salerno and Anzio and the heartbreak of Dunkirk and Aachen, had it, in the spirit of its founders, raised its voice in moral indignation against the latest excrescence of Germanic tribalism.

Jews in Austria fared no better after the downfall of Napoleon. The progress under Emperor Joseph was all but wiped away. The ghetto reappeared, together with most of the ancient discriminations. And again, it is important to observe

that in many places where Jews were denied the right to live in full equality, other classes and sects suffered from similar disabilities. What had failed was democracy. What had triumphed was a pseudo-feudal restoration. What survived among Jews was the counterpart of that alliance of church and state—the feudal concept of “a Jewish people.”

But men had tasted freedom. The threat of slavery gave birth to new emancipators. A Europe that was slipping back toward absolutism, even in France under the Bourbons, was heading for the revolutions of July, 1830. Another blow was to be struck for freedom. And the heralds of the new attempt counted many Jews in their number.

One of the most interesting of these prophets of the 1830 revolutions was Gabriel Riesser. Riesser had studied for the law. The wave of liberalism that had swept through Europe with the French Revolution and Napoleon encouraged him to believe that his profession of Judaism would no longer be a handicap in the professions. He was disillusioned by the subsequent reaction. When he found the practice of law virtually closed to him, he attempted to become a lecturer in the field of jurisprudence at the University of Heidelberg. But the German Universities were as untouched by the emergent liberalism as the rest of Germany. Riesser’s application was denied.

He was by nature a peaceful man. But he foresaw the tragedy of such prejudice for both the Jews and Christians of Germany. Lessing became his ideal and he determined, despite his peaceful, reticent nature, to fight for the freedom that had been so short-lived as a German policy.

In 1831 he published his first pamphlet on the subject. It was an incisive attack on the rulers of Germany and on the German people, including his co-religionists. His attacks upon Jews were directed chiefly against those who abdicated the fight for full equality by hypocritical and expedient conversions to Christianity. He urged the formation of societies, comprised of both Jews and Christians, which would work for the emancipation and integration of Jews. He pointed out to

Christians their own stake in eliminating prejudice, if they were ever to have a stable and free society. To Jews he made clear his indifference to "Judaism in its national form." He believed Judaism could and would "continue to flourish in a rejuvenated, healthy form."

Riesser's activity led to the inclusion of a demand for emancipation of the Jews in the program of the young, liberal group in Germany. The Electorate of Hesse actually legalized the emancipation of Jews.

The important part of Riesser's work was that he realized how inseparably the so-called "Jewish problem" was bound up with universal efforts to liberalize Germany. He knew too that the liberalization of Germany included the necessity of Jews liberalizing themselves. This meant the release of Jews from such concepts as a "Jewish nation."

Therefore, Riesser directed an attack which, for Jews, asked not for "rights and privileges" but for "right and freedom." He was not prompted to fight for his personal interests or the interests of Jews alone. He fought for the unalterable and indivisible right of every human being, not to be forfeited except by crime.

"The state was bound to grant right and freedom to all its inhabitants, regardless of birth or religious belief, who were willing to assume or who were actually performing all the duties of citizens. . . . Jews could not be denied their claim on German citizenship; *they had no other fatherland*; they knew of no other loyalty." . . . He rejected the "pretext that their religious observances were symbols of a different nationality."

Thus another champion of freedom followed the Mendelssohn-Lessing formula for emancipation of Jews.

Like all German revolutions, that of 1830 was only a partial and temporary success. The tragedy of German democracy was that it so often reached the wings too frightened to enter the stage of German history.

Elsewhere in the world the fog of prejudice was lift-

ing. In 1840, there occurred an incident which might, to observant Jews, have proved the progress that emancipation had made in less than a century. In the city of Damascus and on the then Turkish controlled island of Rhodes, Jews were libelled with the savage, ignorant and silly charge of the blood accusation: that the Talmud ordered them to obtain the use of Christian blood for the Passover service.

The Damascus affair was closely linked to one of those intricate political plots that so frequently characterized the politics of the Turkish Empire. What is important is that practically every government of the established liberal states, in at least unofficial representations, came to the defense of the accused. And, it should be noted that, in both accusations, the accused were humble, unknown Jews. The first, accused in the Damascus affair, was a simple barber. Later, under torture, this man named seven other Jews of wealth and prominence. In the Rhodes affair the accused was of such obscure origin that he is not even identified. Nevertheless, the influence of the governments of England, France and Austria forced a new trial of the humble Jew who had been declared guilty of the Rhodes' blood accusation.

The Damascus affair, because of the more complicated political intrigue of which it was a part, was not settled quite so easily. A French consul had played a leading rôle in perpetrating the plot and so to some extent the "honor" of France was involved. This forced circumspection in the manner in which the protests were made. Yet, nine great powers of the world voiced such vigorous protests and exerted such pressure upon the Turkish government that within three months the prisoners were released. Even the Czar of Russia was compelled, by public pressure, to render homage to the right of an obscure Jew to justice and joined in the protests against Turkey's disgraceful libel.

My reader must wonder how the founders of Jewish nationalism could cavalierly dismiss these incidents and pronounce emancipation dead. A hundred years before 1840,

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the barbaric, Central European world could hunt down and murder Jews en masse with impunity. Now, less than a century later, the Western World had begun to realize that the validity of its whole, liberal way of life was challenged when justice was denied to one obscure Jew.

Such interest in the fate of average Jews indicated the virility of the spirit of freedom which is basic to emancipation. The spirit of Lessing and Christian Dohm was on the march, and in 1848, throughout the political capitals of Western Europe, average citizens who had tasted liberty, once again challenged those who sought to revive the patterns of despotism.

Men again inched ahead toward their emancipation from the restrictive controls that had enslaved them. And true to the Lessing-Mendelssohn pattern, Jews would work and share in the hard-won victories.

"Public opinion favored the demand that all political rights should be granted to Jews, who had fulfilled their obligations to the state with no diminution and with the fullest devotion." And the revolutions of 1848 were revolutions of the common people. In Germany, as her National Assembly proclaimed "common rights" for Jews, four Jews were elected as deputies to this Assembly, two from Austria and two from Germany. Gabriel Riesser was one of these four. Nor was his election a mere grudging gesture to the new equality: Riesser was made vice-president of the Assembly.

In Germany the line on the graph marking the advance of emancipation zig-zagged up and down, but it mounted higher after each tragic defeat. The dips in the uneven line were reflections of the failure of German democracy. The peaks were reflections of man's unconquerable will to be free, breaking through the crust of reaction.

The Assembly issued a statement on the "Fundamental Rights of the German People." The constitution put forth by the Assembly provided that "enjoyment of civic and citizen rights will not be conditioned or limited by religious faith."

And here an interesting event developed. Out of excessive zeal to assure Jews equality, some deputies to the Assembly wanted to insert a constitutional provision making "the peculiar conditions of the Israelitish race the object of special legislation." With extraordinary wisdom, Riesser opposed all attempts to single out Jews for special consideration of any kind. All disabilities based upon religion had been abolished, not alone for Jews, but as a universal principle. There must not now be either new disabilities or privileges based upon "race" or "nationality." "The Jews were not conscious of a national difference." Riesser warned that any legalized differentiation "would introduce a disruptive cleavage into the whole body of freedom." Riesser's arguments prevailed. Jews received no special mention in the proposed constitution.

It is impossible to exaggerate the soundness of this nineteenth century Jew's approach. In a nation where freedom of worship was a recognized fact, he quite properly denied that Jews were Jews by virtue of anything other than religion. He proclaimed the end of the artificial "national" differences which had been imposed upon Jews by a benighted world. He knew that emancipation meant integration, consciously practised by Jews. There was, therefore, no reason in the world why a constitution should single out Germans of Jewish faith any more than Germans of Christian faith. They were all Germans, to be recognized as such on a basis of equal rights and equal responsibilities. Jews needed and wanted no more than that. They would be content with no less. Moreover, this wise man realized that to insist upon special consideration for Jews rendered a disservice not alone to Jews. It rendered a disservice to "the whole body of freedom," for freedom is a cooperative adventure, in which men must join hands in a give-and-take, reciprocal relationship. Any unnecessary separating of one human from another, weakens the necessary cooperative effort. It enables the enemies of freedom to divide and conquer.

Typical German submissiveness to authority turned the revolution of 1848, like the revolution of 1830, into failure.

The milling crowds of revolutionaries stood beneath a balcony of the royal palace, awaiting the appearance of a defeated and deserted Emperor who was about to announce the success of the revolution and admit defeat for his own, feudalistic notions of government. Finally the defeated ruler appeared. Immediately the mass of revolutionaries lost their sense of victory and in docile allegiance removed their hats and paid courtly tribute to the astonished monarch. He was quick to sense the changed temper of the crowd and proceeded to exact new allegiances and submissiveness from them. Germany had won and lost a revolution in a split second!

With the general failure of the citizenry to emancipate itself, the fate of the Jews naturally followed the general patterns. The proposed constitution was never put into practice. A wave of reaction set in. The over-cautious revolutionaries were sought out—to be taught a lesson. Jews were among those disciplined. Thousands of liberal Germans of all faiths left their native land to find new homes in more promising places of the earth. Carl Schurz was typical of the loss to Germany and the gain to other nations. Many came to the United States, among them many Jews. Here these men, determined to be free, were to give much to the young democracy. Here, German immigrants of Jewish faith at last were to find a home in which, free from the restrictions of "official" Jewry and from the intolerance of reactionary government, the Lessing-Mendelssohn formula would reach the fullest flowering it had known.

Even though the 1848 revolution failed to free Germany and, therefore, German Jews, the principle of freedom again registered an advance. There was no federal constitution projected by the National Assembly, but many of the individual Germanic kingdoms produced new constitutions in which the right of Jews "to elect and be elected" was established.

The gain was small, for Germany was still essentially feudal. In that country, as in the rest of Central and Eastern

Europe, men still spoke of a "Christian State"—and meant a continuation of the medieval alliance of politics and religion with the accent on politics, and Jews could not escape the general tragedy that such an alliance inevitably brings. Because this alliance of church and state politicians resisted the advances of democracy, Jews were still considered a separate people and nation—and were treated as such. Their desperately won freedom was forever jeopardized by a "Christian Germany" or a "Catholic Austria" or "Holy Russia." A quarter of a century after 1848, Otto von Bismarck would tie Catholics and Jews together as common enemies of a "Christian state" and emancipation would receive another setback, while Bismarck again halted Germany's march of freedom. And half a century after Bismarck, Adolf Hitler would link the religion of paganism to politics in a "new" German church. And this time, all Christians, Protestants as well as Catholics, together with Jews, found their lives in jeopardy.

The half century between Bismarck and Hitler had seen Germany defeated in a major war and another attempt made at freedom in the Weimar Republic. Once again, on the graves of previously defeated hopes, Jews in Germany sought to raise an edifice of emancipation. Once again the German people failed in democracy and, with Adolf Hitler, made the steepest descent and deepest retrogression into barbarism since the upward march had begun in the eighteenth century. Once again the Jews of Germany, together with that nation's finest, liberal spirits, were murdered or driven over the face of the earth. Will this be the last descent on that zig-zag line? With the European part of World War II over, and as the great, liberal states turn to some plan for the rehabilitation of Germany, will they, this time, create a program that will finally bring Germany into the family of liberalized, modern-states? No one knows. But more men today than ever before know that unless Germany is freed of this vestigial barbarism, the world will some day face its third world war. Among those who know this are emancipated Jews, who face tomor-

now hopeful for a better world. They know the problem of German Jewry has been the problem of the world to liberalize Germany. They know that unless Germany and the continent she over-ran are made safe for Jews on the same terms as others, the world will not be safe for man. They know this story of the failure of the Lessing-Mendelssohn formula. But they reject the theory of Jewish nationalists: That it has failed because there is a special problem of a "homeless Jewish people." And they have faith—these emancipated Jews—that out of mankind's common agony, new Mendelssohns and new Lessings will again take up the torch of equality of citizenship for Jews in the better world for which free men are fighting. With that full equality, they know that Jewish John Does will not flee this world, to segregate themselves in a national ghetto. But, as full citizens, they will take up the responsibilities of freedom, determined, together with their fellow-nationals, that this shall be the last time; and that the last stronghold of despotism shall be destroyed. Then, they know, the last vestige of the medieval idea of a "Jewish nation" will disappear and Jews will find peace, security and opportunity.

The indomitable faith of some Jews in that better future is apparent in the latest reports from occupied Berlin, in July of 1945. Six thousand Jews have been found among the survivors of the rubbed capitol. They are preparing to build their lives again in their homeland and "are preparing living quarters for thousands expected to return from Theresienstadt" and other concentration camps.

But "official" Jews, insisting on proving that there is a "Jewish" people, will not leave them in peace. Official publications of Jewish nationalists complain that ". . . none of the reports received so far indicates any desire on their part to flee the land of their horrifying experiences" . . . and that there is no "reluctance to serve their 'fatherland,'" and that these Germans of the Jewish faith, with hope in a better world, lack "dignity and self-respect."

Why? Why this calumniaion of those who, as poten-

tial members of a "Jewish" nation by forceful decree of Hitler, were once the objects of much Zionist concern? Why should not those of Jewish faith join those of Protestant and Christian faith in the building of a Germany that will become a respectable member of the family of nations? Why, because they were segregated in the Europe of Hitler, shall Jews segregate themselves in the Europe of the United nations?

The six thousand Jews in Berlin prove they will not segregate themselves if they are left free and unmolested by those "official" Jews who for all the years that emancipation has been a possibility have opposed free Jews in a free world with siren songs about loyalty to a "Jewish" people.

The checkered history of emancipation in Germany was repeated in Poland, Russia and the Balkans. In all of these lands men suffered the instabilities of life under backward, tyrannical governments. The freedom of all their people was therefore precarious. And, as in Germany, each advance was followed by a general catastrophe that vitiated freedom and therefore wreaked havoc upon Jews. Jews were blamed by the forces of reaction for the liberal advances. When, after relentless efforts, the forces of reaction created setbacks to liberty, Jews paid a severe penalty.

This is the story of those benighted lands in which "a Jewish problem" exists. Added to this history of reaction, "official" Jewry appeared in the form of Zionism further to confuse the world. Zionism drew its sources of strength from the same barbarized medievalism as non-Jewish reactionary movements. It sought the maintenance and the extension of the idea of a "Jewish people." It was linked to the same sentimentality of folkways and folklore as the undeveloped nationalisms of this feudal corridor. It recognized neither reason nor geographic boundaries and sought to build a nation of Jews on the basis of "common culture" and "common historic experience." It ignored the differing conditions of Jews in the different nations of the world and tried to project a common destiny, premised upon a common history which Jews had not known for

1500 years. It maintained the medieval alliance of church and state politics in its own organization.

Thus, Zionism rendered a disservice not alone to Jews. It rendered a disservice to the whole, expanding idea of progressive freedom. In the struggle between atavistic medievalism and modernity, it was allied with many vested interests of despotism against the new concept of the freedom and dignity of individual men.

It was therefore no accident that Zionism had its strongest followers in this dark corridor of Europe; or that it sought the maintenance of a separate Jewish community; or that Herzl, like Hitler, was impatient with parliamentary procedures; or that it patterned its concept of nationality upon the "folk" idea, rather than upon political boundaries and the liberal concepts of western society.

It was in this equivocal position that most of the Jews of Central and Eastern Europe came to the first World War. But the reconstruction that followed the war proved that once equality was established, even here in the heart of prejudice, "The Jewish problem" could be solved. In Russia, 4,000,000 "lost" Jews won full equality with other citizens. As Russia emerged from medievalism, it wiped out the Jewish counterpart of medievalism—Zionism. In Czechoslovakia, in Yugoslavia, democracy also came, at this late hour in history, to release men and women of Jewish faith and to provide them with the opportunity for integration.

If this second World War is not to be in vain, the last, murky areas of barbarism will disappear. The last of the "Jewish problems" will be solved and the Lessing-Mendelssohn process will be fully operative even where it had never before been tried. Russia, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, prove that it will work. "The Jewish people" will disappear with the other vestiges of ancient evil; Jews will survive as human beings settling down to the eternal quest of all men to realize the fullest development of themselves in freedom.

This will happen—unless by default, by appease-

ment, by a continuance of the policy of refusing to understand Zionism, emancipated Jews go on in apathy and permit Jewish nationalists to circumscribe human lives with a dead and ridiculous formula. To prevent this from happening is the high moral responsibility of all men of any faith, who want a world as free as possible from throw-backs to a strait-jacket society.



*J*ust as Germany and Central and Eastern Europe presented the greatest obstacles to emancipation and integration, the United States offered the Mendelssohn-Lessing formula its greatest opportunity.

Colonial America inherited a tradition of discrimination and anti-Jewish sentiment. There were many remnants of the old in a new world that in the seventeenth century had not yet developed any rationale of freedom. Some colonies qualified the admission of Jews by stipulations such as the one applied in New Amsterdam, where Jews were told that they must look after their own indigent population. By and large, in pre-Revolutionary War days, Jewish colonists found general equality in the risks and rewards of the newly settled continent. They were not many and they integrated their lives into the embryo nation as individuals. Freedom of movement, the vast unsettled areas, labor shortages and great resources, as well as a background of dissent, all tended to make the Colonists receptive to egalitarian ideas, and tolerant. The anomalous entity of "a Jewish people" did not exist. Hebraic influence, through the close study of the Scriptures, was strong among the early settlers.

When the thirteen colonies resolved to declare their independence and to establish a new nation, the question of the status of Jews in that nation was never even discussed. The

influence of Roger Williams, Penn and Baltimore had grown so richly through the years that toleration was beneath the new nation's majestic and revolutionary concept of full equality for all men. George Washington, in a letter to the Hebrew Congregation at Newport, R. I., wrote, "all possess alike liberty of conscience and immunities of citizenship. It is now no more that toleration is spoken of, as if it was by the indulgence of one class of people, that another enjoyed the exercise of their inherent natural rights."

Here was acceptance in full of the principle of emancipation—and for the first time, on a large scale, since the days of Greece and Rome. And in this example we can observe the perfect formula with which the so-called "Jewish problem" may be solved. It involves equal rights and equal obligations, granted to individuals whose faith is Judaism. It involves a democracy strong enough to maintain that principle. The United States was the only nation in the world in which the concept of "a Jewish people" had never played a historic part.

Jews who came to the United States, where the Lessing content of the emancipation formula was so perfectly guaranteed in law, at first eagerly supplied the Mendelssohn content of integration.

They came in considerable numbers. In the Revolutionary War days there were probably not more than 20,000 Jews in the colonies. By 1858, that number had increased to more than 200,000. These human beings, grateful for the freedom of the new nation, made no effort to maintain "a Jewish people" in any sense. They struck out as individuals to participate in the new nation's expanding life.

Most of these first 200,000 came from Germany. They integrated themselves completely. There is no better example of the efficacy of emancipation-integration as the solution to the so-called "Jewish problem" than the history of average individuals of Jewish faith in the U. S. A. But it must be observed—and emphasized—that they accepted the reciprocal character of emancipation. Since they were so predominantly of Ger-

man origin, and had a common derivation, they might easily have come to these shores and, in some sense of "peoplehood" sought freedom for a separatist conception of Jews. They rejected this possibility. They came to an emancipated society as emancipated individuals. They consciously integrated themselves into the nation's life and made emancipation succeed.

The transplanting of this rather considerable number of German Jews to America, where they applied the Mendelssohn formula, is a phenomenon that has never been given its proper emphasis. "Official" Jews have been quick to point to the failure of integration in Germany. Yet, the very same sort of folk could come to the United States where, freed from the regimentation of "official" Jews and reactionary government, the process provided the greatest security Jews have ever known, anywhere, in all history.

After 1880, and particularly in the first two decades of the twentieth century, immigration to the United States from Eastern Europe increased rapidly. It was natural that among these immigrants there should be a considerable number of Jews. As individuals, they were freedom-loving, earnest, hard-working men and women, destined to contribute much to the new world and reverentially grateful for its blessings. But coming from Eastern Europe, they had been only dimly touched by the Mendelssohn influence, as they had been untouched by the Lessing influence of general enlightenment. Their "official" Jews had been the chief opponents of the Mendelssohn doctrine of integration, as their former national sovereigns had been the chief opponents of general enlightenment.

They therefore brought with them the wornout concept of "a Jewish people." They enjoyed the same external emancipation as had the earlier immigrants. But they failed to provide the Mendelssohn part of the emancipation formula.

The failure was not theirs alone, however. It was equally that of the more integrated earlier immigrants. By and large, Americans of the Jewish faith at the turn of the century pursued the same short-sighted policy that characterized the

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reaction of emancipated Jews in Europe to Herzl's program for "a Jewish people." They simply stood off and said, in effect, "This does not mean me. I am different. I acknowledge an obligation to these 'different' Jews and I will give financial support to aid them in establishing themselves. But they are different from me."

This was not Mendelssohn's attitude. Mendelssohn did not believe he was different from the Jews from whom he was derived. He had learned, by experience, the way to free Jews from the ancient corporate entity of a "Jewish people," and he devoted his life to that effort. He met with complete success wherever democracy, the other side of the coin of emancipation, was established. He even met with partial and temporary success in a Germany whose heart belonged to the Middle Ages. The American Jews of German derivation were the chief beneficiaries of his formula. But they failed to carry it out among the later immigrants of Jewish faith.

Instead of organizing their newly-won prestige and wealth for an expansion of the Mendelssohn idea upon a scale commensurate with the large migration of Jews from Eastern Europe, they permitted the beginnings of confusion to develop about Jews in the American scene.

They began to organize "defense organizations," as anti-Semitism began to grow. These defense organizations were designed to eliminate the confusions which arose with the intrusion of the "Jewish nation" concept into American life. When, in the United States, out of ignorance or confusion or malice, men began to charge "the Jewish people" with the historic slanders of Jew-baiters, these defense organizations put forth educational programs to counteract these libels, and to show the dangers to general society inherent in them.

In performing this task they render a service to democracy. For if democracy is a cooperative adventure of free, individual men, and if its purpose is to assist individuals to the fullest realization of their own possibilities, that design and purpose must not be impeded by separatist formulas that

circumscribe the lives of individual men and divert their attentions from the common task.

The earlier immigrants of Jewish faith, it is sad to say, had not learned Mendelssohn's lesson. They were satisfied merely to defend. No war is ever won by mere defense and the attainments and maintenance of freedom is a constant war against human inertia and narrow-minded reaction that seeks to exploit that inertia. Moreover, mere defense is negative. It can develop no rationale of its own. It merely mobilizes strength where the enemy attacks and tries to prevent a breakthrough and a rout.

This has been the rôle of the defense agencies in the lives of Americans of Jewish faith. Having no positive goal toward which they hope to lead Jews, they limp between two worlds. They have never asked and answered the question: "For what ultimate status are we defending Jews? Are we defending them for the status of a 'Jewish nationality,' with all of the historic confusions and irritants that separate political ambitions imply? Or are we, in the full logic of our defense education determined that the concept of a 'Jewish nationality' shall be dissolved in the processes of integration?"

The question is fundamental to the whole problem of these defense organizations. To defend a "Jewish people" concept requires one kind of treatment. To defend average individuals who are of the Jewish faith unencumbered with the incubus of such separateness implies another kind of treatment and different chances of success or failure. But there can be no possible defense of both concepts at the same time, for they represent two different worlds. And any defense program, to be successful, must be supplemented among Jews themselves with a program designed to lead Jews toward the life-pattern that the defense organization elects to defend. Until the defense organizations courageously meet and make this choice, they will win nothing new and may be unable to prevent the loss of that which already exists by way of equal status.

And what is true of defense programs is true of any

other program affecting Jews. Zionists know this. They are tireless in their efforts to create a Jewish state. They are equally tireless in their efforts to fulfill Herzl's command to "capture the Jewish communities." Defense, relief, education—all must fit into their pattern.

But if emancipation is really to succeed, integrated Jews must meet the challenge of Jewish nationalism on a scale and with a program vigorous enough to overcome the fifty years of default and underestimation that have allowed Jewish nationalists to dominate the situation and create the inevitable discords and distrusts.

The history of the Jews who came to the United States destroys another myth originated and sustained by the protagonists of a "Jewish people." Repeatedly, throughout emancipation, "official" Jews opposed integration and, sometimes, even equal rights because they contended that without "the Jewish people" Judaism would die. There is, however, nothing whatever in the history of average Americans of Jewish faith to support that theory. The earliest immigrants were completely unaware of a "Jewish people," yet Judaism flourished. In fact, a renewal of strength was demonstrated by a Judaism stripped of its trappings of "Jewish nationhood." With no exercise of force, without the intervention of a hierarchy, the immigrants formed congregations on an entirely voluntary basis. American Jewry has never had any "chief rabbis" and, until fairly recent years, no "official" Jewry. In such unqualified freedom, Jewish congregations were formed across the nation. Judaism flourished and, led by the transplanted disciples of Mendelssohn, produced an interpretation of Judaism designed for a new and freer world.

An even more important phenomenon developed. There have been noticeable numbers of converts to Judaism. The official manual of the liberal rabbinate in America contains a ritual for such conversion.

The striking historic significance of this fact is that

there has been no such noticeable conversions to Judaism since the days of the Roman Empire. In Rome, as in the United States, Jews were just human beings who followed a religion called Judaism. There was no separate, segregated "Jewish people." "Official" Jews, so pessimistic about the future of Judaism, if Jews became simply a religious denomination after the Mendelssohn pattern, might pause to consider the importance of this fact. Perhaps they will come to see that insistence upon "Jewish peoplehood" and "nationality" is a liability.

The operation in the United States of the complete emancipation formula also led to a progressive expression of Judaism known as Reform Judaism.

The origin of American Reform Judaism goes back to the Mendelssohn era of Germany. Inspired by Mendelssohn's example, a number of Jews determined to purify Judaism of its medieval, separatist characteristics. Among these was Israel Jacobson, of Seesen. In 1810, Jacobson built at his own expense the first Reform Temple. As part of the adaptations of Judaism to modern life, Jacobson introduced an organ, and prayers in the vernacular. When Jacobson moved to Berlin in 1815, he carried on the process of emancipating Judaism for integrated Jews.

Thus, the Mendelssohn program was extended beyond its original application to translation of the Scriptures. The extension brought the same reaction from "official" Jews as the translation of the Bible had provoked. Since "official" Jews sought to retain the church-state relationship for Jews, they had no hesitancy about going to the government. They consciously injected Judaism as a political issue into the already complex problem of emancipation. Frederick William III, King of Prussia, was only too ready to join hands with anti-integrationist Jews. He believed the de-nationalization of Judaism was a "revolutionary" plot, a step toward freedom. Therefore, the Prussian king ordered Jacobson's synagogue closed.

An associate of Jacobson went to Hamburg, where

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another Reform Temple was started. Here a new prayer-book was written, for use by Reform Jews. That "official" Jewry and workers for full emancipation of Jews were at cross purposes is evidenced in the elimination from the prayer-book of such statements as, "make us go upright to our land" and "bring near our scattered ones and our dispersed ones from the ends of the earth." These rejections of the "Palestine-fixation" brought forth the usual charges of heresy.

Important in this story is the truth that "the change of forms" represented "the deliberate rejection of Jewish nationalism and the enthusiastic acceptance of complete solidarity with Gentiles in the building up in freedom and justice of a modern Commonwealth, in which distinctions of creed and racial origin would be transcended by the conception of the common humanity of its citizens."

Reform Judaism failed to realize its objective in a Germany devoted to the pseudo-romantic blood-race theories. After 1848, many of its followers came to America. Here, in a free atmosphere, these disciples of Mendelssohn found opportunity to develop the emancipation program.

Reform Judaism in America was largely the creation of the dynamic leadership of an immigrant from Bavaria, Rabbi Isaac M. Wise. Through a tireless half century of effort, he founded and directed a religious revival which was at the same time designed to integrate Jews into the American scene. The Hebrew Union College, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations and the Central Conference of American Rabbis were monuments to his vision and ability. The Union represents the organized laymen of American Reform, the Conference represents the organized Reform rabbis of America, and the College, the institution to educate rabbis for leadership in this modern Judaism.

Wise saw Jewish nationalism as the chief, internal obstacle to emancipation. This is evidenced in almost every line of his voluminous writings. In 1883, he wrote:

"If Miss Emma Lazarus and others who handle a pen would lay aside their romantic notions of race, nation, Holy Land, Restoration, etc., and assist those practical heads in scratching out of their brains the pervert notions of distinction between a man and a citizen who believes in Moses and the Prophets, and another who believes in Jesus and his Apostles, they could render good service to their co-religionists and to the cause of humanity. . . . We, citizens of the United States who believe in Moses and the Prophets, are an integral element of this nation . . . with no earthly interests or aspirations different from those who believe in Jesus and his Apostles."

In 1871, Dr. Wise rejected Palestine as the answer to the persecution of Jews in Central and Eastern Europe. Again, he properly contrasted emancipation with Jewish nationalism. Addressing himself to well-meaning Christians who suggested evacuation of Russian and Romanian Jews to Palestine, Dr. Wise wrote:

"All these benevolent gentlemen, we have no doubt, meant it well and are perfectly earnest in their philanthropic projects. . . . The practicability of those projects seems to be quite doubtful to our mind. . . . The final redemption of Israel can be brought about only by the final redemption of the Gentiles. . . . What we want to impress first and foremost on the noble philanthropists is, that we want no new nationality created, and no old one restored, no sectionalism and no particularism in any temporal affairs; we want the equality and solidarity of mankind."

In 1897, upon the close of the First Zionist Congress, Isaac M. Wise spoke his mind on Herzl and Zionism in no mincing terms.

"The false Messiahs who appeared from time to time among the dispersed and suffering remnants of Judah had no religious purpose in view; all of them were political demagogues or patriotic fantasists with as much religious zeal as was deemed requisite to agitate the Jewish mind and to win the good will of the masses and its leaders for the proposed

political end, which was the restoration of the Jewish nationality and the conquest of Palestine. All of them failed miserably and left behind them plenty of misery for their thoughtless followers. And yet with that warning of history before them, the party of men called Zionists and the admirers of Dr. Herzl's *Judenstadt*, propose to do the same thing over in our days. . . . We cannot afford to let it go out into the world that we are in sympathy with a cause which we know will ultimately result in harm to the Jews even in this country. Already many of the journals of this land are making capital out of this thing, and it becomes us to put a stop to this movement at least so far as we Americans are concerned, right in its incipiency. *We denounce the whole question of a Jewish State as foreign to the spirit of the modern Jew of this land, who looks upon America as his Palestine and whose interests are centered here.*" (My italics.)

And in 1899, with prophetic foresight, Wise saw that only a vigorous, anti-nationalist effort, encompassing projects of relief and rehabilitation, would save garden-variety Jews from being engulfed in the unchallenged march of Zionism. In the *Hebrew Union College Journal*, he wrote:

"If any of them [Jews] want to carry out the original plan of assisting the poor of Israel in the lands of barbarism, turn them to agriculture and the practical arts, they must construct another organization, one which every intelligent and charitable citizen can support without bringing upon himself the odium of being a traitor, a hypocrite or a fantastic fool whose thoughts, sentiments and actions are in constant contradiction to one another."

Inspired by such leadership, a convention of Reform Rabbis met in Pittsburgh in 1885, to formulate a code of principles for the new expression of Judaism. The so-called Pittsburgh Platform declared:

"We consider ourselves no longer a nation but a religious community. And therefore expect neither a return to Palestine, nor a sacrificial worship under the administration of the sons of Aaron, nor the restoration of any of the laws concerning the Jewish state."

For almost fifty years, with this platform as its basis, Reform fought off Jewish nationalism in the American scene. It protested against the Balfour Declaration. It was careful to limit the meaning of the concept of "a Jewish people" to "a religious people." With that viewpoint the movement grew, expanded and set the pattern for the development of other interpretations of Judaism, drawing them slowly out of their ghetto shells and pointing for them the way to integration.

But gradually the policy of ignoring Zionism as impractical and of accepting its fait-accompli diplomacy prevailed. Reform, like other liberal movements, became self-satisfied. It should have worked among the East European Jews who came here in large numbers, not only in the realm of religion, but in the practical, tangible problems of adaptation. It should have become a teacher and guide for the integration of the new immigrants. Their acceptance of the theology of Reform would have followed inevitably.

But Reform failed to do this. It began to swing in the orbit of synthetic Zionism. It set out on a policy of winning the new immigrants by sacrificing the essence of Reform. It failed to reject the Balfour Declaration. By 1935, the inertia of the preceding generation made it possible for three Zionist Reform Rabbis to introduce a resolution into the Central Conference of American Rabbis, stating that "the Central Conference of American Rabbis takes no official stand on the subject of Zionism." In 1937, the Conference went further and tacitly endorsed synthetic Zionism in a new platform of Reform Judaism, designed to supplant the Pittsburgh Platform. In 1942, Dr. James Heller, one of the sponsors of the 1935 "neutrality" resolution, as President of the Conference, ruled that a resolution supporting "a Jewish army"—obviously a nationalistic expression and strategy—was not in violation of the agreement of 1935. The Conference, at a stormy session, passed such an endorsement. And in 1943, the Conference declared that there was no incompatibility between Reform Judaism and Zionism. Thus a cycle was completed. The last, great source

of opposition to Jewish nationalism—an opposition deriving from liberal religion—had succumbed to the relentless pressure of the Zionists. The last chance of a formidable opponent meeting Jewish nationalism with a policy of integration was apparently lost.

Where were the average Jews all this time? Why did they not lift voice in protest? Many did. But the voices were disorganized and therefore could be safely ignored. Many followed in the confusion of "non-Zionism." They stood mute and bewildered before this emphasis of Jewish nationalism. They merely said, "Not I. I am different." Many no longer knew what Zionism really was, for Zionism had appropriated to itself the virtue of philanthropy, religion and the claim of a "practical" solution to the "Jewish problem." Many believed they could be Zionists while rejecting "Jewish nationality" and "a Jewish state." Many who saw the processes of integration hampered by Zionism felt that, if the trend continued, they would discard their attachments to Judaism. They will attempt to integrate by complete assimilation, if denied a Judaism itself designed for integration.

Had these puzzled Jews been in Washington in February, 1944, they might have found a way out of the dilemma in the program presented by the American Council for Judaism, an organization, at that time less than a year old. After five months of effort, it had won 2500 members, not a large number in terms of America's five million Jews, but significant, because they had determined to fight the backward concept of "Jewish nationhood" with an aggressive program of integration. The Council's validity is based not on its numerical size, but on its central, motivating idea, the only working concept born of the hopeful heritage of the historic process of emancipation and integration.*

In the winter of 1941-'42 the Central Conference of

* By July of 1945 the Council membership had increased to 8,000. This, after two and a half years of effort, equaled the membership of the Zionist Organization of America in 1932 after it had expended 40 years of effort in the American scene.

American Rabbis had endorsed the campaign to organize a Jewish Army. The event indicated the capitulation of the leadership of Reform Judaism to Jewish nationalism. It was therefore no accident that in June, 1943, a number of dissenting members of the Conference met at Atlantic City to consider their course of action. The meeting was very largely the result of the efforts of Dr. Louis Wolsey, a rabbi of Philadelphia. During the sessions I had the pleasure of describing, in some detail, a program of education in anti-nationalism and integration with which I had experimented, upon a small scale, in Flint, Michigan. Thereafter, there were two developments. A Lay-Rabbinic Committee, with Dr. Morris Lazaron of Baltimore as Chairman, was organized, to explore the possibilities of interesting laymen in improving the plan with which I had experimented in Flint and developing it into a national program. The sessions also produced a public statement, which was subsequently signed by ninety of the Reform Rabbis of America and England. The statement declared:

"... (1) We believe that the present tragic experiences of mankind abundantly demonstrate that no single people or group can hope to live in freedom and security when their neighbors are in the grip of evil forces either as perpetrators or sufferers. . . . To this general rule the problems of our Jewish people constitute no exception. . . .

"(2) We declare our unwavering faith in the humane and righteous principles that underlie the democratic way of life, principles first envisaged by the prophets of Israel and embodied in our American Bill of Rights. In keeping with these principles we hold that the Jewish people have the same right to live securely anywhere in the world and to enjoy the fruit of their labor in peace as have men of every other faith and historic background. We fervently hope and earnestly trust that in the coming peace programs that right will be fully recognized, unequivocally expressed, and inextricably woven into the texture of the new world order.

"(3) Realizing how dear Palestine is to the Jewish soul, and how important Palestinian rehabilitation is to-

wards relieving the pressing problems of our distressed people, we stand ready to render unstinted aid to our brethren in their economic, cultural and spiritual endeavors in that country. . . . We cannot but believe that Jewish nationalism tends to confuse our fellowmen about our place and function in society and also diverts our own attention from our historic rôle to live as a religious community wherever we may dwell. . . . The maladjustments of society and the consequent sufferings are at bottom due to man's forgetfulness of the elementary decencies and virtues and to the violation of moral and spiritual principles that have universal validity. It is incumbent therefore, upon all of us, Jews and non-Jews alike, to stress to the utmost in thought, word and deed those teachings of our own religion that are all-inclusive, if we would permanently correct the evils that so often bring suffering to mankind."

This statement was an admirable reflection of the Lessing-Mendelssohn formula. It clearly set forth the concept of equality of rights and responsibilities which constitutes the essence of emancipation.

The statement aroused interest. From all over the United States, Americans of Jewish faith sent encouraging letters.

But once more "official" Jewry followed its historic way. The Atlantic City statement was condemned and denounced by a Zionist controlled leadership. Charges of "traitors," "Quislings," " betrayers," were thundered from the pulpits of America and filled the columns of the Jewish press. The ghost of Herzl marched on. The old epithet "Protest Rabbis" was revived. Charges of "disunity" clouded the issues. No one remembered the unapologetic shattering of "unity" admitted by de Haas and Gottheil, in the early days of Zionism. The ninety rabbis were "excommunicated." And from the old bastions of integration not a word of public encouragement was forthcoming. Neither the Union of American Hebrew Congregations nor the American Jewish Committee spoke a word of approbation.

Yet, encouraged by the response of individual Jews, the Lay-Rabbinic Committee called a meeting of like-minded laymen and rabbis in New York. The meeting was small, but enthusiastic. Distinguished "non-Zionists" were on hand in some strength. From many of them came fervent, private words of approval. At this meeting, the American Council for Judaism was born.

In April, 1943, Lessing J. Rosenwald accepted the Presidency of the American Council for Judaism. On August 31, 1943, it published its official *Statement of Principles*. The Statement declared that:

"For countless generations, 'Hear, O Israel, The Lord Our God, the Lord is One,' has been the universal cry that has united all Jews in trial and tribulation, in suffering, hunger and want, in despair—and in achievement. It is still the concept which distinguishes Jews as a religious group.

"Racist theories and nationalistic philosophies, that have become prevalent in recent years, have caused untold suffering to the world and particularly to Jews. Long ago they became obsolete as realities in Jewish history. . . .

"As Americans of Jewish faith we believe implicitly in the fundamentals of democracy, rooted, as they are, in moralities that transcend race and state, and endow the individual with rights for which he is answerable only to God. We are thankful to be citizens of a country and to have shared in the building of a nation conceived in a spirit which knows neither special privilege nor inferior status for any man.

"For centuries Jews have considered themselves nationals of those countries in which they have lived. . . . Those countries in which Jews have lived have been their homes; those lands their homelands. . . . American Jews hope that in the peace for which all of us pray, the old principle of minority rights will be supplanted by the more modern principle of equality and freedom for the individual. . . .

"As a result of the bigotry, sadism, and ambitions for world conquest of the Axis powers, millions of our co-religionists who had homes in, and were nationals of, other

lands have been violently deported and made victims of indescribable barbarism. . . .

"The plight of those Jews together with millions of oppressed fellowmen of all faiths, calls for the profoundest sympathy and the unbounded moral indignation of all free men. The restoration of these broken lives to the status and dignity of men endowed by God with inalienable rights is one of the primary objectives of the peace to come as expressed in the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms of President Roosevelt. . . . By relying upon the broad, religious principles inherent in a democracy and implementing them wherever possible, we join our forces with those of all lovers of freedom, strengthened in that we do not stand segregated and alone upon exclusive demands. . . .

"For our fellow Jews we ask only this: Equality of rights and obligations with their fellow-nationals. . . .

"Palestine has contributed in a tangible way to the alleviation of the present catastrophe in Jewish life by providing a refuge for a part of Europe's persecuted Jews. We hope it will continue as one of the places for such resettlement, for it has been clearly demonstrated that practical colonizing can be done, schools and universities built, scientific agriculture extended, commerce intensified and culture developed. This is the record of achievement of eager, hard-working settlers who have been aided in their endeavors by Jews all over the world, in every walk of life and thought.

"We oppose the effort to establish a national Jewish state in Palestine or anywhere else as a philosophy of defeatism, and one which does not offer a practical solution of the Jewish problem. We dissent from all these related doctrines that stress the racialism, the nationalism and the theoretical homelessness of the Jews. We oppose such doctrines as inimical to the welfare of Jews in Palestine, in America, or wherever Jews may dwell. We believe that the intrusion of Jewish national statehood has been a deterrent in Palestine's ability to play an even greater rôle in offering a haven for the oppressed, and that without the insistence upon such a statehood, Palestine would today be harboring more refugees from Nazi terror. . . .

"Palestine is a part of Israel's religious heritage, as it is a part of the heritage of two other religions of the world. We look forward to the ultimate establishment of a demo-

cratic, autonomous government in Palestine, wherein Jews, Moslems and Christians shall be justly represented, every man enjoying equal rights and sharing equal responsibilities, a democratic government in which our fellow Jews shall be free Palestinians whose religion is Judaism, even as we are Americans whose religion is Judaism."

Nowhere, in all of the many "official" organizations of Americans of Jewish faith, had anyone made such an unambiguous statement of faith in emancipation and integration.

Despite the positive assertion that Jews wanted only "equality of rights and obligations with their fellow-nationals," the statement and the organization issuing it were denounced as "negative." Despite the fact that the Council sought the extension of democracy and emancipation to Palestine it was condemned as being anti-Palestinian.

The statement was made public during the sessions of the American Jewish Conference which was demanding, in the name of all Jews, special and preferential treatment for Jews in the control of immigration into Palestine and postponement of self-government in that country until, by such preferential treatment, Jews should constitute a majority.

Men of good-will might well compare these two programs. The one asked for the extension of the ideals of the liberal, democratic revolutions to Jews everywhere, Palestine included. It sought to normalize the status of the Jew in terms of the process of emancipation and integration, as part of the fabric of western life. The emphasis throughout the Council's statement was on the individual human being. It was a statement designed in the pattern of "one world."

The other program demanded privileges for "the Jewish people." What was this but the inflation into a world pattern of the humiliating privilege of the "protected Jew" bestowed upon Mendelssohn by the patronizing Prussian King, two hundred years before! Only now, Jewish nationalists sought such special privileges from a whole world, in behalf of a whole "Jewish people." Once again, Jews appeared before the world,

limping between the stubbornly-dying past and the dimly perceptible future.

In 1944, pressure mounted upon the British Government for a modification of the discriminating legislation in the White Paper of 1939. The American Council for Judaism interpreted its principles in terms of opposition to the White Paper in these words:

“. . . This official document, [the White Paper of 1939] having taken cognizance of the tense situation created by two conflicting nationalist aspirations, attempts a resolution of the problem by proposals that include the stoppage of immigration of Jews into Palestine after a fixed quota of immigration has been exhausted and restrictions on their further acquisition of land in that country.

“We of the American Council for Judaism record our unqualified opposition to those provisions. In behalf of the substantial section of American Jews whose views on Jewish problems coincide with ours, we petition our Government to use its best offices to prevail upon the British Government not to proceed with so prejudicial and unjust a policy.

“We base our attitude on this fundamental fact: that proposals which exclude Jews, as Jews, from right of entry and restrict Jews, as Jews, from the acquisition of land, do violence to the fundamental concept of democratic equality and thus to the very purposes and ideals to which the United Nations are pledged.

“The American Council for Judaism is dedicated to the view that Jews, a religious community, shall have, as of right and not on sufferance, full equality all over the world. . . . This means equality in the countries in which we live and choose to remain; equality to return to those lands from which Jews have been forcibly driven; equality to migrate wherever there is an opportunity for migration.

“We stand at a cross-roads of decision, at a time of indescribable tragedy for our co-religionists in Axis Europe. Are we to be occupied with the creation of a Jewish National State? Or are we to be concerned with human lives, the lives of harassed and driven Jews?

“We believe it a crucial wrong to confuse the two.

One is a contention for a political ideology. The other is a battle for the elementary rights of men."

And finally, in February of 1944, when Zionists succeeded in introducing resolutions supporting "a Jewish Commonwealth" into the Foreign Affairs Committee of the United States Congress, the Council sought to represent the viewpoint of emancipated Jews during the hearings held on these resolutions. Appearing at the hearings, Mr. Rosenwald pointed out:

"The text of the Resolution calls upon the United States to use its good offices for two purposes. I ask you to note that there are *two* purposes, that they are distinct and different and they are, therefore, properly subject to different reactions.

"One part of the Resolution calls for taking 'appropriate measures to the end that the doors of Palestine shall be open for the free entry of Jews.' I do not wish here to linger over the phrasing of this part of the Resolution. I do want to say that the purpose of this part of the Resolution is plainly humanitarian, consistent with American humanitarian traditions and characteristic of our desire to expand democratic processes wherever they can be expanded.

"We are, therefore, in hearty accord with the purpose of the first part of the resolution. We feel that it seeks to express the profound and invaluable sympathy of the American people for those driven from their lands by tyranny and terror.

"There is, however, a second section of the Resolution on which I feel obliged to convey to you, frankly and fully, our questions and our doubts as to its wisdom. It now reads, ' . . . so that the Jewish people may ultimately reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth. . . .'

"This is no longer designed to serve a solely humanitarian purpose. This brings you, and—through you—the American people at once into a field of international controversy and into a subject that has deeply divided the Jewish community in this country.

"The proposal, you will note, speaks of the establishment of a free and democratic 'Jewish' commonwealth.

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I stress the word 'Jewish.' It does not say the establishment of a free and democratic 'commonwealth.' It specifically uses the word 'Jewish,' a word which has essentially a religious connotation only, although it has been used in a racial sense by the Nazi enemies of the Jews and democracy.

"But the concept of the theocratic state is long past. . . . The concept of a racial state—the Hitlerian concept—is repugnant to the civilized world, as witness the fearful global war in which we are involved. . . . I urge that we do nothing to set us back on the road to the past. To project at this time the creation of a Jewish state or commonwealth is to launch a singular innovation in world affairs which might well have incalculable consequences.

"I ask you to look at your present Resolution again and, especially, at that part of it which reads, ' . . . so that the *Jewish people* may ultimately reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic commonwealth.'

"The language of the Resolution thus makes 'the Jewish people' the agency for the establishment of a free and democratic commonwealth. Here are some serious considerations on that section:

"The population in Palestine is made up of Christian, Mohammedan and Jew. I believe you will agree with me that true democratic developments in that country can only come about as the result of the efforts and with the participation of all of the elements of the population. *All* of Palestine must share in the establishment of a democracy. Any exclusion is undemocratic in character and defeats the very purpose that your Resolution may seek to achieve.

"Moreover, the language of the Resolution places the responsibility for creating a commonwealth at the door of 'Jewish people,' presumably those outside of Palestine as well as those in Palestine. . . .

"The 'Jewish people' are not organized politically, are not and do not want to be a political unit. They are nationals, loyal citizens, of the various countries in which they live. They are to be found in all classes, in all political parties, in all economic levels. . . . Jews in the United States and the world over, not being a national group but essentially a religious community, it is clear that *they cannot assume responsibility anywhere as a political unit*. . . .

"I earnestly commend these views for your consideration. I believe that your own compassionate purposes will be fully served by retaining only the first part of the Resolution or by modifying its second provision so that it reads as follows: . . . and that there shall be full opportunity for colonization in Palestine, ultimately to be constituted a free and democratic commonwealth."

Dr. Wolsey, also testifying for the Council's position, added,

"Is it too much to ask that as Americans we help advance a program whereby Jews shall enjoy equality as citizens of the countries from which they were forcibly driven by the Nazi conqueror, and enjoy equal rights to migrate wherever there is opportunity for migration and settlement?

"Shall we say to the Catholic Pole who fought side by side with the Polish Jew against the Nazi oppressor, to the Dutch clergyman who sheltered the Dutch Jew from the Gestapo at the risk of his life, to the French peasant who fed his Jewish fellow-citizens in a secret hideout, to all those myriads of Europeans freed from the Nazi incubus, that the national home of their fellow Jews is elsewhere, that their will is not to rebuild in the land of their ancient domiciles, but to escape somewhere into a projected Jewish commonwealth?

"Or shall we say, 'Hitler and all his evil works shall not endure. Europe can now create for all its peoples, without regard to religion, a society of decency, democracy and equality. And if some must seek homes elsewhere out of the eternal quest for greater opportunity, let it be done with no distinction on grounds of religion.'

Dr. Lazaron's testament to faith in emancipation said, in part,

"I believe that the reconstruction of the Holy Land can be promoted only through the cooperation of the racial, national and religious groups that live there, and I believe that the passage of this resolution will not create the conditions for such cooperation."

And in the statement of Dr. William H. Fineshriber of Philadelphia, the Council's principles were expressed with these words:

"... What is this puzzling attempt to 'reconstitute a Jewish Commonwealth' if it does not mean setting back the clock two thousand years?

"For there was such a Commonwealth up to about two thousand years ago, a state like other states, only smaller and perhaps more helpless. During its history, it went through all of the vicissitudes of political structures; it had its conquest, it was in turn conquered more than once; it laid tribute upon others, it in turn paid tribute to other countries. It fought wars, it had internal strife, civil war, dissensions, political upheavals, and finally, the enmity of its neighbors swept over it and the Jewish nation was obliterated.

"One thing only survived; one thing that was greater than the nation and because it was greater, could hope to endure through the millennia that followed. . . . Out from among these people came the vision of the Oneness of God and, consonant with that, of the eternal brotherhood of man. . . .

"The first part of your Resolution is consistent with the spirit of the statement by that great American, our Secretary of State, the Honorable Cordell Hull, who said that we must have a world in which Jews, like all others, 'are free to abide in peace and honor.' By that worthy standard, I appeal to you in behalf of the purpose of the first part of the Resolution. And as a teacher of an ancient faith, I ask you not to blur the shining lustre of that appeal for equality by injecting complex, secular, confused and deeply controversial elements such as are found in the second part of your Resolution."

These four men who sat at that committee table, representing a young organization were not important, in and of themselves. Five months of work had made only a dent in the ghetto walls being raised by Jewish nationalism. But the idea they translated in terms of opposition to the proposed resolution, was important; the idea of freedom, of the integration

of individual men, of the destiny of men and women who were Jews, as opposed to the warped concepts of a race-church-state and a "Jewish people."

I said in the first chapter of this book that I was more interested in what average Jews wanted to be rather than in what they had been, and more interested in how they might be what they wanted to be than in why they had failed. I have had to tell a good deal of history to arrive at the point where I could keep that word.

I think I may now fulfill my primary interest and answer the college professor's letter which led me to write.

I am firmly convinced that Jews want only what the American Council for Judaism set forth in one simple sentence: "For our fellow Jews we ask only this: Equality of rights and obligations with their fellow-nationals."

Except for a few "official" Jews, I have never met a Jew who, on self-analysis, wants anything more or who will ever be satisfied with anything less. If some Jews seem to want more, I believe it is because they have been confused by Jewish nationalism. As an escape from confusion, many feign indifference to a problem they do not fully understand. They repeat the sin of all those who have tried to effect a compromise between these two ways of life, representing two different worlds. They commit the unforgiveable sin of free men in abdicating freedom by refusing to inform themselves and make the moral choice which freedom constantly demands. Evading this choice is the active sin of synthetic Zionism and the passive sin of "non-Zionism."

Thus far I have written only of the concept of emancipation as an historic idea and process. The story would be incomplete without some recording of its practical effect upon the lives of ordinary people of Jewish faith.

What has been achieved for such men and women in two centuries during which time the Lessing-Mendelssohn process has been consciously tried as a solution to the Jewish problem? Part of the answer to that question is to be found

in Part I, in the stories of citizens of Jewish faith in many countries of the Western World. But the full significance of the results of emancipation can be realized only when certain pre-emancipation facts about Jews are compared with present day conditions.

In the matter of bare survival, for example, the population statistics tell an interesting story. The proportion of Jews to the world population in the middle of the seventeenth century was about two-tenths of one per cent. There were at the most about one million Jews in all the world. In 1936, after a century and a half of emancipation, the sixteen million Jews represented something like eight-tenths of one per cent of the world population. The 650,000 Jews of seventeenth century Europe alone had increased to ten million.

Of these sixteen millions in 1936, well over ten million lived in freedom and security guaranteed by law, in established modern states. Hitlerism, and the accelerating decline of Central and Eastern Europe into the abyss of war and reaction, aggravated the position of perhaps five million Jews. But all of history makes it clear that if the war to destroy Hitlerism is to be truly won, those of the five million who will survive must find peace, security and opportunity in the very places where it was made impossible for them to live.

In the seventeenth century Jews were largely restricted in residence to a few places in Central and Eastern Europe. Today, after a century and a half of the doctrine of the right to migrate upon a basis of equality, Jews are to be found all over the world. A continuance of the equality which a free world and emancipation implies will enable them to move with the normal movements of populations, or remain in peace and security in their native lands.

Emancipation has allowed people who are Jews to forsake the petty trading to which medieval life restricted them. In America there are over 100,000 Jewish farmers. There are perhaps another 100,000 in Palestine and many thousands more in Russia. While economic discrimination exists in too many

places even in the free nations, Jews are diversified in their economic occupations and generally find opportunities in all fields, from captains of industry to labor organizers, from the sciences to the arts.

Moreover, emancipation has justified Lessing's faith as an essential to the health of all society. It has given the world of Einsteins, its Ochs, its Gershwins, its Rothschilds, and many others who have enriched and completed our lives.

The Lessing-Mendelssohn formula is not yet completed. In an advancing world, there can be no anomaly of a "post-emancipation era," such as is described by the Zionists. And in a large sense, the formula will never be completed as long as there are human beings hoping that tomorrow will be better than today, and striving to realize their hopes—just as one cannot say that democracy or human society will ever be a finished, static thing.

Dr. Hans Kohn, one of the world's foremost authorities on the subject of nationalism, recently wrote these words:

"... It is fashionable today on the part of Nazis and even of some Jews to deny the efficacy and success of emancipation. But this emancipation is very young; it came at a comparatively recent date in Germany and even more recently in Eastern Europe. It is only a few decades old—if so old even—and in view of the fact that it had to overcome deep-rooted prejudices of centuries on both sides, this emancipation (often called assimilation) has been highly successful—a great credit to the different peoples and to the Jews who became integrated into the political, economic, cultural and—to some degree—social life of the countries in which they lived. Emancipation has been one of the greatest achievements in the struggle of humanity and liberty against age-old superstitions, segregation and exclusiveness. . . . There is no reason for despair. . . . America as a nation has always been singled out as looking to the future, a future of common freedom and progress, not like the German nationalists, to the past, which divides group from group and romantically longs for the restoration of a past of centuries ago. It was a typically American saying by Lincoln: 'I do not care who

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my grandparents were, but only what my grandchildren will be.' In this common free and united society of America the Jews can play their rôle only when they live untrammeled and unhampered. In America, accustomed to cultural and religious diversities, we can live primarily as Americans, putting the future ahead of the past. . . ."

And Dr. Kohn is right. As I write these closing lines, Mussolini lies in a pauper's grave. Hitler is reported dead in the charred ruins of the Reichstag building where twelve years ago his henchmen kindled a fire that set the whole world ablaze. In San Francisco earnest, consecrated men of forty-six nations are designing the plan for a new world. The irresistible power of free men is bringing Japan to her knees.

Today our military supremacy makes it possible for all men to choose whether they are to remain victims of the tragic forces of their past or architects of new patterns of life for a better world. Human beings of the Jewish faith cannot escape this choice. Jews cannot have their cake and eat it too. They cannot have full equality of rights and responsibilities—as individuals in a world founded upon individual rights—while, at the same time, they support either aggressively or by silence and default a program that calls Jews an indissoluble minority and asks the world for special rights for such a group. The old era of compromise between two worlds is as dead as the era of Mr. Neville Chamberlain. The age of "non-Zionism" is past.

This was made unmistakably clear in a recent declaration of policy by Hubert Ripka, Minister of State in the Czechoslovakian government that has returned to the soil of its liberated country to reconstruct its nation's life. Mr. Ripka said:

It goes without saying that Czechoslovak citizens of Jewish extraction are in all things, completely and without reservations, legally equal citizens of the Republic. . . . If we understand, as a matter of fact, that the Jews will have equal rights with the non-Jews, there will be no possibility

of renewing in liberated Czechoslovakia the status of national minorities as existed to the year 1938. It will not be possible to recognize special national rights even for the Jewish minority as for some sort of national group. . . .

"As far as Zionists are concerned, it already follows from our viewpoint which is in principle favorable to the national Zionist movement, that Zionists will naturally have as in the past, the possibility of leaving for Palestine and that Czechoslovak official authorities will, with friendly understanding, help toward the accomplishment of their plan, the goal of which is to organize the emigration of Zionists, living in Czechoslovakia, to their national state." (My italics.)

The choice will be set forth elsewhere as the world is rebuilt. Australia rejected a program of Jewish colonization along collective, group lines. The statement of rejection was accompanied by an offer for "normal" immigration of Jews; that is for Jews as individuals of the Jewish faith.

These next few formative years, therefore, are a time of decision for Jews, as for all men. Jews may no longer think of themselves, or ask a world to think of them, as a "nation" in suspension; refusing to apply to their lives the Mendelssohn half of the Lessing-Mendelssohn formula. They may not forever evade the choice and perpetuate their dilemma. With zeal and energy equal to the task, Jews must now free themselves of the distorted concept of a world-wide "Jewish people." The hopefulness of a better world looks to an extension of the American dream. That dream will not fail; it must not. And human beings of the Jewish faith share that dream. Freed from tyranny within and without their lives as Jews, they will cut through the historic confusion about themselves and there will arise a generation of Jews accepting their religious heritage as normal. Then and only then will they be free to walk anywhere—and not just a single plot of ghetto ground—with the full dignity befitting men.

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KEEP CARD IN POCKET

Date Due

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